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ABSTRACT
NATHANIEL P. SHARADIN: Understanding Reasons.
(Under the direction of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord and Simon Blackburn)
Normative thinking – thinking about what to do, what to believe, how to feel, and so on
– is sometimes very complicated. Reasons, it seems to me, represent the best conceptual
device we have for thinking about what actions one should do, what beliefs one should
have, how one ought to feel, and so on. But the nature of reasons themselves is sometimes
opaque. This dissertation comprises four papers, each of which focuses in a different way
on the nature of reasons. Here I’ll say a bit about how each paper relates to the others.
In “Structuralism about Reasons” I lay out a view about reasons – structuralism – that
I find attractive. I show how structuralism about reasons remains neutral on substantive
normative views about the content of the reasons – what reasons there are – while offering
an informative account of their nature – what reasons are. In this way, structuralism is
designed to be acceptable to a wide range of philosophers who care about reasons.
“ReasonsWrong and Right” addresses the problem of distinguishing different kinds of
reasons for actions and attitudes. I argue that the distinction between the so-called ‘right’
and ‘wrong’ kind of reasons for an action or attitude is best understood as a distinction
between reasons that are evidence that the action or attitude conforms to a constitutive
standard of correctness and reasons that are merely evidence that the action or attitude
conforms to some (non-constitutive) standard of correctness or other. Although this view
is in principle available to anyone who wants to generate an extensionally correct view of
the distinction between the right and wrong kind of reasons, it squares especially well with
structuralism since it makes the distinction between the right and wrong kind of reasons
parasitic on a distinction between different kinds of standards of correctness.
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“Problems for Pure Probabilism (& a Disjunctive Alternative)” and “Reasons and Pro-
motion” represent my thoughts about the relationship between reasons and promotion. In
“Problems for Pure Probabilism (& a Disjunctive Alternative)” I consider the question:
What is it for an action to promote the satisfaction of a desire? I argue that probabilistic
analyses of promotion are fraught and offer an alternative account of promotion in terms
of the fit between a desire and the world that is the causal upshot of an action. I show how
this account can incorporate the insights of the probabilistic accounts without inheriting
their difficulties. In “Reasons and Promotion” I argue that, even given the account of pro-
motion defended in “Problems for Pure Probabilism,” we cannot be promotionalists about
all sorts of reasons: in particular, reasons for belief and non-doxastic attitudes like admi-
ration present problems for promotionalism. I argue that there is an alternative position
available, what I call conformationalism about reasons; conformationalism is the natural
view to have if one accepts structuralism about reasons. And it is independently attractive
because it keeps our meta-normative theorizing about what reasons are separate from our
normative theorizing about what reasons there are. Although I argue that promotionalism
about reasons quite generally is false, promotionalism about reasons for action remains
plausible.
In the appendix, “Patterns of Transmission and Wrong Kind of Reasons Skepticism,”
I consider a recent argument for wrong kind of reason skepticism, the view that the wrong
kind of reasons for attitudes are not genuine reasons for attitudes at all. Instead, according
to the skeptical view, the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes are reasons to try and get
yourself to have the relevant attitude, if you can. I show how this argument goes wrong.
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1 STRUCTURALISM ABOUT REASONS
Abstract
Anti-fundamentalists about reasons, unlike fundamentalists, think that we can give an
informative, substantive account of what reasons are. Unfortunately, anti-fundamentalists
are viciously divided amongst themselves over what that account should be. I think this
is because current anti-fundamentalist accounts of what reasons are mistakenly involve
substantive normative views about what reasons there are. In this paper I articulate an anti-
fundamentalist account of reasons that corrects this mistake, an account I call Structuralism
about reasons. I show how competing anti-fundamentalist proposals can each be factored
into Structuralism together with commitments over what the standards of correctness are
for, e.g., actions and beliefs. By way of a limited defense of the account, I argue that this
feature of Structuralism – its ability to factor competing accounts – yields two advantages
for the view.
1.1 Two Views about Reasons
Consider the relation: F is a reason for A to  . Call this three-place relation ‘R’ (for
reason relation); R can be written R(F, A,  ). There are at least two sets of disputes over
R. One set of disputes is over what can be related by R. Depending on your view, values
of F might include mental states (as when the belief that p is a reason for the belief that
q), facts (as when the fact that p is a reason for the belief that p), propositions (as when
the proposition that p is a reason for the belief that p), or some combination of these.1
Intuitively, one’s view about what the possible values of F are constitutes one’s view about
1Turri (2009) has a nice discussion of these issues.
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the ontology of reasons. There is a similar issue over what sorts of things  -ings must be
such that they can be related by R: possible values of   include attitudes (such as belief),
actions (such as taking out the trash), and emotions (such as love, or blame).2 Intuitively,
one’s view about the possible values of   constitutes one’s view about what sorts of things
are evaluable in terms of reasons. And, finally, there is a longstanding issue over what
creatures must be like in order to be be appropriately thought of in terms of reasons: that
is, over what a creature has to be like in order to be a value of A in R. That is one set of
disputes over R. Call these the extensional disputes: the extensional disputes constitute a
unified class by all being disputes over what can be appropriately related by R. I am not
concerned with the extensional disputes over R in this paper; instead, I will simply assume
that facts are the values of F, that attitudes, actions, and emotions are all possible values
of  , and that there is an account available of what a creature must be like in order to be
appropriately thought of in terms of reasons, and that this account reveals why creatures
like us are appropriately thought of in terms of reasons.
The second set of disputes over R cuts across these issues. These disputes are over
whether and how to analyze R. Fundamentalists about reasons think it is impossible to
give a non-trivial, informative analysis of R.3 According to fundamentalism about reasons,
the most we can say is that F is a reason for A to   when F ‘counts in favor’ of A’s  -ing;
so fundamentalists accept:
Counts-in-Favor: R(F, A,  ) iff F counts in favor of A’s  -ing.4
According to reasons fundamentalism, Counts-in-Favor is the best “analysis” of R we can
give. Of course, Counts-in-Favor is not an informative analysis: claiming that F ‘counts
2For an overview of issues in each of these first two areas, the essays in Reisner and Steglich-Petersen
(2011) and Sobel and Wall (2011) are particularly useful. On the rationality of the emotions, see Greenspan
(2004).
3This view is also sometimes called ‘primitivism’ about reasons. Scanlon (1998, 2009) defends such a
view. So do Parfit (2011a,b) and Dancy (2004, 2003).
4For instance, see Scanlon (1998).
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in favor’ of A’s  -ing sounds awfully like repeating the claim that F is a reason for A to
 . Fundamentalists think this is exactly right: they think we cannot say anything more
informative about what the relation is that holds between a reason and the object of the
reason such that the former ‘counts in favor’ of the latter.
Anti-Fundamentalists about reasons disagree with fundamentalists on precisely this
point. According to anti-fundamentalism about reasons, we can give a non-trivial, infor-
mative analysis of R. Particular anti-fundamentalist views differ on the details, but all anti-
fundamentalist views hold that there is a true instance of:
Informative*: R(F, A,  ) iff informatively-fill-in-the-blank.
Anti-fundamentalists are thus happy to join fundamentalists in accepting Counts-in-Favor.
Where anti-fundamentalists differ from their fundamentalist counterparts is in thinking
there is a true instance of Informative*. Anti-fundamentalists therefore owe us an answer
to the question: How should we informatively fill in the blank? Here is where things get
interesting.
There is one in-house fight among anti-fundamentalists over whether it is best to ana-
lyze reasons in terms of explanation or evidence. Some anti-fundamentalists, such as John
Broome, Stephen Finlay, and Mark Schroeder, think something is a reason just in case it
explains a certain fact.5 Others, such as Stephen Kearns, Daniel Star, Judith Thomson,
and myself, think that something is a reason just in case it is evidence for a certain fact.6
This is a fight over what sort of relation the reason relation R is, whether it is explanatory
or evidentiary. I am not going to pursue this fight here. For the purposes of this paper, I
will simply assume an evidentialist picture of reasons.7 So for the purposes of this paper,
5Broome (2004); Schroeder (2007c,a); Finlay (2006, 2010).
6Kearns and Star (2009, 2008, 2013); Thomson (2008).
7See Kearns and Star (2008) for arguments in favor of an evidentialist view of reasons. If it turns out that
an explanationist picture is correct, the view about reasons I defend here can be modified to accommodate
this discovery. The details of the argument for the view I advance here will then look somewhat different, but
the basic structure of the view will be the same.
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anti-fundamentalism should be understood as the view that accepts:
Informative: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that informatively-fill-in-the-blank.
Acceptance of Informative constitutes the only common ground among anti-fundamentalists.8
When it comes to proposals about how to go about informatively filling in the blank, anti-
fundamentalists are divided amongst themselves. For instance, Humeans say we should
informatively fill in the blank like this:
Informative-Humeanism: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing promotes
one of A’s desires.9
As an anti-fundamentalist account of what reasons are, Informative-Humeanism faces a
number of familiar challenges. I will mention two. First, Informative-Humeanism ap-
pears to be a particularly bad analysis of epistemic reasons. This is because, intuitively
at least, agents’ epistemic reasons do not depend on their desires in the way Informative-
Humeanism says they must. For instance: an agent’s epistemic reasons to believe that q do
not seem to depend for their existence on whether the agent has a desire such that that desire
would be promoted by her believing that q. Epistemic reasons, in other words, do not seem
to be instrumental reasons.10 Even if, as I suspect it might, the analysis of epistemic reasons
can be made to work, the problems with Informative-Humeanism go deeper.11 Reasons for
attitudes like admiration, envy, fear, and so on, also do not seem to be the sorts of things
that depend for their existence on whether the agent for whom there is a reason to have the
attitude has also a desire that would be promoted by having that attitude.12 For instance: an
8Again, Informative is not strictly common ground, since there is disagreement over whether reasons
explain or are evidence. But this disagreement is not relevant here.
9Although I am assuming an evidentialist picture of reasons throughout this paper, as a matter of fact
most substantivist Humeans tend to be explanationists. See, for example, Schroeder (2007c).
10Kelly (2003) levels this charge against Informative-Humean – what he calls ‘Instrumentalist’ – accounts
of epistemic reasons.
11Schroeder (2007c) and Kornblith (2002) each suggest a strategy for accounting for epistemic reasons
within an Informative-Humean framework. In Sharadin (2013a) I argue that this strategy, suitably understood,
might be successful.
12I argue for this claim at length in Sharadin (2013a).
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agent’s reason to admire her colleague seems to depend just on the admirable qualities of
her colleague, and to depend not at all on whether, by admiring her colleague, she is pro-
moting some desire of hers. This suggests, at the very least, that Informative-Humean will
not work as an analysis of all reasons: that it cannot be the correct way to informatively fill
in the blank for all instances of R.
A second, related, problem with Informative-Humeanism is that it turns out to be
quite difficult to say what, precisely, an agent’s  -ing ‘promoting’ a desire amounts to.
One natural idea is that promotion should be understood probabilistically: an agent’s  -
ing promotes some desire of hers just in case it makes the satisfaction of that desire more
probable. Indeed, among those who accept some version of Informative-Humeanism, prob-
abilism about promotion is not only the default view, it is the only view.13 But it is not clear
that probabilism about promotion is a coherent view.14 Briefly, the problem with probabil-
ism about promotion is that it is unclear what the contrast class is supposed to be, relative
to which the probability of an agent’s desire being satisfied must be increased in order for
her  -ing to count as promoting that desire. Is it ‘not- -ing’? Or ‘doing nothing’? Both an-
swers yield seriously counterintuitive results. If the answer is ‘not  -ing,’ then Informative-
Humeanism cannot explain why, given that both  -ing and  -ing would satisfy an agent’s
desire, and given that, if the agent does not  , she will  , there can be reasons for her to  .
If the answer is ‘doing nothing,’ then Informative-Humeanism cannot explain why, given
that an agent’s desire will be satisfied just in case she does nothing, there is a reason for
her to do nothing. This suggests, at the very least, that in order to constitute an informative
analysis of the reason relation, Humean anti-fundamentalism still owes us an account of
what it is for one thing (e.g., an action or attitude) to promote another (e.g., a desire).
In the face of these and other difficulties, some anti-fundamentalists abandon Humeanism
in favor of a view I will call Oughtism. Oughtism says we should informatively fill in the
13See, for instance, Schroeder (2007c) and Finlay (2010).
14Behrends and DiPaolo (2011); Evers (2009); Snedegar (2013); Sharadin (2013a).
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blank like this:
Informative-Oughtism: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A ought to  .15
Informative-Oughtism has its own problems. The most serious challenge to Informative-
Oughtism is that it seems to be extensionally inadequate. This is because, as several
philosophers have pointed out, some facts that are evidence that an agent ought to   do
not themselves constitute reasons for the agent to  .16 For instance, the fact that an agent
can   is in certain circumstances evidence that the agent ought to  , but, plausibly, the fact
that an agent is able to   is never – by itself, at least – a reason for the agent to  .17
Fundamentalists about reasons point to these problems with Humeanism and Oughtism
in order to beat up on anti-fundamentalism about reasons in general. Anti-fundamentalist
accounts of reasons such as Humeanism and Oughtism, they say, always seem to have
counter-intuitive consequences about what reasons there are. According to fundamental-
ists, this suggests that what they have been insisting on all along is correct: there is no
informative way to analyze reasons; we should give up on trying to informatively fill in the
blank. I think Fundamentalists are right about one thing, but wrong about another. They
are right that these problems with Humeanism and Oughtism are real problems. But they
are wrong that these problems indicate trouble for anti-fundamentalism about reasons in
general. Instead, I think that these problems with particular anti-fundamentalist accounts
of reasons indicate that current anti-fundamentalist accounts are being pitched at the wrong
level: Anti-fundamentalist accounts of reasons are illicitly smuggling substantive norma-
tive views about what reasons there are into their meta-normative account of what reasons
are. That is what is causing all the fuss. That is what is causing the disagreement among
15Kearns and Star (2008, 2009, 2013)
16Brunero (2009); Broome (2008); Sharadin (2013b).
17I argue that cases like this represent counterexamples to the claim that something is a reason just in case
it is evidence that an agent ought to   in Sharadin (2013b).
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anti-fundamentalists over how to informatively fill in the blank, and that is what is provid-
ing fodder to fundamentalist complaints to the effect that anti-fundamentalist accounts of
reasons are hopeless.
My idea is that, suitably purged of illicit substantive normative views, all anti-fundamentalists
can agree on one true instance of Informative; that is, all anti-fundamentalists can agree on
one meta-normative account of what reasons are. If I am right, then the in-house fights
among anti-fundamentalists both can and should be had on other grounds. And, if I am
right, then anti-fundamentalists will be able to present a united front against fundamen-
talism in offering an informative account of what reasons are. One way to think about
the aim of this paper, therefore, is as an attempt to clear more common ground for anti-
fundamentalists. I am going to argue that we can and should give an account of what
reasons are – an informative way of filling in the blank – that everyone who is an anti-
fundamentalist can sign on to. Although my main aim in this paper is simply to articulate
this account of what reasons are, I will also provide a limited defense of the account by
pointing out two ways it improves on its competitors. Here, then, is the plan for the rest of
the paper.
The first part of the paper is a proof of possibility. My goal here is to articulate a
general account of what reasons are: I will answer the question of how to informatively fill
in the blank. My goal in this part of the paper is simply to articulate the account, not to
defend it. Thus, although I think there is much to be said in favor of the account, in the first
part of the paper I will not argue in its support. Instead, I will simply present the account in
a way that, hopefully, reveals how it offers us a coherent, interesting, anti-fundamentalist
answer to the question of what reasons are. I am going to approach the issue sideways-on,
by first dealing with a different, but related topic: standards and standards of correctness.
My idea is that thinking about standards and standards of correctness reveals the natural
home of reasons, and so reveals a natural way of understanding reasons. In §2 I give an
account of how to think about standards and objects’ conformance to them. In §3 I extend
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this account to standards of correctness. In §4 I propose a way to think about reasons in
relation to standards of correctness: my idea, in brief, is that reasons are naturally thought
of as facts that bear on objects’ conformance to standards of correctness. That is the anti-
fundamentalist view about what reasons are that I call Structuralism about reasons.
In the second part of the paper I present a limited defense of Structuralism. I first argue
that competing anti-fundamentalist accounts of reasons can all be factored into Structural-
ism plus substantive normative claims about what the standards of correctness (for actions,
attitudes, and so on) are (§5.1). Then, I argue that this feature of Structuralism – its ability
to factor competing accounts of what reasons are – yields two related advantages for the
account (§5.2). As I said, this represents a limited defense of the account: it does not show
decisively that all anti-fundamentalists – let alone all fundamentalists – should be Struc-
turalists about reasons. But it does reveal unique and attractive features of the account.
1.2 Standards, Conformance, and Conformance-Indicating Facts
I said I would try and sidle up to the issue of informatively analyzing R by dealing
head-on with a different topic: standards and standards of correctness.
To begin, we need a clear way to think about standards conformance to standards. I
am going to propose a relatively simple model for thinking about what standards are, and
what conformance to standards consists in, though, as we will see, articulating even this
simple model will involve some complications. My proposal should not be taken as the
final word on what standards are, but only as a heuristic device that, hopefully, will allow
us to sharpen our thinking about the topic.
For present purposes, then, here is my suggestion: think of a standard as a set of
properties like so: {p1, p2, ... pn}. A standard can in principle comprise any number
of properties you like, including an infinite number of properties; but: the only standards
that will interest us will comprise finite numbers of properties. A standard comprises also
any sort of property you like including, but not limited to: dispositional properties, such
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as ‘being disposed to turn blue when exposed to acid;’ counterfactual properties, such as
‘being such that it would have exploded had the fuse been lit;’ relational properties, such as
‘being to the left of;’ and more ordinary properties, such as ‘being six-feet tall’. Properties
in the sense that interest us here, then, are, to use David Armstrong’s metaphor, simply the
shadows of predicates.18 Intuitively, a standard is like a list of properties, and the properties
that comprise this list are the content of the standard. So, for example, here is a standard:
Sbear: {hairy, omnivorous, sleepy in the winter}
The properties that comprise the content of Sbear are the three properties that are its mem-
bers: ‘hairy,’ ‘omnivorous,’ and ‘sleepy in the winter’.
What about conformance to a standard? Here is my suggestion: think of an object’s
conformance to a standard in terms of the object’s exhibiting the properties that comprise
the standard. A quick remark on the term ‘object’ is in order. Here and throughout I use
the term ‘object’ loosely to include anything that we can think of in terms of its properties,
including physical objects such as tables and chairs, but also including mental states such as
beliefs and desires. My use is loose in order to capture the idea (spelled out in more detail
below) that for any thing we can think about in terms of its properties, we can think about
that thing in terms of its conformance to standards. So, consider the object Harry the bear.
Suppose Harry the bear has the properties that comprise Sbear: he is hairy, omnivorous, and
sleepy in the winter. Then we can say that Harry conforms to Sbear.
It is convenient to think of conformance to a standard as something that comes in
degrees. This is so in two respects. First, an object can exhibit more or less of the properties
that make up a standard. For instance, Barry the hairless bear might exhibit the properties
of being omnivorous and sleepy in the winter without also exhibiting the property of being
18Armstrong does not endorse this deflationary picture about the nature of properties, but his character-
ization of it is useful nonetheless. See Armstrong (1989, p. 78). Here I do not take a stand on whether
the deflationary picture is the right one to have about what properties are really like. Instead, I am simply
specifying the sense of ‘property’ that will interest me here. Whether the things that I am calling ‘properties’
here turn out, in the end, to really be properties, and what, if they do, they turn out to be like, is not something
that matters at present.
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hairy. This is one dimension along which the degree of conformance to a standard can be
measured. I will call this dimension of conformance an object’s match-conformance. We
can talk of objects having higher or lower degrees of match-conformance. So: Harry has a
higher degree of match-conformance to Sbear than does Barry, because Barry lacks one of
the properties that comprise Sbear whereas Harry exhibits them all.
Second, an object can exhibit the properties that comprise a standard to a greater or
lesser degree. For instance, the property of being hairy is plausibly a property possession
of which itself comes in degrees. So objects can vary in the degree to which they conform
to a standard in terms of whether they exhibit the properties that comprise the standard to
a greater or lesser degree. For instance, Fuzzy the bear might exhibit the property of being
hairy only to a very low degree. This is the second dimension along which the degree
of conformance to a standard can be measured. I will this dimension of conformance
an object’s extent-conformance. Again, we can talk of objects having higher or lower
degrees of extent-conformance. So: Harry the very hairy bear has a higher degree of extent-
conformance to Sbear than does Fuzzy, because Fuzzy exhibits one of the properties that
comprise Sbear to a lesser degree than does Harry.
In what follows I will for the most part avoid the complications introduced by the
differences between degrees of match- and extent-conformance, and simply talk about de-
grees of conformance where the sort of conformance being measured is given by context.
But the differences between these two dimensions of conformance to a standard should be
kept in mind throughout.
The notion of conformance should not mislead: I do not mean to suggest that when we
think of an object in terms of its conformance to a standard we should think of the object
actively conforming itself to the standard, i.e., engaging in a process of trying to come to
be in accord with the standard. That can sometimes happen, of course. Barry might try
out various strategies for becoming hairy and thereby be, in some sense, “conforming”
or, better, attempting to conform with Sbear. But the central notion of conformance here
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does not concern activity. Conformance to a standard, in the sense that is relevant for our
purposes here, is wholly constituted by facts about an object’s properties and the content of
a standard.
Because, as we are thinking of it here, an object’s conformance to a standard is simply
a matter of the object’s exhibiting the properties that comprise the standard, our capacity
to think about objects in terms of their conformance to standards is flexible in two related
respects. First, we can think about a wide variety of objects in terms of a single standard.
For instance, in addition to thinking about bears like Harry, Barry, and Fuzzy in terms of
Sbear, I can also, despite its name, think about, for instance, cats, dogs, and humans in
terms of Sbear. There are some restrictions on the scope of meaningful exercises of this
capacity, however. To see this, notice that it would be a mistake to try and think of, say, a
Lamborghini Aventador (an Italian super-car) in terms of its conformance to Sbear. This is
because a Lamborghini Aventador is not the sort of object that can have the properties that
comprise Sbear: it would be a category mistake to ask whether, for instance, a Lamborghini
Aventador eats meat in addition to plants, or whether it gets sleepy in the wintertime; Italian
super-cars are not the sorts of objects for which these questions make any sense. So whereas
it is right to say that a Lamborghini Aventador ‘fails to conform’ to Sbear, this failure to
conform is different in kind from the failures to conform exhibited by, e.g., Barry and
Fuzzy. In order to mark this point, I will say that a standard is apt relative to an object
when it is possible for the object to possess the properties that comprise the standard, and
inapt otherwise.19 So, for instance, Sbear is apt relative to, among other things, bears,
cats, dogs, and humans, because it is possible for bears, cats, dogs, and humans to each
be hairy, omnivorous, and sleepy in the wintertime; this same standard is inapt relative to,
among other things, Lamborghini Aventadors, because it is not possible for Lamborghini
19That is, conceptually possible. Note that on this way of thinking, standards can be more or less apt
relative to an object corresponding to whether it is possible for the relevant object to possess more or less
of the properties that comprise the standard. For present purposes, this detail will not matter since we will
deal exclusively with standards that are perfectly apt relative to their objects, i.e., standards where all the
properties that comprise the standard are capable of being possessed by the relevant objects.
11
Aventadors to be hairy, omnivorous, or sleepy come wintertime.
One cautionary remark before moving on. As I am thinking of things, despite what the
example above might suggest, a standard’s aptness relative to an object is not a matter of
its intuitive fit with the relevant object. A standard can be apt relative to some object while
at the same time striking us as a rather strange standard in terms of which to think about an
object. For instance, it might be odd to think about Napoleon in terms of his conformance
to Sbear. Nonetheless, Sbear is apt relative to Napoleon, since it is possible for Napoleon to
exhibit the properties that comprise Sbear.
The second, related respect in which our capacity to think about objects’ conformance
to standards is flexible is that we can think about a single object in terms of its conformance
to a wide variety of standards. For instance, in addition to think about Harry in terms of
Sbear, I can also think about Harry in terms of:
Ssize: {weighs more than 200 kilos, more than a meter tall}
As before, there are the same restrictions on the scope of meaningful exercises of this
capacity: a standard can be inapt relative to some object, and so thinking about an object
in terms of its conformance to that standard can fail to be meaningful.
Bears aside, let me make one final remark on the flexibility of thinking of objects
in terms of their conformance to standards. I said above that I was using the term ‘object’
loosely, to refer to anything we can think about in terms of its properties, including medium-
sized dry goods such as tables and chairs, but also including mental states, such as beliefs
and desires, and even including actions. There might be some resistance to this idea, but I
think that resistance would be misplaced. Like tables, chairs, and other dry goods, mental
states and actions can have properties. So, for instance, the mental state of ‘believing that
it is going to rain’ can have the property of ‘being true’, or ‘being false’. Beliefs can have
other properties too, such as the property of ‘being psychologically healthy,’ or the property
of ‘being caused by a nasty bump to the head’. Actions can have properties in the relevant
sense too: an action might have the property of ‘satisfying the object of an agent’s desires,’
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or the property of ‘maximizing utility’, or a range of other properties. And for each of these
individual properties, and for some combinations of them, we can generate standards that
are apt for thinking about the objects in question. For instance, here is a standard apt for
thinking about both beliefs and desires:
Smental odd: {caused by a bump on the head, psychologically healthy}
For instance, the belief that it is going to rain might be conform to this standard or it
might not. It would perfectly conform to this standard – along the dimension of match-
conformance – just in case it was caused by a bump on the head and it was a psychologically
healthy belief to have. Desires, such as the desire to spend the day organizing one’s stamp
collection, can also conform, or fail to conform to this standard in all the usual ways, by
either exhibiting the properties that comprise Smental odd or by failing to exhibit them. So as
I understand things, we should not balk at the idea that mental states like belief and desire,
as well as actions, are the kinds of things on which we can bring this capacity to think about
conformance to standards to bear. Since they are objects that can possess properties in the
relevant sense, they can be thought of in terms of standards that comprise properties they
can possess, i.e., standards that are apt relative to them.
To sum up: I suggest we think of a standard as a set comprising an arbitrary number
of properties, each of which we can think of as the ‘content’ of the standard. An object’s
conformance to a standard conceived of like this comes in two kinds of degree. The degree
to which an object exhibits more or less of the properties that comprise the standard is the
degree of an object’s match conformance to the standard; the degree to which an object
exhibits the properties that comprise a standard to a greater or lesser degree is the degree of
an object’s extent conformance to the standard. Because standards so conceived are simply
set of properties, and objects so conceived simply the bearers of properties, our capacity to
think about objects in relation to standards is flexible, though not maximally so. We can
think of a wide range of objects in terms of the same standard, and, similarly, we can think
of a single object in terms of a wide range of standards. This capacity is limited by whether
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a standard is apt relative to the relevant object: that is, whether the object in question is
capable of possessing the properties that comprise the standard.
With all this before us, we can now make the following observation: not only can
objects conform, or not, or to varying degrees, to standards, facts can constitute evidence
that an object conforms or fails to conform to a standard. Sometimes it is obvious how a
fact constitutes evidence that an object conforms to a standard. For instance, the fact that
Harry is omnivorous is evidence that Harry conforms to Sbear. That is because the fact that
Harry is omnivorous entails that Harry has one of the properties that comprise Sbear, and so
entails that Harry conforms, at least in some degree of match, to Sbear. Sometimes things
are less obvious. For instance, the fact that Harry is a bear is evidence that Harry conforms
to Sbear. That is because, given what we know about bears, that they tend to be hairy,
omnivorous, and sleepy in the wintertime, Harry’s being a bear makes it likely that Harry
has one or more of the properties that comprise Sbear. Quite generally, a fact is evidence that
an object conforms to a standard when, relative to the background information, it increases
the (epistemic) probability that it does so. More formally:
Evidence of Conformance: F is evidence that object O conforms to standard
S relative to background information B iff pr(O conforms to S | F & B)> pr(O
conforms to S | B).20
For the most part, I will drop the talk of background information and simply say that a fact
is evidence that an object conforms to a standard when it increases the probability that it
does so. And for shorthand, I will call facts of this sort – facts that constitute evidence that
an object conforms to a standard – conformance-indicating facts.
The existence of conformance-indicating facts should not strike us as in any way mys-
terious. A standard, after all, is like a list of properties; and when we think about an object’s
conformance to a standard what we are thinking about is whether and to what extent the
20Notice that, since there are two dimensions of conformance – match and extent – along which we can
think about an object’s relation to a standard, there will be two corresponding sorts of evidence of confor-
mance.
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object has the properties that comprise the list. Conformance-indicating facts are simply
those facts that indicate that the object in question has the properties in question (or: has
them to a certain degree).
So that is how I propose to think about standards and our capacity to think about
objects in terms of their conformance to them. I have not said anything, yet, about what
this has to do with reasons. Before moving to that discussion, I am going to extend the
ideas from this section to an account of standards of correctness and our capacity to think
about objects in terms of their conformance to them. With that account place, I will turn to
a discussion of reasons.
1.3 Standards of Correctness
To say that something is a standard of correctness as opposed simply to a standard in-
troduces a normative dimension into our thinking in terms of it. When something conforms
to a standard of correctness, it is thereby normatively well-off, whereas when something
conforms simply to some standard or other, it is not the case that it is thereby normatively
well-off. But what, precisely, distinguishes standards of correctness from (mere) standards?
One, mistaken, idea would be that the difference between the two is due to an essential
difference in the kind of thing a standard of correctness is compared to a (mere) standard.
According to this idea, there is something different about the nature of a standard of cor-
rectness as compared to the nature of a (mere) standard that makes thoughts about object’s
conformance to standards of correctness essentially different from thoughts about objects’
conformance to (mere) standards. It would be a coincidence, on this view, that both are
called ‘standards,’ since they would not have any fundamental structure in common. I
think we should resist this idea and instead think of standards and standards of correctness
as exactly the same sort of thing, with the same underlying structure. I therefore suggest
that we think of a standard of correctness, just like a standard, as a set comprised of prop-
erties each of which can be any sort of property you like. Conformance to a standard of
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correctness, just like conformance to a standard, will therefore come in degrees measured
along the two dimensions of match and extent.21
Instead of attempting to distinguish standards from standards of correctness in terms
of the kind of things they are, we should look to the consequences of the thoughts involving
each. Here is what I suggest: what distinguishes a thought about an object in terms of its
conformance to a standard and a thought about an object in terms of its conformance to a
standard of correctness is simply that while conformance or not with a standard is always
normatively neutral, conformance or not with a standard of correctness is always norma-
tively relevant. We can put the idea this way: conformance with a standard of correctness is
always normatively positive, while failure to conform to a standard of correctness is always
normatively negative.
Intuitive support for this idea comes from considering two examples of standards of
correctness. Consider first the case of a standard of correctness for belief. A number
of philosophers have argued that the standard of correctness for beliefs is truth.22 As I
understand things, this means these philosophers think two things. First, that there is a
standard comprising one property:
SB alethic: {truth}
And, second, that any given belief’s conformance to SB alethic always counts normatively
in favor of the belief, and any given belief’s failure to conform to SB alethic always counts
normatively against the belief. And that seems right: philosophers who think that the stan-
dard of correctness for belief is truth presumably also think that beliefs can be meaningfully
compared to the standard, mentioned above:
21As I am thinking of things, then, conformance to standards of correctness can be a matter of degree. This
might seem somewhat awkward to some, given a natural inclination to think of being ‘incorrect’ as the only
alternative to being ‘correct’. But I think there is a fairly intuitive notion correctness that is degree-theoretic,
as when we evaluate a student’s reconstruction of an argument as being more correct than another student’s,
or when we evaluate an agent’s credence in some proposition that p as more or less correct depending on,
say, how close it matches the objective chance that p.
22Shah (2006, 2003); Shah and Velleman (2005); Wedgwood (2007, 2002).
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Smental odd: {caused by a bump on the head, is psychologically healthy}
The difference is that someone who thinks that SB alethic but not Smental odd is a standard
of correctness for belief will think that conformance to SB alethic is always positively nor-
matively relevant to the evaluation of a belief, whereas conformance to Smental odd is not.
Consider as a second example the case of standards of correctness for actions. A num-
ber of philosophers have argued that the standard of correctness for actions is maximizing
overall happiness.23 As I understand things, this means these philosophers think two things.
First, that there is a standard comprising one property:
SA util: {maximizes overall happiness}
And, second, that any given action’s conformance to SA util always counts normatively
in favor of the action, and any given action’s failure to conform to SA util always counts
normatively against the action. And that seems right: philosophers who think the standard
of correctness for action is maximizing overall happiness presumably also think that actions
can be meaningfully compared to the standard:
SA Kant: {an action whose maxim can be universal law}
The difference is that someone who thinks that SA util but not SA Kant is a standard of cor-
rectness for action will think that conformance to SA util is always positively normatively
relevant to the evaluation of an action, whereas conformance to SA Kant is not.
As before, while this capacity is flexible, there are some restrictions on the scope of
meaningful exercises of this capacity. To see this, notice that it would be a mistake to try
and think of the desire for a cupcake in terms of its conformance to SB alethic. That is
because desires are not the sort of things that can be true (or false). What this shows is that
the distinction between apt and inapt standards carries over to our discussion of standards
of correctness: a standard of correctness is apt relative to an object when it is possible
23Classical utilitarians like Mill (2002) have a view roughly like this. Some contemporary utilitarians also
accept this view. For instance, Pettit (1991).
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for the object to possess the properties that comprise the standard, and inapt otherwise.
SB alethic is apt relative to, among other things, beliefs, hypothesizings, and supposings;
it’s inapt relative to, among other things, desires and actions.
It can be tempting to think that, when it comes to standards of correctness, the aptness
of a standard relative to an object involves more than the mere possibility of the object’s
possessing the properties that comprise the standard. It can be tempting to think, for ex-
ample, that for certain objects there are properties that, although the objects in question
manifestly can possess them, the possession of these properties is never normatively rele-
vant in evaluating the object, and so a standard of correctness involving them is in this sense
inapt for the objects in question. For instance, you might think that Smental odd comprises
properties that are never relevant to the normative status of a belief and that Smental odd is
therefore inapt as a standard of correctness for belief.
I think we should resist the temptation to describe what is going on here as a failure
of aptness between a standard of correctness and an object. It is, after all, a substantive
if fairly uncontroversial normative view about belief that being caused by a bump on the
head does not contribute positively to the normative status of a belief. The idea that stan-
dards involving properties like being caused by a bump on the head cannot be standards of
correctness for belief is therefore best thought of, I think, as a substantive normative view
about what the standards of correctness for belief in fact are, rather than as a view that
follows from a view about the aptness conditions for standards of correctness in general.
This point is even clearer, perhaps, when it comes to the case of action, since there is
perhaps more disagreement in this case. It can be tempting, if one is not a utilitarian of a
certain sort, to want to say that, although actions clearly can possess the property of maxi-
mizing overall happiness, this property is not ever normatively relevant to the evaluation of
an action, and that therefore SA util is inapt as a standard of correctness for action. Again,
however, I think we should resist this temptation. It is clearly a substantive normative view
that maximizing overall happiness does not contribute positively to the normative status
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of an action: certain sorts of utilitarians and (to pick one) Kantian deontologists disagree
precisely over the truth of this view. But what utilitarians and Kantians disagree over is
not which standards of correctness are apt for the evaluation of action. What they disagree
over is what the actual standards of correctness for action are.24
Putting the point this way raises two good questions, neither of which will concern me
in this paper, but both of which I will mention here in order to set aside. The first is this:
What does it take for a standard to be one such that conformance with it is always counted
as normatively relevant? This is a question about the source of normativity for certain
standards; the question is what makes conformance to one standard matter, normatively,
to our evaluation of an object, while conformance to another standard matters not at all,
normatively, to our evaluation of that same object. In other words, what turns a standard
from a (mere) standard into a standard of correctness? The meta-normative literature is rife
with competing answers to this question. Traditionally, the field has been divided into two
camps: realists and anti-realists. Realists answer the question by appealing to a special class
of properties that comprise standards of correctness, as opposed to mere standards: these
are the normative properties. According to realism, normative properties are properties
that are, in Mackie’s phrase, objectively prescriptive: they wear their normative relevance,
as it were, on their sleeve.25 The realist thought, then, is that in virtue of certain standards
being comprised of these special properties, i.e., normative properties, conformance to
these standards is always normatively relevant. What turns a (mere) standard into a standard
of correctness is, on this view, a matter of the content of the standard being a certain
way, namely, comprised of normative properties. Anti-realists, by contrast, have tended to
answer by appealing to a special class of (usually non-cognitive) attitudes agents can have
24I return to this point below, in §5.2.
25Moore (1903) was a realist of this sort. On objectively prescriptive properties, see Mackie (1977).
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toward the properties that comprise standards: the normative attitudes.26 According to anti-
realism, the normative attitudes are pro-attitudes agents have toward, say, the properties
that comprise standards, or toward things that exhibit certain properties.27 The anti-realist
thought, then, is that in virtue of agents having these attitudes toward (the content of)
particular standards, conformance to those standards is always normatively relevant. What
turns a (mere) standard into a standard of correctness, on this view, is not a matter of
the content of the relevant standards, but is instead a matter of the attitudes agents have
toward (the content of) the standards. The details of these competing answers and the
differences between them will not concern me here. That is because I am not interested here
in answering a question about the source of normativity of particular standards; whatever
we say about that issue, I am interested in what standards of correctness, however they
come to be standards of correctness rather than merely standards, have to do with reasons.
The second good question is this: What are the standards of correctness for (things
of kind) X? This is a question about the actual content of the standards of correctness for
classes of objects, including mental states like belief and desire, but also including persons,
actions, and even, according to some views, emotions. Again, the literature is rife with
competing answers to this question. Normative ethics can be thought of as an attempt to
answer the question when it comes to actions and (perhaps) persons. For example, Kan-
tians say that the standard of correctness for actions is the categorical imperative, whereas
certain sorts of utilitarians say that the standard of correctness for actions is (something akin
to) Mill’s greatest happiness principle.28 Kantians and utilitarians therefore disagree over
26There are other anti-realist views. For instance: normative nihilism is a kind of anti-realism. According
to that view, no standards ever matter, normatively, to our evaluation of objects. It follows, according to the
view about reasons that I am going to lay out (§4 below) that normative nihilists think there are no normative
reasons. And that seems right.
27For reasons that are not relevant to present purposes, anti-realist views of this kind sometimes go by the
label ‘quasi-realism’. See, for instance, Blackburn (1998) and Gibbard (2003).
28Virtue ethics, by contrast, can be thought of as an attempt to redirect our attention from standards of
correctness for actions to standards of correctness for persons. Hursthouse (2002) is especially clear that
changing the focus from actions to persons is part of the motivation for (her brand of) virtue ethics.
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the content of the standards of correctness for actions. But the debate between Kantians
and utilitarians over the content of the standards of correctness for actions does not bear
on the question that concerns me here, which is what standards of correctness in general
have to do with reasons. Similar remarks apply to epistemology. Normative epistemol-
ogy can be thought of as an attempt to provide the content of standards of correctness for
doxastic attitudes like belief. For example, coherentists say that the standard of correct-
ness is coherence with one’s other beliefs, whereas evidentialists say that the standard of
correctness is truth.29 Coherentists and evidentialists therefore disagree over the content
of the standards of correctness for belief. But again, the debate between coherentists and
evidentialists over the content of the standards of correctness for belief does not bear on
the question that concerns me here, which is what standards of correctness in general have
to do with reasons.
It is worth noting the possibility, before moving on, that these two questions are not
necessarily independent. For instance, you might think that the correct answer to the ques-
tion about the source of normativity of certain standards determines the correct answer
to the question about the content of those same standards. Evidently, this is the view of
Kantian Constructivists like Christine Korsgaard: Korsgaard thinks that explaining how
any standards at all come to be normatively relevant requires thinking that the standard of
correctness of action is the categorical imperative.30 It bears repeating, though, that this
possibility is irrelevant for present purposes: what I am interested in is the connection be-
tween standards of correctness – however they get to be so, and whichever ones they are –
and reasons.
29Compare Davidson (1986) and Shah (2006).
30See Korsgaard (1996, 2009).
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1.4 Reasons
So: What do reasons have to do with standards of correctness? Recall the observation
from §2 that not only can objects conform, or not, or to varying degrees, to standards,
facts can constitute evidence that an object conforms or fails to conform to a standard.
Given that standards and standards of correctness share the same fundamental structure,
similar remarks apply to standards of correctness: facts can constitute evidence that an
object conforms, or not, or to varying degrees to a standard of correctness. Sometimes it is
obvious how a fact constitutes evidence that an object conforms to a standard. Recall the
standard of correctness:
SB alethic: {truth}
The fact that Wesley is in his office is evidence that the belief that Wesley is in his office
conforms to SB alethic. That is because the fact that Wesley is in his office entails that the
belief that Wesley is in his office has the property that comprises SB alethic, viz. truth.
Sometimes things are less obvious. For instance, the fact that you just overheard Sam
say he was headed to a meeting with Wesley in his office is evidence that the belief that
Wesley is in his office conforms to SB alethic. That is because, given that Wesley tends
to be fairly reliable in keeping appointments and that Sam is not engaged in an elaborate
deception, the fact that you overheard Sam say he was headed to a meeting with Wesley in
his office makes it likely that the belief that Wesley is in his office is true. Quite generally,
a fact is evidence that an object conforms to a standard of correctness when, relative to
the background information, it increases the (epistemic) probability that it does so. More
formally:
Evidence of Correctness: F is evidence that object O conforms to standard of
correctness S relative to background information B iff pr(O conforms to S | F
& B) > pr(O conforms to S | B).31
31Again, since there are two dimensions of conformance – match and extent – along which we can think
about an object’s relation to a standard of correctness, there will be two corresponding sorts of evidence of
correctness.
22
For the most part, I will drop the talk of background information and simply say that a
fact is evidence that an object conforms to a standard of correctness when it increases the
probability that it does so. And for shorthand, I will call facts of this sort – facts that
constitute evidence that an object conforms to a standard of correctness – correctness-
indicating facts.
The existence of correctness-indicating facts should not strike us as in any way mys-
terious. A standard of correctness, recall, is like a list of properties, and when we think
about an object’s conformance to a standard of correctness what we are thinking about is
whether and to what extent the object has the properties that comprise the list. Correctness-
indicating facts are simply those facts that indicate that the object in question has the prop-
erties in question (or: has them to a certain degree).
To see how this works in practice, consider a toy example involving the following
standard of correctness for actions:
SA util: {maximizes overall happiness}
SA util is a standard of correctness comprised of just one property, the property of being an
action that maximizes overall happiness. To say that SA util is the standard of correctness
for actions, recall, is to say that actions that conform with it get a positive normative tick,
and actions that fail to do so get a negative normative tick. Intuitively, utilitarians of a
certain sort think that SA util is the sole standard of correctness for actions. Now consider
the action:
Donate: Donating $10 to OXFAM.
We can think about Donate in terms of its conformance to SA util. Whether Donate con-
forms to SA util will be a matter of whether Donate exhibits the property of being an action
that maximizes overall happiness. We can also think about facts that constitute evidence
about whether Donate exhibits the relevant property, for example:
Save: A $10 donation to OXFAM will save three infants from starvation.
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Intuitively, Save is a correctness-indicating fact for Donate. It is a correctness-indicating
fact because it constitutes evidence that Donate conforms to SA util, at least given the
plausible background information that actions that prevent starvation are actions that tend
to maximize overall happiness.
This should all be familiar from the discussion of standards and objects’ conformance
to them. All I have done is extend that account to the current proposal regarding standards
of correctness. What about reasons?
Here is my idea about reasons in a slogan: reasons are correctness-indicating facts.
That is, reasons are evidence that an object conforms to a standard of correctness. Thus, in
our toy example, Save is a reason for the action Donate, and it is so because it constitutes
evidence that Donate conforms to the (stipulated) standard of correctness for actions, viz.
SA util.
Here is my idea more carefully. Recall the three-place reason relation R(F, A,  ) and
the schema:
Informative: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that informatively-fill-in-the-blank.
I said in the beginning of the paper that anti-fundamentalist views about reasons were
required to provide a way of informatively filling in the blank. This is my proposal about
how to do it:
Informative-Structural: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing conforms
to a standard of correctness for  -ing.
The anti-fundamentalist view that accepts Informative-Structural is the view I call Struc-
turalism about reasons. In what remains of the paper I will present a limited defense of this
account of reasons. Before proceeding, however, let me highlight an important feature of
the view by considering how it treats two intuitive cases of reasons.
First, consider a case of reasons for admiration. Intuitively, the fact that Jane is honest
is a reason to admire Jane. How does Structuralism understand this intuitive claim? Like
so: the claim that Jane’s honesty is a reason to admire her amounts to the two-fold claim
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that (i) there is a standard of correctness for the attitude of ‘admiring N’ partially comprised
of the property ‘N is honest’, and (ii) the fact that Jane is honest is evidence that admiring
Jane conforms to this standard. According to Structuralism, if both (i) and (ii) are true, then
the fact that Jane is honest is a reason to admire her. Let me take these in reverse order:
(ii) is obviously true, since the fact that Jane is honest entails that admiring Jane conforms
to the standard of admiring N if N is honest.32 That leaves (i): whether or not we think
(i) is true will depend on a substantive normative view about what admirability amounts
to. So the truth of (i) will depend on whether or not we think honesty is an admirable
property of persons, i.e., whether we think the standard of correctness for admiration is
partially comprised of the property of honesty. Intuitively, it is. And so, intuitively, the
fact that Jane is honest is a reason to admire her. But Structuralism does not by itself
entail that Jane’s honesty is a reason to admire her: whether or not it is depends on a
substantive normative view about admirability, in particular, a view about whether honesty
is an admirable property of persons.
Now consider a case of reasons for action. Intuitively, the fact that  -ing would pro-
mote one of Tim’s desires is a reason for Tim to  . How does Structuralism understand
this intuitive claim? Like so: the claim that promoting one of Tim’s desires is a reason for
Tim to   amounts to the two-fold claim that (i) there is a standard of correctness for actions
partially comprised of the property ‘promoting one’s desires’, and (ii) the fact that  -ing
would promote one of Tim’s desires is evidence that Tim’s  -ing conforms to this standard.
According to Structuralism, if both (i) and (ii) are true, then the fact that  -ing would pro-
mote one of Tim’s desires is a reason for Tim to  . Again, I will take these in reverse order:
(ii) is obviously true, since the fact that  -ing would promote one of Tim’s desires entails
that Tim’s  -ing conforms to the standard of  -ing if  -ing promotes one’s desires. That
leaves (i): whether or not we think (i) is true will depend, again, on a substantive normative
32Recall, this is meant to be a standard of correctness partially comprised of the property of honesty.
Plausibly, the standard of correctness for admiration involves more than simply the property of honesty.
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view about what the standard of correctness for actions is. So the truth of (i) will depend
on whether or not we think promoting one’s desires is what we might call a ‘correctness-
making’ property of actions, i.e., whether we think the standard of correctness for action
is partially comprised of the property of promoting one’s desires. Intuitively, albeit contro-
versially, it is. And so, intuitively, the fact that  -ing would promote one of Tim’s desires
is a reason for Tim to  . But Structuralism does not by itself entail that the fact that  -ing
would promote one of his desires is a reason for Tim to  : whether or not it is depends on
a substantive normative view about action, in particular, a view about whether promoting
one’s desires is a correctness-making property of actions.
The important feature of Structuralism that its treatment of these cases highlights is
that Structuralism about reasons is silent on questions over what the standards of correct-
ness are. Earlier (§3) I said that the answers to these questions are what debates in normative
ethics and normative epistemology are about. Since Structuralism eschews any attempt to
engage in these debates, it does not deliver any substantive results about the content of the
reasons for actions or attitudes. But it is a substantive view nonetheless: it is a substantive
view about what reasons are, not a substantive view about what reasons there are. A reason
is a fact that bears a certain relationship to standards of correctness, whatever the content
of these standards might turn out to be. That relationship can be specified structurally,
without any need to specify the content of the relevant standards. Hence the moniker.
This completes my account of what Structuralism about reasons is. In the next several
sections I will pursue what I said was the second aim of this paper: to provide a limited
defense of Structuralism. I will argue that competing anti-fundamentalist accounts of rea-
sons can all be factored into Structuralism plus substantive normative claims about the
content of standards of correctness. Then I will argue that Structuralism’s ability to factor
competing accounts yields two related advantages for the view.
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1.5 Factoring Competing Accounts
In this section I will do two things. First, I will show how competing anti-fundamentalist
accounts can all be factored into Structuralism plus a claim about what the content of the
standards of correctness is. I will do this by providing a general recipe and then showing
how to cook the recipe using a particular competitor to Structuralism: Humeanism. Then,
I will show how factoring competing accounts in this way yields theoretical advantages; I
will show why we might prefer a view about what reasons are that remains silent on the
question of what reasons there are.
1.5.1 The Recipe
Competing anti-fundamentalist accounts of what reasons are can all be factored into
Structuralism plus a substantive normative view about the content of standards of correct-
ness. Here a recipe for doing so in four easy-to-follow steps.
Step 1: Gather your ingredients.
First, you will need a competing anti-fundamentalist account of
what reasons are (Competing Account). Recall that all anti-fundamentalist
accounts of reasons think there is a true instance of:
Informative: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that informatively-
fill-in-the-blank.
The first thing to do, then, is to identify what Competing Account
has to say about how to informatively fill in the blank.
Step 2: Make a property and a corresponding standard.
Next, make a property out of the way the Competing Account says
we should informatively fill in the blank. This part is easy, given our
liberal understanding of properties: simply define a property as the
property of ‘being such that informatively-fill-in-the-blank,’ where
the content of ‘informatively-fill-in-the-blank’ is given by Compet-
ing Account. The corresponding standard will then be:
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SCompeting Account: {being such that informatively-fill-in-
the-blank}
Step 3: Cook.
Now, cook up a view about reasons. We will end up with two dishes.
The first dish will always be Structuralism:
R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing conforms to a
standard of correctness for  -ing.
The second dish will be a Substantive Normative View. In every
case, the substantive normative view will be of the form:
Substantive Normative View: SCompeting Account is a stan-
dard of correctness for  -ing.
Step 4: Serve.
Now that you have Structuralism and Substantive Normative View,
you can serve up the Competing Account as a version of Struc-
turalism. What started as a competing account of what reasons are
can now be served as: Structuralism accompanied by Substantive
Normative View, like so:
R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing conforms to
SCompeting Account.
Let me make a few brief remarks. Following this recipe allows us to present what looked
like a single dish – Competing Account – as two dishes, Structuralism accompanied by
Substantive Normative View. In less colorful language, what this means is that Struc-
turalism allows us to factor competing anti-fundamentalist accounts of reasons into (i) a
Structuralist account of what reasons are and (ii) a substantive normative view about what
the standards of correctness are. I am going to argue, below, that this yields two advantages
for Structuralism. But before I do that, I want to illustrate how to cook the recipe using
a competing anti-fundamentalist account of what reasons are that we are already familiar
with: Humeanism.
Here is how to follow the recipe using Humeanism as our starting ingredient.
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Step 1: Gather your ingredients.
In this case, the competing account is Informative-Humeanism,
which says that:
Informative-Humeanism: R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence
that A’s  -ing promotes the object of one of A’s desires.
Step 2: Make a property and a corresponding standard.
Define a property as the property of ‘being such A’s  -ing promotes
the object of one A’s desires’. The corresponding standard will then
be:
SHumeanism: {being such that  -ing promotes the object of
one of A’s desires}
Step 3: Cook.
The first dish is Structuralism:
R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing conforms to a
standard of correctness for  -ing.
The second dish is a substantive normative view:
Normative Humeanism: SHumean is a standard of correct-
ness for  -ing.
Step 4: Serve.
Now we can serve up Informative-Humeanism as a version of
Structuralism. What started as a competing view about what reasons
are can now be served as: Structuralism accompanied by Norma-
tive Humeanism:
R(F, A,  ) iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing conforms to
SHumean.
Notice what we have just done. We have taken what was supposed to be a competing
anti-fundamentalist account of what reasons are and factored it into a Structuralist account
of what reasons are plus a substantive normative view about the content of standards of
29
correctness. This means that what initially looked like a genuine competitor to Struc-
turalism can now be understood as a view that accepts Structuralism’s conception of what
reasons are and accepts a substantive normative view about what the standards of cor-
rectness are, namely, SHumean. This same procedure can be applied to any competing
anti-fundamentalist proposal about reasons.
1.5.2 Two Related Advantages
But why should we care about this result? More specifically: What advantages re-
dound to Structuralism in virtue of its ability to factor competing accounts of what reasons
are? I think there are two related advantages.
First, it puts fights over the content of the reasons in their proper place. It takes those
fights out of our meta-normative account of reasons and puts them into our first-order nor-
mative theorizing. And that, intuitively, is where those fights belong. Here is an analogy
that helps make the point.
Suppose you were trying to give a philosophical account of what, in general, laws are.
You might come up with something like the following account:
Law: L is a law iff L is a requirement or rule, enforceable by means of coercive
sanction, that a society recognizes as governing the actions of its members.
Now compare two questions. The first question is: What are laws? Law provides a straight-
forward answer to this question. It says that laws are requirements or rules that are enforce-
able by means of coercive sanction that a society recognizes as governing the actions of its
members. The second question is: What is the content of the laws for society X? Law is
itself silent on this question, though it provides some guidance in answering it. The sec-
ond question is an empirical one, answerable only by doing some empirical investigation.
What needs to be investigated in order to answer this second question is what requirements
or rules are enforceable by means of coercive sanction that society X recognizes as govern-
ing the actions of its members. And that task, interesting and important as it is, is separate
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from the task of giving a theoretical account of what a law is. Debates over the content of
the laws are properly a matter for empirical investigation, though of course these debates
will be guided, in part, by our theoretical understanding (in this case given by Law) of what
a law is.
The situation with Structuralism is similar, though different in one important respect.
Structuralism gives an account of what, in general, reasons are. It says that:
Structuralism: F is a reason for A to   iff F is evidence that A’s  -ing con-
forms to a standard of correctness for  -ing.
Now compare two questions. The first question is: What are reasons? Structuralism pro-
vides a straightforward answer to this question. It says that reasons are evidence of con-
formance to a standard of correctness. The second question is: What is the content of the
reasons to  ? Structuralism is itself silent on this question, though it provides some guid-
ance in answering it. Here is the important difference from the case of law. Unlike the case
of law, where the question of the content of law was an empirical matter, the question of the
content of reasons is a normative matter, answerable only by doing some first-order nor-
mative investigation. What needs to be investigated in order to answer this second question
is what the standards of correctness actually are. But, just as in the case of law, that task,
interesting and important as it is, is separate from the task of giving a theoretical account
of what a reason (law) is. Debates over the content of the reasons are properly a matter for
first-order normative theorizing, though of course these debates will be guided, in part, by
our theoretical understanding (in this case given by Structuralism) of what a reason is.
The first advantage of Structuralism, then, is that, unlike its competitors, it keeps two
separate tasks, and their associated questions, separate. Just like we want our meta-legal
account of what laws are to stay out of the way of empirical investigation into which laws
there are, so we want our meta-normative account of what reasons are to stay out of the
way of normative investigation into which reasons there are. And that is precisely what
Structuralism, unlike its competitors, does. If Structuralism is correct, then, on the one
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hand, we have our account of what reasons are – given by Structuralism; and, on the other
hand, we have our account of what the content of the reasons is – given by our best first-
order normative theories about the standards of correctness for actions and attitudes.
The second main advantage enjoyed by Structuralism as a result of its ability to fac-
tor competing accounts follows is closely related to the first. It is that Structuralism is
flexible in a way competing anti-fundamentalist proposals are not. Recall the objection
to Informative-Humeanism that it was incapable of accounting for epistemic reasons be-
cause, counterintuitively, it made epistemic reasons for an agent to believe that p depend
for their existence on whether or not the agent had a desire such that it would be promoted
by her believing that p. Objections of this sort to anti-fundamentalist accounts of reasons,
extensional objections, are a favorite of fundamentalists: extensional objections to anti-
fundamentalist accounts of reasons seem to reveal that attempts to analyze what reasons
are systematically get the content of the reasons wrong.
We are now in a position to see both why Informative-Humeanism faces this exten-
sional objection and how Structuralism avoids it. Informative-Humeanism faces the ob-
jection because it accepts the controversial and counterintuitive substantive normative view
that the standard of correctness for all  -ing’s, including  -ings that are believings, involves
the promotion of an agent’s desires.33 That is why Informative-Humeanism is forced to say
that an agent’s reasons for belief depend in the way they do on an agent’s desires. But Struc-
turalism need not say any such thing. Instead, Structuralism remains neutral on whether
or not the standard of correctness for belief involves promoting an agent’s desires. If, as
the objection to Informative-Humeanism seems to indicate, it turns out that the standard of
correctness for belief does not involve promoting an agent’s desires, then Structuralists can
adopt this result as a discovery about the correct first-order normative standards governing
belief without in any way modifying their account of what reasons for belief in fact are. So
33In Sharadin (2013a) I argue that, not only do we have reason to reject the Humean claim that all reasons
involve the promotion of desires, we also have good reason to reject the more general claim that all reasons
involve promoting something or other, whether it be a desire, a goal, an end, or a value.
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the second main advantage of Structuralism is that as a result of separating issues over the
nature and content of reasons it is flexible enough to avoid what would otherwise be serious
objections – objections its competitors must face head-on.
1.6 Conclusion
In the first part of this paper I outlined the anti-fundamentalist account of what reasons
are that I call Structuralism. My idea was that focusing on standards and standards of
correctness revealed the natural home of reasons as facts that bear on whether an object
conforms or not to a standard of correctness. Structuralism differs from competing anti-
fundamentalist accounts by remaining neutral on the content of the reasons: it does not say
anything about what the content of the standards of correctness for actions or attitudes is.
In the second part of the paper I tried to show that this neutrality was a good thing,
for two reasons. First, by remaining neutral on the content of the standards of correct-
ness for actions, Structuralism keeps what are intuitively two separate tasks separate. On
the one hand, there is the task of giving an account of what reasons are. Structuralism
is an attempt to accomplish that task. On the other hand, there is the task of giving an
account of what reasons there are. Structuralism eschews any attempt to accomplish that
task, which is properly the job of first-order normative theorizing. Second, and as a direct
result of its neutrality, Structuralism can avoid the extensional challenges faced by com-
peting accounts. For instance, because Structuralism does not commit to the controversial
first-order normative claim that the standard of correctness for belief involves promoting
desires, Structuralism, unlike Informative-Humeanism, does not face any special difficulty
in accounting for epistemic reasons.
As I said in my introduction, this represents a limited defense of the view. A full
defense of Structuralism requires showing how it deals with other issues surrounding rea-
sons, including, just to mention two, the weight of reasons, and the distinction between the
right and the wrong kinds of reasons. I think Structuralism makes good sense out of both
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these issues, and a range of others.34 But each of these topics deserves its own paper-length
treatment, and so a full defense of the view will have to wait for another occasion.
34In Sharadin (2013c) I argue that one competing account of reasons, Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism,
cannot satisfactorily distinguish between the right and the wrong kind of reasons. And in Sharadin (2014b) I
argue for a way of distinguishing between the two kinds of reasons that, while it is available to (some) other
anti-fundamentalists about reasons, fits best with Structuralism. With respect to the weight of reasons, I think
an account along the lines of the one defended in Kearns and Star (2013) can be adopted by Structuralism,
though more needs to be said about how this would work.
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2 REASONS WRONG AND RIGHT
Abstract
The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone
will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in
kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire,
whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of
Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ and the
‘wrong’ kind of reasons wherever it appears. In this paper I argue that two recent proposals
for solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative
solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two
kinds of reasons.
2.1 Introduction: Two Kinds of Reasons
One thing philosophers agree on is that, whatever else is true of reasons, reasons count
in favor of what they are reasons for.1 When it comes to attitudes like belief and admiration,
something is a reason when it counts in favor of the attitude. Among reasons for attitudes,
we can distinguish between intuitively good reasons and intuitively bad reasons, where
intuitive quality is a matter of strength. For instance, testimony from a reliable source to
the effect that the concert begins at eight is in this sense a good reason, i.e., a relatively
1Some philosophers – fundamentalists about reasons – think this is the most informative analysis possible
of reasons possible. For instance, see Scanlon (1998); Parfit (2011b). Others – anti-fundamentalists about
reasons – think we can give an informative, non-trivial account of what the ‘counting in favor of’ relation
amounts to. For instance, see Kearns and Star (2009); Broome (2004); Schroeder (2007c); Sharadin (2013d).
This debate will not concern me here, since the problem I am interested in faces fundamentalists and anti-
fundamentalists alike; but see Sharadin (2013d) in which I argue for an anti-fundamentalist account of reasons
that pairs nicely with the solution I offer to the problem that concerns me here.
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strong reason, to believe the concert begins at eight. By contrast, my dim recollection of
last year’s concert beginning at eight is a bad reason, i.e., a relatively weak reason to believe
the concert begins at eight. It is an interesting question what accounts for the difference
in strength among reasons for attitudes.2 But in this paper I am interested in a different
difference among reasons, one that is orthogonal to difference in strength. To illustrate the
difference I am interested in, consider the following two reasons for believing the concert
begins at eight:
Memory: I dimly recall last year’s concert beginning at eight.
Criminals: Criminals will torture my family unless I believe the concert begins
at eight.
As we just noted, Memory is a relatively weak reason for belief. By contrast, Criminals
seems like a relatively strong reason for belief. After all, the fact that criminals will torture
my family unless I believe the concert begins at eight counts quite strongly indeed in favor
of so believing. But despite being a relatively strong reason, there is something funny, odd,
or, as we might put it, not quite kosher, about the reason constituted by Criminals. Memory
and Criminals seem to differ not just in strength, but also in the kind of reasons they are:
What accounts for this difference between reasons for belief?
One natural reaction to have to cases such as this is to distinguish between epistemic
and non-epistemic reasons for belief along the following lines: epistemic reasons for belief
bear on the truth of the thing believed, whereas non-epistemic reasons do not. Memory,
despite being a relatively weak reason, is an epistemic reason for belief, whereas Criminals,
however strong a reason it is, is a non-epistemic reason for belief. But natural as it is, this
way of accounting for the difference between Memory and Criminals cannot be the whole
story. This is for two reasons. First, we shall still want to know why it is that, compared to
epistemic reasons for belief, non-epistemic reasons have the distinctively odd flavor they
do. At the very least, then, we are owed a story about that. Second, the very same oddness
2Surprisingly, this question has received little attention. Some notable exceptions include Schroeder
(2007d); Kearns and Star (2013); Broome (2008).
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among reasons seems to show up in reasons for attitudes other than belief. Consider the
following two reasons for admiring a person, Lara:
Generous: Lara is generous.
Benefactor: Lara’s benefactor will pay me to admire her.
Regardless of whatever difference there might be in the relative strengths of Generous and
Benefactor, there is this difference between them: compared to Generous, there is some-
thing funny, odd, not quite kosher, about Benefactor as a reason to admire Lara. Moreover,
the oddness exhibited by Benefactor seems to be exactly the same oddness exhibited by
non-epistemic reasons such as Criminals in the case of belief. In addition to a story about
why non-epistemic reasons for belief have the odd flavor they do, then, we are also owed a
story about what unifies the oddness exhibited by those reasons and the oddness exhibited
by some of the reasons for attitudes like admiration. Simply describing the difference in
terms of epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief will not do the trick, because the
very same difference seems to show up in cases where the distinction between epistemic
and non-epistemic reasons is inapt, e.g., in the case of attitudes such as admiration.
What we have here is a phenomenon that appears across a range of attitudes for which
there can be reasons, including belief and admiration, but also including blame, envy, fear,
love, and desire. The phenomenon is usally labeled the phenomenon of the ‘Wrong Kind of
Reasons.’3 The idea is that reasons like Memory and Generous are the ‘right,’ whereas what
I have been calling ‘odd’ or ‘not quite kosher’ reasons like Criminals and Benefactor are
3Hieronymi (2005, 2013); Schroeder (2007c); Olson (2009, 2004); Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen
(2006, 2004); Stratton-Lake (2005); Lang (2008); Reisner (2009); Schroeder (2010); Way (2012). See also
D’Arms and Jacobson (2000), where D’Arms and Jacobson argue against what they call the ‘moralistic
fallacy,’ i.e., the fallacy of inferring from the fact that feeling an emotion would be wrong or vicious to the
fact that it is therefore unfitting. The problem I am concerned with in this paper is obviously related to the one
D’Arms and Jacobson address, but it is not the same. D’Arms and Jacobson are concerned with a particular
subset of the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons (moral and – sometimes – prudential reasons) for a particular subset of
attitudes (the emotions). In this paper, I aim to address the problem as it appears across the whole range of
attitudes (and activities – see §4) for which the distinction between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons
arises. And my proposed solution to the problem is different from the one D’Arms and Jacobson propose,
appealing as it does to a certain distinctive class of standards for attitudes and activities. More on this in §3.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I clarify the connection between the problem as it arises in
the case of emotions and the problem as it arises more generally, as I address it here.
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the ‘wrong,’ kind of reasons for their respective attitudes. This label for the phenomenon
is potentially misleading. It is potentially misleading because the label ‘wrong’ suggests
there is something defective or somehow worse about this sort of reason. But as we have
already seen, Criminals and Benefactor seem to be quite good reasons, in the sense of
being relatively strong reasons, for their respective attitudes. This is not to say there is
nothing odd about such reasons. This is to say that whether their oddness amounts to
a defect in them will depend on what account we give of the phenomenon. With this
caveat in mind, I will follow the convention of calling reasons like Memory and Kind
the ‘right’ kind of reasons and reasons like Criminals and Benefactor the ‘wrong’ kind
of reasons. So understood, the phenomenon of the Wrong Kind of Reasons presents a
philosophical problem: The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of giving a
systematic account of the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons for
attitudes.
You might worry that the problem has no solution, because there is not anything that
unifies the right and the wrong kind of reasons for diverse attitudes such as belief and
admiration. You might worry that for each of these different attitudes, there is an intuitive
distinction between two different kinds of reason, but that all these different dichotomies
are all different from one another. Here is an analogy: perhaps being a right kind of reason
for belief as opposed to a wrong kind of reason for belief is no more the same kind of thing
as being a right kind of reason for admiration as opposed to a wrong kind of reason for
admiration than being a golden parachute (for a CEO) as opposed to a Labrador parachute
(a certain kind of clause in a CEO’s contract that first became common on the island of
Labrador) is the same kind of thing as being a golden retreiver as opposed to a Labrador
retreiver.4 The proper response to this worry comes in two steps.
4Thanks to John Roberts for this way of putting the worry.
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The first step is to point out that, whatever attitude we are concerned with, the right
kind of reasons share some distinguishing features.5 One such feature is that the right kind
of reasons exhibit a motivational asymmetry to the wrong kind of reasons: it is in general
easier to get oneself to believe or admire for the right kind of reason than for a wrong
kind of reason.6 Another feature is that the right kind of reasons, but not the wrong kind
of reasons, seem to bear on the rationality of the attitude for which they are reasons in a
distinctive way: the right kind of reasons, but not the wrong kind of reasons, seem to bear,
in a way that is difficult to state precisely, on whether an attitude is rational as an instance
of the kind of attitude it is. This is a rough way of putting the idea, but that is part of the
point of the response to the worry, since the second step in the response is a conditional
appeal to explanatory unity: if we can explain, in a unified, systematic way, why it is that
the right and the wrong kind of reasons seem to have the features they do, and what these
features actually amount to, then we should. Doing so is part of the task of giving a unified,
systematic account of the nature of reasons in general. The project of this paper, in part, is
to show that we can give such an explanation: that we can contribute to our understanding
of the nature of reasons in general by giving a unified systematic account of the difference
between the right and the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes. I am therefore offering a
promissory note, cashable on the condition that we can explain the intuitive distinction in
a systematic, unified way.
Before presenting my explanation of that distinction, I am going to argue that two re-
cent attempts to account for the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons
5Schroeder (2012) calls these the ‘earmarks’ of the distinction. Hieronymi (2013) argues that quite
generally, ‘earmarks’ are not always trustworthy as a guide to a distinction that interests us, such that an
account of the distinction that cannot capture (all) the earmarks of the distinction fails as an account. I am
sympathetic to this idea; but Hieronymi’s argument is not germane at present, since I am appealing to the
earmarks of the distinction only to motivate the idea that there is some puzzling phenomenon present, against
the view that there is none – an idea Hieronymi surely agrees with, since she herself is in the business of
providing an account of the relevant phenomenon.
6Raz (2013) takes this to be the distinguishing mark of the right kind of reasons. See also Schroeder
(2012).
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fail. Despite failing, each attempt contains important insights into the problem. So it is
worth spending time with these accounts in order to see whether their insights can be in-
corporated into an alternative solution. As I will argue, the clue to explaining the difference
between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons for attitudes lies in noticing that, despite
what we might have thought, the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of rea-
sons does not arise for all attitudes for which there can be reasons. As we will see, this is
prima facie puzzling. I will argue that what explains this puzzle also provides the resources
for explaining the distinction between the two kinds of reasons where it does arise. And,
as I will argue, the resulting account incorporates the insights of the two failed competitor
accounts. More on this later. First, let me try and convince you that two recent attempts to
account for the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons do not work.
2.2 Two Failed Solutions
2.2.1 Hieronymi
Pamela Hieronymi has recently suggested the following way of accounting for the
difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons. According to Hieronymi, the
clue to explaining the difference lies in noticing that certain attitudes, belief among them,
are what she calls ‘commitment-constituted.’7 A commitment-constituted attitude is one
for which there is a question the answering of which amounts to forming that attitude. It
is easy to see how this works for the attitude of belief. Recall the example from above of
the belief that the concert begins at eight. Plausibly, affirmatively answering for oneself
the question ‘whether the concert begins at eight’ simply amounts to forming a belief that
the concert begins at eight.8 In other words, settling for oneself the question ‘whether the
concert begins at eight’ just is forming a belief about whether the concert begins at eight.
7Hieronymi (2005, p. 447). See also Hieronymi (2013).
8But see Boyle (2011) and Cassam (2010) for some discussions of the complications involved in this
idea.
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Having noticed this feature of commitment-constituted attitudes, Hieronymi points out that
there is a corresponding difference in reasons for such attitudes: some reasons for these
attitudes bear on a question the answering of which amounts to forming the attitude, and
some do not. In our example, Memory bears on the question ‘whether the concert begins
at eight’ whereas Criminals does not. Intuitively, Criminals bears on a different question,
such as ‘whether it would be good to believe the concert begins at eight.’ Now, according
to Hieronymi, this difference, the difference between bearing on a question the answering
of which amounts to forming an attitude and not bearing on a question the answering of
which amounts to forming an attitude, is what the difference between the right and the
wrong kind of reasons for an attitude amounts to. Memory is the right kind of reason to
believe the concert begins at eight because Memory bears on a question the answering of
which amounts to believing the concert begins at eight, and Criminals is the wrong kind
of reason because Criminals does not bear on this question. In general, then, Hieronymi’s
view is that:
Bears on a Question (BQ): R is the right kind of reason to  mind iff R bears
on a question the answering of which amounts to  mind-ing.9
The problem with Hieronymi’s account is this: BQ is extensionally inadequate to the
phenomenon. This is because, for some attitudes, there is a difference between the right
and the wrong kind of reasons for the attitude, but there is no question the answering of
which amounts to forming the attitude. Thus, for these attitudes, while there are not any
reasons that bear on a question the answering of which amounts to forming the attiudes
(since there is no such question), there is nonetheless a difference between the right and the
wrong kind of reasons for the attitudes.
Admiration is an attitude like this. There simply is not a question the answering of
which amounts to forming the attitude of admiration toward some person N analogously to
the way answering the question ‘whether P’ amounts to forming the belief that P. To insist
9Hieronymi (2005, p. 448).
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otherwise is to do violence to what we think admiring someone is like: it is to collapse the
distinction between thought and feeling.10 When I admire Lara, it is not as if all I do is make
or assent to certain judgments about her: that she is courageous, that she is generous, and so
on. It is certainly a complicated matter to say what else admiring Lara involves, but we can
safely say this: admiring Lara involves a distinctive way of being attitudinally related to
Lara that is not exhausted by being credally related to certain propositions, i.e., by having
certain beliefs, or by making or assenting to certain judgments. But, quite generally, settling
for oneself a question is exhausted by having certain beliefs, or by making or assenting to
certain judgments.11 But then, we can be certain there is no question such that settling
for oneself that question amounts to admiring Lara, since the former is simply a matter of
having certain beliefs, and the latter, whatever else it is, is not only that. But this means
that there will not be any facts that bear on a question the answering of which amounts
to admiring Lara. And so there will not be any facts such that they are the right kind of
reasons to admire Lara. But this is false. Recall the difference between:
Generous: Lara is generous.
Benefactor: Lara’s benefactor will pay me to admire her.
Generous is clearly the right kind of reason to admire Lara, whereas Benefactor is clearly
the wrong kind of reason to admire Lara. The problem is that Hieronymi’s account (BQ)
will not allow us to say this. That is because, according to BQ, for Generous to be the right
kind of reason to admire Lara is for it to bear on a question the answering of which amounts
to admiring Lara. But there is no such question. And so nothing bears on that question;
and so in particular Generous does not bear on it. So, if BQ is correct, then then we are
blocked from saying what it is clearly correct to say about this case.
10Thanks to Simon Blackburn for this way of putting the point.
11The details of how one settles for oneself a question do not matter here. What is important is the idea
that, for any question, settling it one way or the other for oneself will simply involve forming beliefs whose
contents bear on the question or, perhaps equivalently, assenting to or making judgments whose content bears
on the question. For more details on how this might work, see Schaffer (2007).
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If you are not convinced because you think, contrary to my claim, that there is a ques-
tion the answering of which amounts to admiring someone, consider the general form of
the argument. I claimed that (i) there can be the right and the wrong kind of reasons to
admire a person and, while admiring a person may involve having certain beliefs, (ii) ad-
miring a person also involves more than simply having certain beliefs. All that is required
to show that Hieronymi’s account is false is that (i) and (ii) be true for some attitude or
other. I think (i) and (ii) are clearly both true of admiration. But we can just as easily pick
a different attitude for which the difference between the right and wrong kind of reasons
shows up but where the presence of the attitude is not guaranteed by the presence of certain
beliefs; my claim is that there is at least one such attitude. The attitude of love is a particu-
larly good alternate case.12 Given the existence of attitudes for which a distinction between
the right and the wrong kind of reasons for those attitudes makes sense, but for which the
idea of a question the answering of which amounts to having the attitude does not, BQ is
unacceptable as a solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.
The point can be made even more forcefully than this, if we think there are sometimes
reasons for evaluative attitudes that are best thought of as emotions, such as anger, or fear.
This is because the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons will appear
for these emotions just as it did for attitudes like admiration, belief, and so on. For instance,
the fact that something is dangerous is a reason – intuitively, the right kind of reason – to
be afraid of it. And the fact that someone will pay you a substantial amount of money to
be afraid of something is a reason – intuitively, the wrong kind of reason – to be afraid of
it. How could Hieronymi account for this difference? Her view would have to be that there
12It is open to Hieronymi to insist on an intellectualized conception of attitudes such that any attitude for
which there can be reasons is an attitude such that making certain judgments amounts to having it. There
is some evidence that Hieronymi herself has such a view. See for instance Hieronymi (2013). But because
taking this route involves collapsing the distinction between thought and feeling, this would severely limit the
appeal of her account. Anyone who thinks, e.g., both that there can be reasons for desire and that having a
desire does not simply amount to making certain judgments or having certain beliefs will be unable to accept
Hieronymi’s account of the problem. For this reason I assume that, even if it is open to Hieronymi to pursue
this line, it is a flaw with her solution to the problem since accepting that solution will involve accepting
controversial claims very few are willing to accept.
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is a question the answering of which amounts to forming the emotion of fear, and that the
right kind of reasons are considerations that bear on that question. But, perhaps even more
clearly than in the case of attitudes like admiration, there is no such question: no amount
of settling questions for oneself will ever amount to having an emotion such as fear. So,
if we think there can be reasons to have emotions such as fear, then Hieronymi’s account
of the distinction between the right and the wrong kind of reasons cannot be extended to
cover this distinction as it arises in cases of reasons for these emotions.13
2.2.2 Schroeder
Faced with similar worries with the extensional adequacy of Hieronymi’s account,
Mark Schroeder has recently offered a somewhat different account of the distinction be-
tween the right and the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes.14 According to Schroeder, the
‘point of the distinction between the “right” and the “wrong” kind of reasons, is that only
the “right” kind contribute to standards of correctness’.15 For instance, the right kind of
reasons for belief seem to contribute to whether a belief is correct, and the wrong kind of
reasons for belief do not. Why should this be? Schroeder’s idea is that the wrong kind
of reasons are idiosyncratic in a way that bars them from contributing to standards of cor-
rectness.16 In the case above, Criminals is a reason for me to believe the concert begins
at eight, but not a reason for you – or anyone else, for that matter – to believe the concert
begins at eight. Similarly, Benefactor is a reason for me to admire Lara, but not a reason for
you – or anyone else, for that matter – to admire her. Intuitively, it is because these reasons
are idiosyncratic that they fail to contribute to the attitudes’ standards of correctness. Not
only so, but also: the right kind of reasons seem to be reasons one has simply in virtue of
13Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this further problem for Hieronymi’s account.
14I give this same account of what Schroeder’s view is, and what is wrong with it, in Sharadin (2013c).
15Schroeder (2010, p. 13)
16Schroeder (2010, pp. 35-36).
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having the relevant attitude, whereas the wrong kind of reasons seem to be reasons one has
also in virtue of some other facts, such as the fact that one does not want one family to be
tortured, or the fact that one wants to be paid by Lara’s benefactor. The fact that the right
kind of reasons are ones that one has simply in virtue of having the relevant attitude is part
of what makes it the case, according to Schroeder, that the right kind of reasons are the
ones that contribute to an attitude’s standard of correctness. Schroeder’s thought, then, is
that a systematic account of the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons
will be one that distinguishes these reasons in terms of the former, but not the latter, being
reasons that are not idiosyncratic in these two ways: that is, they will be reasons every
agent engaged in having the attitude has, and simply because she is engaged in having the
attitude. Here, then, is what Schroeder suggests as a principle for distinguishing reasons of
the right from reasons of the wrong kind:
Shared Reasons (SR): Relative to the attitude of  mind-ing, R is the right kind
of reason to  mind iff R is a reason shared by necessarily anyone engaged in
 mind-ing and just because they are so engaged.17
Intuitively, SR correctly sorts reasons like Criminals and Benefactor as the wrong kind
of reasons. Recall, the idea is that the right kind of reasons contribute to an attitude’s
correctness because they are reasons shared by necessarily everyone engaged in having an
attitude and just because they are so engaged. Criminals and Benefactor do not contribute to
the correctness of believing and admiring because they are not reasons everyone engaged
in believing and admiring shares. And, so, they are the wrong kind of reasons for their
respective attitudes. Schroeder’s proposal has some intuitive appeal. Intuitively, there is
17Schroeder (2010, p. 37). Two remarks are in order. First, Schroeder’s official statement of the view
leaves open the possibility that, relative to, say, believing, there can be the right kind of reasons for attitudes
other than belief. This possibility will not concern me here, and it is not relevant to the problems I raise with
his solution. So I elide this possibility in my statement of Schroeder’s principle. Second, Schroeder’s account
is actually designed to apply more generally, beyond the case of attitudes. Officially, his view is that, relative
to an activity A, R is the right kind of reason to   iff R is a reason shared by necessarily anyone engaged
in A and just because they are so engaged. But, restricting our attention just to his solution as it applies to
attitudes, Schroeder’s account is as I have it. I return to the question of whether the correct solution to the
problem will also apply to activities below, in §4.
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something right about the idea that the right, but not the wrong, kind of reasons contribute
to an attitude’s correctness. And, further, there is something intuitively right about the idea
that reasons that contribute to an attitude’s correctness are reasons that everyone engaged
in having an attitude shares.
But because Schroeder proposes to understand correctness for attitudes in terms of
there being shared reasons, his way of solving the problem requires that we be able to make
independent sense of two claims: (i) that there is a set of reasons shared by necessarily any-
one engaged in  mind-ing and just because they are so engaged (call this claim Shared Set)
and (ii) that the shared set of reasons is coextensive with the set of the right kind of reasons
for  mind-ing (call this claim Shared-Right Connection). The problem with Schroeder’s
account, I think, is that it cannot establish Shared Set and Shared-Right Connection.
Schroeder is aware that his account owes us some story about Shared Set and Shared-
Right Connection, and he tries out two different strategies to establish these claims: the
background facts strategy and the alethic strategy. What each of these strategies is designed
to show is that there is a set of shared reasons relative to an attitude (Shared Set), and that
this set of reason is equivalent to the set of the right kind of reasons for the attitude (Shared-
Right Connection). If either strategy were successful, it would show that the right kind of
reasons contribute to an attitude’s correctness because they are members of a set of reasons
shared by necessarily everyone engaged in having the attitude and just because they are
so engaged. I will now argue that neither of Schroeder’s two strategies can succesfully
establish both Shared Set and Shared-Right Connection. Briefly, the problem with the
background facts strategy is that it cannot establish Shared Set, and the problem with the
alethic strategy is that, even if it can establish Shared Set, it cannot establish Shared-Right
Connection – that is, it cannot establish that the shared set of reasons is coextensive with
the set of the right kind of reasons.
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2.2.3 The Background Facts Strategy
Schroeder’s first strategy appeals to background facts about attitudes.18 For example,
here is Schroeder discussing background facts about admiration:
One such fact is that [admiration] is the kind of state to motivate you to emulate
the people that you admire. That fact is a reason to be such that if you admire
anyone, you only admire people who it would not be a bad idea to emulate.
Moreover, this is a reason that you have, whether you admire anyone or not.
[...] On this picture, these reasons [only to admire people who it would not
be a bad idea to emulate] are derivative reasons which are triggered by the
fact that you are engaged in admiring in the first place. So they are shared by
anyone who is engaged in admiring, and hence are the right kind of reasons for
admiration.19
The idea is that Shared Set is true for admiration because there is a shared set of reasons
for emulation, and emulation naturally follows admiration: the shared set of reasons for
emulation derivatively yields the shared set of reasons for admiration. Grant that there is
a shared set of reasons for emulation.20 This will still not do the trick to establish Shared
Set for admiration. It is not enough to point out, as Schroeder does, that admiration is
the kind of state to motivate you to emulate people you admire. For, all this shows is that
admiration typically, normally, when all goes well, motivates you to emulate people you
admire. But this does not show that anyone engaged in admiring a person has a reason
to admire them only if it would not be a bad idea to emulate them. It would only show
that if admiration always, without fail, no matter what, motivated you to emulate those you
admire. But admiration does not do this. For instance, it is possible to admire someone’s
life-long commitment to saving the rain forests without being motivated to emulate that
18Schroeder (2010, p. 42).
19Schroeder (2010, p. 42).
20Schroeder’s reason for thinking there is a set of reasons shared by necessarily anyone engaged in em-
ulating is presumably that, first, one does not even count as engaged in emulating unless one also aims at
emulating those it would not be a bad idea to emulate, and that, second, having an aim of this sort guarantees
the presence of certain reasons. See Schroeder (2007c, Chapter 7), esp. p. 135 and following.
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person. But then, since there is conceptual room to admire without also being motivated
to emulate, then the reasons there are to only admire those it would not be a bad idea to
emulate will not always be ‘triggered’ by the fact that one is engaged in admiring in the
first place. In particular, these reasons will not be triggered in cases where the (admittedly
typical) connection between admiring and emulating is somehow interrupted, or blocked.
You might think I am being unfair to Schroeder. Surely the connection between certain
attitudes and related activities is more than merely typical. Emulating someone is not
just typically associated with admiring them: the connection is stronger than this. I am
willing to grant that the connection is stronger. But unless we are willing to strengthen the
connection all the way to necessity, the point stands: what is required in order to show that
the shared set of reasons for emulation always derivatively yields a shared set of reasons
for admiration – what are supposed to be reasons of the right kind for admiration – is a
necessary connection between admiration and emulation. And, I claim, however strong we
think the connection between admiration and emulation is, we do not think it is a necessary
connection.21
This problem with the background facts strategy generalizes. In general, there is not
a necessary connection between someone’s attitudinizing in a certain way (e.g., admir-
ing) and that person’s engaging in an intentional activity with an aim (e.g., emulation) for
which, we grant, there might be a shared set of reasons. In other words, while there might
be certain activities or actions typical for people with certain attitudes, most attitudes – in-
cluding those liable to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem – do not come with a necessary
connection to any actions, and so do not come with a shared set of reasons, even if certain
actions do come with shared sets of reasons.22 So the background facts strategy does not
work because it cannot establish Shared Set.
21Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to be clearer about this point.
22Thanks to Derek Baker for this way of putting the point.
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2.2.4 The Alethic Strategy
Schroeder’s second strategy is the alethic strategy; here he is explaining it:
If admiration is an attitude which represents its objects as being in a certain
way, and if there is a standing reason not to have false mental representations
of a certain kind – including the kind involved in belief, but also whatever
kind is involved in admiration – then we could take the view that having the
attitude of admiration triggers these reasons to not have false representations,
by giving you reasons to not admire people who lack the feature that admiration
represents people as having [...]23
The problem with the alethic strategy is that it cannot establish Shared-Right Connection:
that the shared set of reasons for an attitude is coextensive with the set of the right kind
of reasons for the attitude. Consider the case of admiration. Grant that admiration repre-
sents its object as being a certain way. Grant that there is a standing reason not to have
false mental representations of a certain kind, including those involved in admiration. The
problem is that the reasons there are to not admire people who lack whatever features ad-
miration represents people as having clearly do not exhaust the set of the right kind of
reasons with respect to admiration. That is because they are only negative reasons: reasons
against admiring people who lack certain features. But some of the right kind of reasons
with respect to admiration are reasons for admiring certain people, not just reasons against
admiring others. To explain: Suppose, for the sake of argument, that admiring someone
involves representing them as generous. Now suppose Lara is not generous. The alethic
strategy reveals why the fact that Lara is not generous is the right kind of reason against
admiring Lara. This is because admiring Lara would be a way of falsely representing Lara
as generous. But suppose Lara is generous. The alethic strategy does not explain why this
fact is the right kind of reason to actually admire Lara. But, clearly, it is.24
23Schroeder (2010, p. 42).
24Of course, it is not true that in every case admiring someone involves representing them as generous.
This is because there can be disparate grounds for finding someone admirable, such as their kindness, courage,
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The case against the alethic strategy is even clearer when it comes to the attitude of
belief: the reasons there are to not believe false propositions clearly do not exhaust the
right kind of reasons with respect to belief. That is because they are only negative reasons:
reasons against believing propositions that are false. But some of the right kind of reasons
for belief are reasons for believing certain propositions, not just reasons against believing
others. To explain: Suppose you receive reliable testimony that the concert does not start at
eight. The alethic strategy explains why this fact is the right kind of reason to not believe
that the concert starts at eight. But now suppose you receive reliable testimony that the
concert does start at eight. The alethic strategy does not explain why this fact is the right
kind of reason to actually believe the concert starts at eight. But, clearly, it is.
The general problem with the alethic strategy is that the reasons it establishes as shared
reasons are only reasons against having false mental representations. So you could try and
rehabilitate the alethic strategy by extending it to include standing reasons not just against
having false mental representations, but also standing reasons for having truemental repre-
sentations. But that will not work either. That is because it is overwhelmingly implausible
that there is such a reason. If there were a standing reason to have true mental representa-
tions, then there would be in particular a standing reason to have beliefs in true propositions,
for these are paradigmatic instances of true mental representations. Then there would be
a standing reason to have a belief in any old true proposition, no matter how trivial: there
would be a reason, for instance, to have a true belief about each name and number in
the phonebook. But there is no such reason. So there is not any standing reason to have
true mental representations, and appealing to such a reason cannot rehabilitate the alethic
or strength. I make the simplifying assumption for the sake of easing exposition. In its expanded form, the
argument would begin with the assumption that admiring someone involves representing them as generous,
or kind, or courageous, or strong, or... and so on for all the properties the having of which we think is
admirable. The argument would then proceed as before: the alethic strategy explains why the fact that
someone is not generous, or not kind, or not courageous, or not strong, and so on... is the right kind of reason
against admiring that person, but it does not explain why the fact that someone is generous, or is kind, or
is courageous, or is strong, is the right kind of reason to admire them. In what follows, I shall continue to
use the abbreviated form of the argument. Thanks to an anonymous referee for recommending clarity on this
point.
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strategy. So the alethic strategy does not work because it cannot establish Shared-Right
Connection, that the shared set of reasons there are relative to an attitude is co-extensive
with the right kind of reasons for the attitude.
At this point the fan of the alethic strategy might try to reply by discrediting our
negative existential intuitions about reasons.25 Elsewhere, Schroeder has tried to do pre-
cisely this.26 His suggestion, briefly, is that ‘there is a reason to  mind’ is usually elliptical
for ‘there is a particularly weighty reason to  mind’.27 Without going into details: this
means that our negative intuitions about the existence of particularly weak reasons cannot
be trusted, because it will strike us as counterintuitive or false that there is a reason to  mind
whenever the reasons for  mind-ing are sufficiently weak.28 In the present context, then, the
suggestion would be that the negative intuitions I appealed to above, e.g., that there is no
reason to have a true belief about each name and number in the phonebook, cannot be
trusted. Instead, there is a standing reason to have true mental representations, including
the kind involved in admiration and belief, only it is a relatively weak reason: That is why
it seemed counterintuitive that such a reason existed.
The alethic strategy that replies in this way still faces two problems. First, this reply
would seem to entail that the right kind of reasons to  mind are all relatively weak rea-
sons. To see this, recall that on the current proposal the right kind of reasons to  mind are
supposed to be ‘triggered’ by the reasons there are to have true mental representations. For
instance, the right kind of reasons to admire Lara, such as that she is generous, are triggered
by the reasons there are to have true mental representations of the kind involved in admi-
ration, presumably representations to the effect that Lara is generous. We just said that the
reason there is to have true mental representations about Lara is a relatively weak reason.
25Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion on behalf of the alethic strategy.
26See Schroeder (2007d, p. 121-124), Schroeder (2007c, esp. Chapters 5 and 7), and Schroeder (2007b)
27Again, Schroeder’s account is meant to apply to reasons for action as well as reasons for attitudes. But
my focus here is solely on the latter.
28Schroeder (2007d, p. 123)
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That is what was supposed to explain our negative intuition about the existence of such a
reason. But then, on the plausible assumption that facilitative connections between reasons
do not contribute to the strength of a reason,29 the reasons there are to admire Lara that are
triggered by the reason to have true mental representations about Lara are correspondingly
weak. And that seems like a mistake. The fact that Lara is generous is, in addition to being
the right kind of reason to admire her, a relatively strong reason to admire her.
In any event, the alethic strategy faces a second, worse problem. Suppose there is a
standing reason to have true mental representations, including the kind of representations
involved in admiration, and suppose further that these reasons are suitably strong. The
problem is that the reasons there are to have whatever true mental representations are in-
volved in admiring Lara do not correspond to the right kind of reasons to admire Lara. That
is because some of the mental representations involved in admiring Lara do not have any-
thing to do with whether Lara is admirable, in the sense of deserving admiration, but rather
have to do with whether Lara is admirable in the sense of being a suitable possible object
of admiration. And only reasons for the former, and not the latter, sort of mental represen-
tation are the right kind of reasons to admire Lara. For example, suppose one of the mental
representations involved in admiring Lara is the representation of Lara as a responsible
agent. That is, you would not count as admiring Lara unless you had the mental repre-
sentation of Lara as a responsible agent. Then, according to the account on offer, being
engaged in admiration triggers reasons to have true mental representations about whether
Lara is a responsible agent. It would follow, then, that the reasons there are to believe truly
that Lara is a responsible agent are the right kind of reasons to admire Lara, since these
would be reasons shared by necessarily anyone engaged in admiring Lara and just because
they are so engaged. But the reasons there are for thinking that Lara is a responsible agent
29For reasons of space, I will not argue for this principle here. For some intuitive support in its favor,
notice that, if it were false, then there could be an overwhelmingly strong reason to perform an action that is
a means to performing an action there is an underwhelmingly weak reason to perform. Intuitively, at least,
this is the wrong result.
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are not per se reasons (let alone reasons of the right kind) for admiring Lara.30 For instance,
the fact that Lara is a human adult is (at least some) reason for believing Lara is a respon-
sible agent; but the fact that Lara is a human adult is not by itself a reason for admiring
Lara, let alone a reason of the right kind for doing so. In general, the problem can be put
like this: if the current suggestion is correct, the reasons there are to correctly represent the
world in all the ways involved in  mind-ing are all the right kind of reasons to  mind. But
that is false. For, as we have just seen, not all ways  mind-ing represents the world to be are
ways that are relevant to whether  mind-ing is merited, in the sense of deserved. And thus
not all reasons for correctly representing the world in the way involved in  mind-ing are the
right kind of reasons to  mind. So the alethic strategy still cannot establish Shared-Right
Connection.
I have just argued that Schroeder’s account – SR – cannot be correct because, in order
for it to work, he would have to establish both that there is a set of reasons shared by
necessarily anyone engaged in  mind-ing and just because they are so engaged and that this
set of reasons is coextensive with the set of the right kind of reasons. The problem is that
neither of Schroeder’s two strategies for establishing these two claims will do the trick.
2.3 A Puzzle and a Proposal
Where does this leave us? It leaves us without an account of the Wrong Kind of
Reasons Problem: neither Hieronymi’s BQ nor Schroeder’s SR can successfully distinguish
the right from the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes like admiration and belief. BQ was
extensionally inadequate because for some attitudes, e.g., admiration, there simply is not
a question the answering of which amounts to forming that attitude. And as we just saw,
SR was inadequate because it relied on the idea that there are sets of reasons shared by
necessarily anyone engaged in having an attitude, an idea that neither of Schroeder’s two
strategies could make sense of.
30I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this way of putting the problem for the alethic strategy.
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I do not want to make any more hay out of how Hieronymi and Schroeder’s accounts
go wrong, because I think each contains an important insight into the nature of the Wrong
Kind of Reasons Problem. It is worth pausing over these insights for just a moment – I will
return to them in some more detail below, in my concluding remarks.
Schroeder’s idea, recall, is that, as he puts it, the ‘point of the distinction between the
“right” and the “wrong” kinds of reasons, is that only the ‘right’ kind contribute to standards
of correctness’.31 The idea, then, was that shared sets of reasons for attitudes contribute
to standards of correctness, and so it is the shared sets of reasons that are the right kind of
reasons for an attitude. The problem with Schroeder’s account, as we just saw, was that it
required us to have an independent grip on the idea that there were shared sets of reasons
for attitudes, an idea that neither of Schroeder’s two strategies could make sense of. But
despite the failure of the account, I think Schroeder’s idea is basically right: the right kind
of reasons are ones that contribute to standards of correctness. The problem with his view
was that it required us to derive the standards of correctness for attitudes from the shared
sets of reasons for those attitudes. Hieronymi’s view also contains an important insight.
Hieronymi’s idea, recall, was that the right kind of reasons for an attitude are reasons that
bear on a particular question. For instance, in the case of belief, her view was that the right
kind of reasons for belief bear on a question the answering of which amounts to forming
the belief. The problem with Hieronymi’s account was that it could not be extended to
cover all attitudes for which the problem arises. The case of admiration was particularly
striking: since there is no question the answering of which amounts to admiring someone,
Hieronymi’s account was incapable of account for the difference between the right and the
wrong kind of reasons for admiration. The trouble with Hieronymi’s account, I think, is not
that she is wrong that the right kind of reasons bear on a particular question. The trouble
is that she has got the question wrong. I am going to argue for an alternative solution
to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem that can be thought of as combining Schroeder
31Schroeder (2010, p. 13)
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and Hieronymi’s insights into a single account: the right kind of reasons are those that
contribute to standards of correctness, and the way they do so is by bearing on a particular
question, viz. the question of whether the relevant attitude is correct. This is rough. Before
fleshing out the details, let me motivate my proposal by introducing a puzzle.
When I introduced the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes I said that the
problem of distinguishing between the right and the wrong kind of reasons was not limited
to the attitudes of admiration and belief, but that the same problem arises across a range
of attitudes for which there can be reasons. This way of stating the problem left open the
possibility that there are attitudes for which the distinction between the right and the wrong
kind of reasons does not make any sense. In fact, I think this possibility is actual. And
I think focusing on cases of attitudes for which the distinction between the right and the
wrong kind of reasons does not make any sense can help shed light on how to think about
that distinction in cases where it clearly does.
Consider the attitude of imagination. Like believing, imagining is a way of being
attitudinally related to a proposition, P. And like believing that P, imagining that P is a
way of regarding P as true.32 Moreover, as with the attitude of belief, there can be reasons
to imagine one way rather than another. For instance, consider the proposition:
Democrat (D): The Democrats will retain control of the Senate in 2014.
There can be reasons to believe D and there can be reasons to imagine D. For instance, the
fact that polling data supports the truth of D is a reason to believe D, and the fact that it
is part of a pleasant fantasy is a reason to imagine D. But notice: While there can be the
wrong kind of reasons to believe D (that is something we are already familiar with) there
cannot be the wrong kind of reasons to imagine D. To see this, recall how easy it was to
generate reasons of the wrong kind for attitudes like belief and admiration. All we had to
do was to introduce an extraordinary incentive in favor of the attitude, such as criminals
32I borrow this way of putting the point from Shah and Velleman (2005).
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threatening to torture your family, or eccentric benefactors offering payment.33 But this
method will not work for the attitude of imagination. Consider:
Pleasant: Imagining D is part of engaging in a pleasant fantasy.
Mad Billionaire: A mad billionaire will pay you a million dollars to imagine
D.
Both Pleasant and Mad Billionaire are reasons to imagine D but, unlike in the case of
belief, the extraordinary incentives introduced in Mad Billionaire do not seem to make it a
reason of the ‘wrong’ kind. Indeed, it is hard to see what could even count as a reason of the
‘wrong’ kind to imagine D: that is, while there can be reasons to imagine, imagination does
not appear to be the sort of attitude for which the intuitive distinction between the ‘right’
and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons makes sense. This is prima facie puzzling. It is puzzling
because, in other respects, imagination seems very much like belief: both attitudes involve
regarding their objects as true, both are attitudes for which there can be reasons, and so
on. So: What explains why belief, but not imagination, is liable to the Wrong Kind of
Reasons Problem? Put generally: What explains why some attitudes, but not others, are
liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem? I think the clue to answering this question
lies in noticing an important difference between attitudes like belief and imagination. Let
me warm you up to that difference by way of an analogy.
Consider two visually similar objects, each of which comprises colored intersecting
lines arranged in a roughly web-like structure, one of which is a paint splatter and one of
which is a commuter’s map of the London Underground. What, we can ask, is the differ-
ence between these two objects? There are a number. But here is one important difference:
whereas we can evaluate both objects in a variety of ways, for instance in terms of their
aesthetic qualities, the cost of producing each, and so on, the object that is the map of the
Underground brings with it a particular standard of evaluation. That standard is, roughly,
33Schroeder also makes this point about the ease of generating the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes by
way of introducing extraordinary incentives in Schroeder (2010). According to Schroeder, that is part of the
clue that what is going on in these cases has to do with the reasons being idiosyncratic.
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accuracy in conveying the (commuter’s map relevant) features of the London Underground.
What does it mean to say that the map of the Underground brings with it a particular stan-
dard of evaluation? It means that part of what it is to be a map of the London Underground
is to be subject to this standard of evaluation. An object that we did not think of as liable
to this standard would not be one that we thought of as a member of the kind ‘map of the
London Underground’: being a series of colored intersecting lines arranged in a roughly
web-like structure that is a member of the kind ‘map of the London Underground’ means,
in part, being liable to the standard of evaluation of accurately conveying the relevant fea-
tures of the London Underground.34 This is not to say that we cannot similarly evaluate
the paint splatter in terms of how well it accurately represents the London Underground.
Perhaps by some chance the paint splatter is adequate, or even exceptional, in regards to
this standard. This is to say that the paint splatter is not, simply in virtue of the kind of thing
it is, the kind of thing that is liable to such evaluation, whereas the map of the Underground
is so liable. And this is not to say that we cannot evaluate the map in other terms, such as
whether it has artistic flair, or whether it is economical to produce. This is to say that the
map is not, simply in virtue of the kind of thing it is, the kind of thing that is liable to such
evaluation.
Let us sharpen up the language. We can say that the map is subject to a constitutive
standard of correctness involving its accuracy in representing the features of the London
Underground, whereas the paint splatter, while it might be subject to some standards of cor-
rectness or other – including perhaps the standard of accuracy in representing the features
of the London Underground – is not subject to any constitutive standard of correctness. In
other words, there is no way a paint splatter should be, if it is to be a correct member of
the kind ‘paint splatter’. A constitutive standard of correctness can therefore be thought of
34Thus a map of the London Underground is what Judith Thomson calls a ‘correctness-fixing kind’. For
Thomson’s account of correctness-fixing kinds, see Thomson (2008). I disagree with Thomson on the correct
diagnosis of the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, but I agree with her, to a large degree, on what it takes for
something to be liable to the problem, viz. that it must be a member of a correctness-fixing kind.
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as a standard of correctness that expresses a constitutive ideal for the thing in question – a
way the thing must be, if it is to be a correct instance of the kind of thing it is. In order for
the map to meet the standards to which it is subject qua map of the London Underground
it has to be accurate in representing the relevant features of the Underground. That is what
it means to say that accuracy is the constitutive standard of correctness for a map of the
Underground.
How does all of this relate to belief and imagination? Consider two structurally similar
mental attitudes, each of which comprises an attitude of ‘regarding as true’ toward some
proposition, P, one of which is an imagination, and one of which is a belief. What, we can
ask, is the difference between these two mental attitudes? There are a number. But here
is one important difference: whereas we can evaluate both attitudes in a variety of ways,
for instance in terms of the costs of acquiring each, their contribution to psychological
health, and so on, the attitude that is the belief that P brings with it a particular standard of
evaluation. That standard is truth. (Actually, this is a simplification in order to make the
point. I shall return to the complications involved in specifying the constitutive standard
of attitudes below. For now, the idea that the constitutive standard of belief is truth will be
sufficient.) What does it mean to say that the belief that P brings with it the standard of
truth? It means that part of what it is to be a belief that P is to be subject to this standard of
evaluation. A mental attitude that we did not think of as liable to this standard would not
be one that we thought of as a member of the kind ‘belief’: being a regarding as true that is
a member of the kind ‘belief’ means, in part, being liable to the standard of evaluation of
truth. Again, this is not to say that we cannot similarly evaluate an imagination in terms of
how well it conforms to the standard of truth. Perhaps by some chance what is imagined is
in fact true, and so the imagination is adequate, or even exceptional, in regards this standard.
This is to say that an imagination is not, simply in virtue of the kind of mental attitude it
is, the kind of mental attitude that is liable to such evaluation, whereas a belief is so liable.
And this is not to say that we cannot evaluate belief in other terms, such as whether it is
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costly, or whether it contributes to psychological health. This is to say that the belief is not,
simply in virtue of the kind of thing it is, the kind of thing that is liable to such evaluation.
We can use our sharpened language to express the point. We can say that belief is sub-
ject to a constitutive standard of correctness involving truth, whereas imagination, while it
might be subject to some standards of correctness or other – including perhaps the standard
of truth – is not subject to any constitutive standard of correctness. The standard of truth
expresses a constitutive ideal for belief – a way belief must be, if it is to be a correct in-
stance of the kind of mental attitude it is. In order for the belief that P to meet the standards
to which it is subject qua belief that P it has to be true. That is what it means to say that
truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief.
How do these observations about belief and imagination help with our original puz-
zle? Recall, that puzzle was motivated by noticing a difference between attitudes: some
attitudes, but not others, are liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. In particular,
belief, but not imagination, is liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. The puzzle
is the puzzle of explaining why in general this is so. We just observed a different differ-
ence between belief and imagination: belief, but not imagination, is subject to a constitutive
standard of correctness. Here, then, is my hypothesis: it is the latter difference that explains
the former. That is, the fact that belief is subject to a constitutive standard of correctness is
what makes it liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, and the fact that imagination
is not similarly subject to a constitutive standard of correctness is what makes it not liable
to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Quite generally, my hypothesis is that what ex-
plains why some attitudes, but not others, are liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
is that some attitudes, but not others, are subject to constitutive standards of correctness.
Why would being subject to a constitutive standard of correctness make an attitude
liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem and failure to be subject to such a standard
make an attitude not liable to the problem? The answer is simple: the distinction between
the right and the wrong kind of reasons is the distinction between reasons that are evidence
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that an object conforms to a constitutive standard of correctness and reasons that are not
such evidence. Thus, in the case of attitudes that lack a constitutive standard of correctness,
the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason is inapt, since making sense of
that distinction requires, first of all, that the attitude in question is subject to a constitutive
standard of correctness.
As confirmation of this idea, consider, again, the right and the wrong kind of reasons
for belief that D, the Democrats will retain control of the Senate in 2014. Recall, the right
kind of reasons for believing D are facts like:
(i) Recent polling data suggests that D.
(ii) Some reliable political analysts believe that D.
(iii) The number of vulnerable Democratic seats is insufficient to result in a
Republican takeover.
What (i-iii) have in common is that each of them is evidence that a belief that D is true,
i.e., is evidence concerning whether a belief that D conforms to a constitutive standard of
correctness for belief. My suggestion is that this fact, that each of (i-iii) is evidence that the
belief that D’s conforms to a standard of correctness constitutive of belief, is what makes
(i-iii) the right kind of reasons for the belief thatD. The wrong kind of reasons for believing
D are facts like:
(iv) It is pleasant to believe that D.
(v) Your peer group will like you more if you believe that D.
(vi) Democratic strategists will torture your family unless you believe that D.
What (iv-vi) have in common is that each of them is evidence that a belief that D is useful,
i.e., is evidence that a belief thatD conforms to a standard of correctness for belief we might
call the standard of utility. But the standard of utility is not a standard that applies to belief
as such, simply in virtue of the kind of attitude it is. My suggestion then is that this fact,
that each of (iv-vi) is evidence that the belief that D conforms to a standard of correctness
that is not constitutive of belief, is what makes (iv-vi) the wrong kind of reasons for the
belief that D. Importantly, this is not to say that (iv-vi) are not reasons for belief. This
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is to say that they are they are the wrong kind of reasons for belief, because they are not
evidence that the belief conforms to a standard of correctness that applies to it simply in
virtue of the kind of attitude it is. So that is how the account solves the Wrong Kind of
Reasons Problem for belief.
This hypothesis, along with its attendant solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Prob-
lem, predicts that for attitudes like imagination, which lack a constitutive standard of cor-
rectness, we will be unable to distinguish between the right and the wrong kind of reasons
for the attitude. And we have already seen that this is so in the case of imagination. The
hypothesis also predicts that, wherever we are able to distinguish the right from the wrong
kind of reasons for an attitude, there too we will think that the attitude is governed by a
constitutive standard of correctness. Is this prediction borne out? I think it is. Obviously
I cannot proceed stepwise through all attitudes, showing for each one that is liable to a
Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem that it is also subject to a constitutive standard of cor-
rectness. But let me provide some inductive evidence for my proposal by illustrating how
it deals with a range of attitudes, including one we are already familiar with, one we we
know is liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem: admiration.
According to the proposal on offer, an attitude is liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Problem if and only if, and because, it is subject to a constitutive standard of correctness,
i.e., a standard of correctness that applies to the attitude simply in virtue of being the kind
of attitude it is. So: are all attitudes liable to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem subject
to such constitutive standards? I think we have good independent reason to say they are.
Consider a range of different attitudes you might have toward some person, N. You might
fear N, trust N, hate N, love N, despise N, envy N, respect N, admire N... the list continues.
What distinguishes one attitude from another? In particular, is there something analogous
to ‘being true’ or ‘being an accurate map of the London Underground’ that, as a standard
for each of these attitudes, helps constitute the attitude as the distinctive attitude it is?
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We can begin to answer this question by noticing that each of these attitudes repre-
sents its objects as being a certain way. Fear represents its objects as dangerous, trust as
trustworthy, envy as enviable, admiration as admirable, and so on. Part of what it is to be
the distinctive attitude each of these attitudes is seems to be for the attitude to represent its
object as being the distinctive way each attitude represents its object as being, viz. dan-
gerous, trustworthy, enviable, admirable, and so on. Here, then, is my suggestion: this is
best thought of in terms of there being a constitutive standard of correctness for each of the
attitudes in question. So: the constitutive standard of correctness for the attitude of fear is
dangerousness; for trust, trustworthiness; for envy, enviability; for admiration, admirabil-
ity. Putting the point this way means that admiration is distinguished from, say, trust, in
part by the former, but not the latter, being subject to a standard of admirability.
This is not to say that, when it comes to admiration, we are always exclusively inter-
ested in admirability. Indeed, we regularly wonder wonder whether admiring someone is to
our advantage, or would offend them, or would please those around us. Practical advantage,
avoiding offense, peer approval, and so on are all what we might think of as standards of
correctness for admiration: they are all standards the meeting of which sometimes matters
to us when it comes to admiration. But the standard of admirability plays a special role for
admiration, analogous to the role played by the standard of truth for belief: thinking of an
attitude as the attitude of admiration already involves thinking of it as subject to the stan-
dard of admirability, just like thinking of something as a belief already involves thinking
of it as evaluable in terms of whether or not it is true. Part of what it is for admiration to be
the kind of mental attitude it is – or, we might say, what turns admiration from an attitude
that merely involves fondly regarding its object into an instance of admiration – is for it to
be subject to a standard of correctness involving whether or not its object is admirable. Ad-
mirability in this sense expresses a constitutive ideal for the attitude of admiration. Similar
remarks apply to the other attitudes. What turns mere negative affect into the attitude of
envy? The thought that the attitude is subject to a standard of correctness involving whether
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or not its object is in fact enviable.
Notice that what this means is that, in order to provide a complete solution to the
problem, we shall have to have an independent account of the properties that comprise the
relevant constitutive standards for the attitudes in question. If the right kind of reasons for
admiration are those reasons that are evidence that the object of admiration is admirable
then in order to identify the right kind of reasons for admiration we shall need an account
of what admirability comprises. Importantly, the very same thing goes for the attitude of
belief. Earlier, I said that the idea that ‘truth’ comprised the constitutive standard for belief
was a simplification. We are now in a position to see what sort of simplification this was,
and why it was merited. In fact, all that we are strictly licensed to say about the attitude of
belief is that it is a mental attitude subject to the constitutive standard of credibility. The
simplification I made was in assuming a substantive normative view according to which
credibility is a matter of truth. This simplification is justified, I think, in virtue of the
fact that there is wide – perhaps universal agreement – on this idea, viz. that credibility –
meriting belief – is a matter of being true. But there could in principle be disagreement on
this fact: a bizarro-epistemologist might implausibly suggest, for instance, that credibility
– what merits belief – is falsehood rather than truth.35 We would presumably have no truck
with such a view, since we would reject its first-order normative implications to the effect
that, e.g., evidence that something is false is the right kind of reason to believe it. The
point here is just that such a view is possible: what determines the content of the right kind
of reasons for an attitude is in part a substantive normative view about which properties
comprise the constitutive standards for the attitude in question. There is not, or at least
not much, disagreement in the case of belief over what the properties are that comprise
‘credibility’: credibility is a matter of truth. But when it comes to attitudes like admiration,
35Somewhat, but only somewhat, less implausibly, Richard Rorty infamously floats a view according
to which what merits belief is truth, but according to which truth is correctly understood not as matter of
correspondence to reality, but instead as a matter of that which one’s contemporaries are willing to accept.
See Rorty (1989).
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fear, envy, and so on, such disagreement is not only possible, but actual.
As I said, the disagreement in these cases is a substantive normative disagreement over
what the properties are that comprise the constitutive standards for the attitude in question.
So, for instance, there can be substantive normative disagreement over whether some prop-
erty partially comprises the property of ‘admirability,’ and then, according to my view, there
will be resulting disagreement over what the right kind of reasons are to admire someone.
I think it is plausible to suppose that we are in fact in such substantive disagreement with
a range of eighteenth- and even nineteenth-century philosophers and laymen over whether
the property of ‘chastity’ partially comprises the property of admirability, i.e., whether
someone’s (in particular a woman’s) being chaste contributes to her admirability. What
this means is that we will, at the level of the reasons, be in substantive disagreement over
whether evidence that someone is chaste is ipso facto the right kind of reason to admire her.
I take it that we think this is false, and that at least some have thought it is true.36 To my ear,
this sounds like exactly the result we want from an account of the right kind of reasons: we
want our account to allow for the possibility of disagreement over what the right kind of
reasons are to, e.g., admire someone, and to explain this disagreement in terms of a more
fundamental substantive normative disagreement over what admirability amounts to.
This sort of disagreement over the right and the wrong kind of reasons shows up not
just in cases of admiration, but also in cases of other attitudes, such as the attitude of
blame. Blame is an attitude for which there can be reasons, and there is a corresponding
distinction between the right and the wrong kind of reasons to blame someone. And there
can be substantive normative disagreement over whether some property partially comprises
the property of blameworthiness. For instance, we might all agree that the fact that it will
lead to excellent outcomes in terms of utility is a good reason to blame someone, i.e., a
relatively strong reason to do so. (We might not agree to this, but let’s say we do for the sake
36Hume seems to be among those that thinks chastity is admirable; he says, at least, that it is praiseworthy.
See Hume (1978, 3.2.12).
64
of argument.) But what (certain sorts of) utilitarians and (certain sorts of) deontologists
disagree over is whether such a reason is a reason of the right kind to blame someone:
utilitarians think of blameworthiness as comprised of the property of promoting overall
utility; deontologists think of blameworthiness as comprised of the property of having (say)
violated a duty.37 What this means is that utilitarians and deontologists are, at the level
of the reasons, in substantive disagreement over whether evidence that blaming someone
promotes overall utility is ipso facto the right kind of reason to blame her. Deontologists
think this is false, and (at least some) utilitarians think it is true. Again, this sounds like
the right result: even if deontologists were to grant that promoting overall utility generates
a (possibly strong) reason to blame someone, their disagreement with utilitarians (on this
point, at least) is over whether such a reason is a reason of the right kind to do so. (And
settling whether it is a reason of the right kind will not, of course, settle whether or not we
ought to blame the person.)38
So much for the possibility of disagreement about the right and the wrong kind of
reasons. Let me try and convince you that my account delivers the intuitively correct re-
sults about the right and the wrong kind of reasons for admiration. As we now know,
doing so will require assuming some substantive normative claims about what admirability
comprises. I shall try and keep these assumptions as uncontroversial as possible. Recall,
intuitively, the right kind of reasons for admiring N are facts like:
(i) N is courageous.
(ii) N is kind.
(iii) N is generous.
37At least, this is what utilitarians say they think though, as an anonymous reviewer pointed out to me, it
may be that such utilitarians are making a conceptual mistake about blame and what they really think is that
blameworthiness doesn’t matter at all. Instead, what matters is who it is optimal to blame. But for present
purposes I’ll take them at their word.
38Thanks to an anonymous referee for taking issue with an earlier version of this example and pressing
me to be clearer on this point. For another example of a substantive normative view about the content of the
properties that comprise the constitutive standards of an attitude – one with which we might disagree – see
Rawls’s claims concerning envy in Rawls (1971, Chapter 9).
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What (i-iii) have in common, I suggest, is that each of them is evidence that admiring N is
admiring something admirable, i.e., is evidence that admiring N conforms to a constitutive
standard of correctness for admiration. My idea, then, as in the case of belief, is that this
fact, that each of (i-iii) is evidence that admiring N conforms to a standard of correctness
for admiration is what makes (i-iii) the right kind of reasons to admire N. The wrong kind
of reasons to admire N are facts like:
(iv) It is pleasant to admire N.
(v) N’s benefactor will pay you to admire her.
(vi) Criminals will torture your family unless you admire N
What (iv-vi) have in common is that each of them is evidence that admiring N is in some
way useful or expedient, i.e., is evidence that admiring N conforms to a standard of correct-
ness for admiration we might call the standard of utility. But the standard of utility is not a
standard that applies to admiration as such, simply in virtue of the kind of attitude it is. My
suggestion then is that this fact, that each of (iv-vi) is evidence that admiring N conforms
to a standard of correctness that is not constitutive of admiration, is what makes (iv-vi) the
wrong kind of reasons for admiring N. Importantly, again, this is not to say that (iv-vi) are
not reasons for admiring N. This is to say that they are the wrong kind of reasons for admir-
ing N, because they do not constitute evidence that the attitude conforms to a standard of
correctness that applies to it simply in virtue of the kind of attitude it is. So that is how the
account solves the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for admiration; and I hope it is clear
how it would go for other attitudes too.
2.4 Too Narrow?
In developing his solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes,
Schroeder observes that a structurally identical problem arises not just for attitudes, but
also for certain activities, such as making a move in chess, tying knots, and setting the table
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for a White House State Dinner.39 His idea is that, just as there can be the right and the
wrong kind of reasons to admire someone, there can be the right and the wrong kind of
reasons to make a move in chess. For instance, intuitively, the fact that castling is likely to
lead to checkmate is the right kind of reason to castle in a game of chess, whereas the fact
that someone will pay you to castle is the wrong kind of reason to castle in a game of chess.
Moreover, this difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons in chess seems
structurally the same as the difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons
when it comes to attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder uses this observation to
motivate his own strategy for solving the problem over its competitors, since he thinks that
his strategy, but not his competitors’, can account for the difference between the right and
the wrong kind of reasons for activities as well as attitudes. His idea, then, is that insofar as
we should prefer a solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem that solves the problem
not just for attitudes but also for activities, we should prefer his solution.40 Now, we have
already seen why Schroeder’s solution will not work: either it cannot make good sense of
the idea that there is a shared set of reasons for an attitude or activity, or it cannot make
sense of the idea that the shared set of reasons there is for an attitude or activity is equiv-
alent to the set of the right kind of reasons. But I think Schroeder is right that we should
prefer a solution to the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem that solves the problem wherever
it occurs, not just as it occurs with attitudes.
Notice that our preference for a solution to the problem wherever it occurs gives us an
additional reason to reject Hieronymi’s account. That is because, even if it could somehow
be made to work for the range of attitudes for which the problem arises – including attitudes
such as admiration which, as I have already argued, present problems for the account – that
account has no hope of solving the problem as it arises for activities. That is because it
essential to Hieronymi’s solution that the relevant phenomenon occur with attitudes for
39Schroeder (2010, p. 9).
40Schroeder (2010, p. 10).
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which there is a question the answering of which amounts to forming the attitude. Recall:
it was this feature of her view that caused trouble in the case of admiration, since there did
not appear to be any such question. But even if we could somehow manage to identify a
question the answering of which amounted to, e.g., admiring someone, the account cannot
be extended to cover the problem as it arises for activities. That is because of the obvious
fact that there is no question the answering of which amounts to, e.g., making a move in
chess. In any case, my interest here is not in rehearsing the difficulties with Hieronymi’s
account; instead, I want to investigate how my own solution fares in accounting for the
difference between the right and the wrong kind of reasons as that difference arises with
respect to activities.
So: can the account I offered above be extended to solve the problem when it comes
to activities? I think it can, and that it is clear how such an extension would go. Some
activities, a move in chess, tying a knot, and setting the table for a White House State
Dinner, bring with them particular standards of evaluation. Let me focus on chess. For a
move in chess, that standard is, roughly, advancing checkmate. What does it mean to say
that a move in chess brings with it the standard of advancing checkmate? It means that
part of what it is to be a move in chess – as opposed to merely an instance of moving an
oddly shaped piece of material around a checkered board – is to be subject to this standard
of evaluation. A moving of an oddly shaped piece around a checkered board that we did
not think of as liable to this standard would not be one that we thought of as a member
of the kind ‘a move in chess’. We can put the point thus: a move in chess is subject
to a constitutive standard of correctness involving advancing checkmate, whereas simply
moving oddly shaped pieces around the board is not. The standard of advancing checkmate
expresses a constitutive ideal for a move in chess – a way a move in chess must be, if it is
to be a correct instance of the kind of activity it is.
And now, with these observations in front of us, it should be clear how the resulting
account of the right and the wrong kind of reasons for a move in chess will go. Something
68
is the right kind of reason to make a move in chess – castling, say – just in case it is
evidence that making that move conforms to the constitutive standard of correctness for
moves in chess, viz. advancing checkmate. And something is the wrong kind of reason
to make a move in chess otherwise. This is not to say that someone’s paying you is not
a reason to castle; this is to say that it is the wrong kind of reason to castle, because the
fact that someone will pay you to castle does not bear on whether castling conforms to the
constitutive standard of correctness for moves in chess, namely, advancing checkmate. It
should be clear, then, how my account can be extended to handle the case of the Wrong
Kind of Reasons for Activities.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
So, unlike both Hieronymi and Schroeder’s views, my view delivers the extensionally
correct results about what the right and the wrong kind of reasons are for attitudes like
belief, admiration, and so on. And unlike Hieronymi’s view, it can be extended to capture
what is plausibly the same distinction as it arises in the case of activities. At this point
you might have the following thought: Who cares? More specifically, you might think:
Why should I care whether or not we have a view that can deliver the extensionally correct
results about the right and the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes (and activities)? My
response to this is that, insofar as we are interested in providing a unified, systematic ac-
count of the nature of reasons, an account that provides a unified, systematic account of
an intuitive distinction among reasons is of intrinsic interest. Recall, we began the paper
by considering two intuitive instances of the distinction between the right and the wrong
kind of reasons. As I mentioned, you might have been worried by the idea that there was
no unified explanation of what was going on in these cases. In response to this worry, I
appealed to explanatory unity and offered a promissory note. We are now in a position to
cash that note in: if I am right, then we have before us a systematic, unified explanation
of what it is for something to be the right or the wrong kind of reason for an attitude (or
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activity): what it is for something to be the right kind of reason for an attitude (or activity)
is for it to be evidence that the attitude (or activity) conforms to its constitutive standard of
correctness.
I argued here that Hieronymi and Schroeder’s solutions to the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Problem do not work. Let me close by commenting again on what I think Hieronymi and
Schroeder each get right, and on how my view improves on each of their accounts.
Hieronymi says that the right kind of reasons for an attitude bear on a question. Ac-
cording to Hieronymi, the question the right kind of reasons bear on is a question the
answering of which amounts to forming the relevant attitude. As we saw, the problem with
this idea is that at least some attitudes that are liable to the problem are not ones for which
there is a question the answering of which amounts to forming the attitude. But with my
account in front of us, we can now make good on Hieronymi’s idea that the right kind of
reasons bear on a question. On my account, the right kind of reasons to have an attitude
are evidence that the attitude in question conforms to a constitutive standard of correctness.
We could just as easily put this point by saying that the right kind of reasons bear on the
question of whether or not the attitude conforms to a constitutive standard of correctness.
But, and here is where my disagreement with Hieronymi lies, it is not the case that answer-
ing the question of constitutive correctness with respect to any attitude simply amounts to
forming the attitude. It may work like this for some attitudes – again, belief is a particularly
compelling case – but it need not. As we saw, it does not work like this for the attitude of
admiration.
Schroeder holds that the right kind of reasons are shared by necessarily anyone en-
gaged in having an attitude and just because they are so engaged. According to Schroeder,
these shared sets of reasons exist either because of background facts about the attitude in
question (the background facts strategy), or because of a standing reason against having
false, or for having true, mental representations (the alethic strategy). As we saw, the
problem with Schroeder’s account is that neither of these two strategies can do the work
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establishing both that (i) there is a shared set of reasons for an attitude and (ii) this shared
set of reasons is co-extensive with the set of the right kind of reasons. But with my account
in front of us, we can now make good on Schroeder’s idea that the right kind of reasons
are those that are shared by necessarily anyone engaged in having an attitude and just be-
cause they are so engaged. On my account, the right kind of reasons to have an attitude
are evidence that the attitude in question conforms to a constitutive standard of correctness.
Because the standard is partly constitutive of the attitude being the attitude it is, anyone en-
gaged in having the attitude will share those reasons, and just because they are so engaged.
Thus it might look like my account goes so far as to vindicate Schroeder’s view by showing
how it is that there are shared sets of reasons for anyone engaged in having an attitude. But
this appearance is misleading. That is because, on Schroeder’s view, (constitutive) stan-
dards of correctness must be explained in terms of shared sets of reasons, whereas, on my
view, the existence of shared sets of reasons is explained by the fact that there are constitu-
tive standards of correctness for certain attitudes. And this, in turn, is explained by the way
in which we distinguish attitudes of one kind from attitudes of another. That means, if I am
right, then Schroeder’s account might well be extensionally correct, but it is explanatorily
backwards: it may get the (right kind of) reasons right, but it does so for the wrong reasons.
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3 PROBLEMS FOR PURE PROBABILISM ABOUT PROMOTION (AND A
DISJUNCTIVE ALTERNATIVE)
Abstract
Humean promotionalists about reasons think that whether there is a reason for an agent
to   depends on whether her  -ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one of her desires.
Several authors have recently defended probabilistic accounts of promotion, according to
which an agent’s  -ing promotes the satisfaction of one of her desires just in case her  -ing
makes the satisfaction of that desire more probable relative to some baseline. In this paper I
do three things. First, I formalize an argument, due to Jeff Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo, to
the effect that Mark Schroeder’s and Stephen Finlay’s probabilistic accounts of promotion
cannot be correct. Next, I extend this argument to a recent alternative offered by D. Justin
Coates and show how Coates’ attempt to avoid the argument by introducing a distinction
between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ probability doesn’t help. Finally, I suggest an alternative
way of understanding promotion in terms of increase in degree of fit between the causal
upshot of an action and the content of a desire. I show how this view, disjunctively paired
with probabilism about promotion, solves the problems with previous accounts.
3.1 Introduction
Humean promotionalists about reasons for action think that whether there is a reason
for an agent to   depends on whether her  -ing promotes the satisfaction of at least one
of her desires. In order for Humean promotionalism to represent an informative account
of reasons, we require an account of what it is to promote the satisfaction of a desire.
Probabilistic accounts of promotion say that an agent’s action promotes the satisfaction of
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her desire just in case the probability of the desire’s being satisfied is positively affected by
the action relative to some baseline. In separate work, Stephen Finlay and Mark Schroeder
each propose different accounts of the baseline relative to which the probability of the
desire’s being satisfied must go up in order for some action to count as promoting the
satisfaction of that desire.1 In a recent article, Jeff Behrends and Joshua DiPaolo argue
by counterexample that Schroeder’s and Finlay’s accounts of the probabilistic baseline for
promotion cannot be correct. They tentatively conclude that this suggests promotion “is
best thought of non-probabilistically”.2 As we will see, I disagree. What Behrends and
DiPaolo’s cases show is that promotion is best thought of as as not necessarily probabilistic.
In a response to Behrends and DiPaolo, D. Justin Coates highlights a neglected alternative
for the probabilistic baseline.3 Coates argues that his alternative baseline is not subject to
Behrends’ and DiPaolo’s counterexamples and, moreover, that his account of the baseline
has the intuitive features we want. That is the current state of play.
In this paper, I do three things. First, I formalize Behrends and DiPaolo’s argument
by defining a Behrends/DiPaolo situation in terms of a set of requirements on an initial
probability distribution and argue for a constraint on accounts of promotion defined in
terms of this situation (§2). Formalizing Behrends and DiPaolo’s argument reveals pre-
cisely what is wrong with Schroeder and Finlay’s accounts: they cannot make sense of
promoting the satisfaction of a desire when the probability that the desire will be satisfied
is 1 (§3). I then extend the argument to Coates’ alternative and argue that although Coates’
distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ probability might save his alternative from
Behrends/DiPaolo counterexamples, Coates’ alternative remains unacceptable (§4). The
conclusion of these sections is that increase in probability is not necessary for promotion;
In the final section of the paper I outline an account of promotion in terms of increase in
1Finlay (2006, 2010); Schroeder (2007c).
2Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 5)
3Coates (2014).
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degree of fit between a desire’s content and the world that is the causal upshot of an action
(§5). I show how disjoining this account with a probabilistic account results in a view that
incorporates the insights of pure probabilistic accounts without inheiriting their difficulties.
Before all that, a quick preliminary remark. Above, I characterized the Humean pro-
motionalist as holding that there exists a reason for an agent to   just in case  -ing promotes
the satisfaction of at least one of the agent’s desires. But promotionalists usually put their
view in terms of promoting the object of a desire, where the object is taken to be a state
of affairs, or a proposition describing a state of affairs. For instance, Schroeder: “. . . the
objective normative reasons for X to do A are things which help explain why X’s doing
A promotes P, where P is the object of one of X’s desires.”4 Obviously, it doesn’t make
sense to think of P here as a simple object, e.g., “ice cream”, since the idea of promoting an
object, e.g., promoting ice cream, is nonsense. Schroeder must be thinking of the relevant
Ps as propositions, such as the proposition that I have a cone of ice cream, or states of
affairs, such as the state of affairs where I have a cone of ice cream. The idea, then, would
be that the relevant proposition is promoted when it is made more likely to be true, or that
the relevant state of affairs is promoted when it is simply made more likely. But there has
been some recent controversy over whether desires are or are not propositional attitudes the
objects of which are states of affairs or propositions describing such.5
In the present context, I aim to avoid this controversy by focusing simply on the pro-
motion of the satisfaction (rather than the object) of a desire. This move should be uncon-
troversial. After all, what makes Humean promotionalism intuitively plausible is that by
promoting the object of a desire (whatever that is), one promotes the satisfaction of that
desire. In the first place, then, the Humean promotionalist thesis is one that ties the exis-
tence of reasons to the satisfaction of desire. So in what follows I will speak of promoting
the satisfaction of a desire rather than promoting the object of a desire in order to remain
4Schroeder (2007c, p. 29, emphasis in original)
5Thagard (2006); Lycan (2012).
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neutral on what the potential objects of desire are. Notice that there is no corresponding
possible controversy over whether the state of affairs where a desire is satisfied is some-
thing that can be picked out propositionally. The controversy was over whether the actual
objects of desire are just those states of affairs (or propositions describing them). But I’ll
side-step this issue by simply talking about the state of affairs where a desire is satisfied (or
the proposition describing this state of affairs) and ignoring the question of whether desires
have such propositions or states-of-affairs as their objects.
3.2 Behrends/DiPaolo Situations & The Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint
Behrends and DiPaolo have devised a series of cunning counterexamples to Finlay and
Schroeder’s accounts of the probabilistic baseline for promotion.6 Rather than simply re-
hearsing Behrends and DiPaolo’s counterexamples, I will give a formal characterization of
such counterexamples in terms of a set of requirements on an initial probability distribution.
Cases that conform to these requirements are what I call Behrends/DiPaolo situations. (I
will briefly rehearse the reasons for thinking that Beherends/DiPaolo situations represents
cases agents can actually find themselves in.) I’ll then argue for a common-sense constraint
on accounts of promotion defined in terms of Behrends/DiPaolo situations. This will set
the stage: in the next section I’ll show that Finlay and Schroeder’s accounts of promotion
each violate this constraint.
Let A and B denote potential actions by some agent N. Let D denote the state of affairs
where some particular desire d of N’s is satisfied. Define a Behrends/DiPaolo situation as
one in which the initial probability distribution conforms to these requirements:
[1] pr(A) > 0 < 1
[2] pr(B) > 0 < 1
[3] pr(D) > 0
6Behrends and DiPaolo (2011).
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[4] pr(B | A˜) = 1
[5] pr(D | A) = 1
[6] pr(D | B) = 1
Here, briefly, is the intuitive reasoning behind [1-6]. [1-2] represent the initial probability
that N will perform one of the actions available to her, together with the idea that, between
the two live options (A and B), neither is “closed off” by certainty in the other. So there is
some chance Nwill A and some chance she will B.7 [3] represents the initial probability that
N’s desire will be satisfied. Assuming it is at least possible (i.e., not logically inconsistent)
to satisfy the desire is what sets the requirement that the probability be above 0.8 [4] says
that if N does not A, she will B.9 [5-6] say that the relevant desire is certain to be satisfied
given that she either A’s or B’s.10
Now, the result we need from an account of promotion is that in a Behrends / DiPaolo
situation N’s A-ing promotes D. This is so because in a Behrends/DiPaolo situation it is
supposed to be a matter of common-sense that there is a reason for the agent to A. After
all, if she A’s, then her desire is certain to be satisfied [5]. So at the very least there is an
instrumental reason for N to A since, if she does, she is certain to satisfy her desire.11 That
is common-sense. But since we are here assuming Humean promotionalism, which says
that there exists a reason for the agent to A just in case her A-ing promotes D, what follows
is a common-sense constraint on any account of promotion:
Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint: In a Behrends/DiPaolo situation, A-ing pro-
motes D.
7C.f. Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2).
8See also §4 below, where I discuss the initial probability of D in more detail.
9C.f. Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 2).
10ibid.
11C.f. Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 3).
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An account of promotion violates the Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint if A-ing fails to pro-
mote D in any Behrends/DiPaolo situation. If an account of promotion violates the Behrends/DiPaolo
Constraint, I assume it should be rejected, since it violates common-sense (because it yields
the result that in a Behrends/DiPaolo situation there is no reason to A).
3.3 Finlay and Schroeder
It’s easy to see why Finlay’s and Schroeder’s accounts violate the Behrends/DiPaolo
Constraint. Consider Finlay’s proposal concerning the baseline for promotion:
Finlay-Promote: A-ing promotes D iff pr(D | A) > pr(D | A˜)12
Clearly, this will not do. For, in a Behrends/DiPaolo situation, it is both certain that the
desire will be satisfied given that the agent A’s and certain that it will be satisfied given that
she does not A, since we know if she does not A she will B – and B certifies the satisfaction
of the desire too. [pr(D | A) = pr(D | A˜) = pr(D | B) = 1]. But then Finlay-Promote violates
the Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint, because, according to Finlay-Promote, A-ing does not
promote D.13
Alternately, consider Schroeder’s proposal:
Schroeder-Promote: A-ing promotes D iff pr(D | A) > pr(D | N does noth-
ing)14
Clearly, this will not do either. For all we know, there are Behrends/DiPaolo situations in
which the probability that the desire is satisfied given that the agent A’s is exactly the same
as the probability in which the desire is satisfied given that she does nothing; in particular,
though not exclusively, this will be in cases in which A-ing just is doing nothing. And
there is nothing in the characterization of a Behrends/DiPaolo situation that rules out such
12This is a formal characterization of the view articluated in Finlay (2006, p. 8)
13C.f. Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 1-3).
14This is a formal characterization of the view articluated in Schroeder (2007c, p. 113)
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cases. It’s possible, in other words, that [pr(D | A) = pr(D | N does nothing)]. But then
Schroeder-Promote violates the Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint, for A-ing does not promote
D in all Behrends/DiPaolo situations, e.g., in situations where A-ing is doing nothing.15
3.4 Coates
Coates has recently offered an alternative account of the baseline for promotion. Here
is Coates’ proposal:
Coates-Promote: A-ing promotes D iff pr(D | A) > pr(D)16
Coates-Promote appears to fix the problems with Finlay-Promote and Schroeder-Promote.
This is because it does not compare the probability of D given A to the probability of D
given some possible sequence of events (such as the agent’s doing A˜ or nothing). Instead,
it compares the probability of D given A simply to the probability of D: it asks “whether
the likelihood of [the desire’s] obtaining is greater after the agent acts than it was before
she acted.”17 It’s a little trickier to see how Coates’ proposal violates the Behrends/DiPaolo
Constraint. Coates-Promote will violate the Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint if the probabil-
ity of D is the same as the probability of D given A, i.e., if pr(D | A) = pr(D). Here’s
the (only somewhat) tricky part: assuming the definition of a Behrends/DiPaolo situation
and the axioms of probability, we can prove that all Behrends/DiPaolo situations are ones
in which this equality holds.18 In light of this proof, we can revise our description of
15C.f. Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 3-5).
16This is a formal characterization of the view articulated in Coates (2014, p. 5)
17Coates (2014, p. 5, emphasis in original)
18Proof:
(1) pr(D) = pr(D | A) * pr(A) + pr(D | A˜) * pr(A˜) [Theorem of total probability]
(2) pr(D | A) = 1 [[5], definition of a Behrends/DiPaolo situation]
(3) pr(D | A˜) = pr(D | B) = 1 [[4], [6], definition of a Behrends/DiPaolo situation]
(4) pr(D) = 1 * pr(A) + 1 * (1-pr(A)) [(1-3)]
(5) pr(D) = pr(A) + 1 - pr(A) = 1 [(4)]
(6) pr(D) = pr(D | A) = 1 [(2, 5)]
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Behrends/DiPaolo situations to make this fact explicit, replacing
[3] pr(D) > 0
with
[3*] pr(D) = 1
Given [3*] it should be obvious how Coates-Promote violates the Behrends/DiPaolo Con-
straint. For a Behrends/DiPaolo situation is always be one in which the inequality identified
by Coates-Promote fails to hold, and so one in which A-ing does not promote D.
Coates is aware of this problem with his account. His response is to distinguish be-
tween two kinds of initial probability: “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”. According to Coates, the
intrinsic probability of some outcome is simply a matter of the intrinsic properties of the
outcome itself.19 For instance, the intrinsic probability of a particular fair six-sided die –
Die – being rolled 3 is .166¯. This is so, according to Coates, even if, as a matter of fact,
it is also true that, via some external interference, Die is always guaranteed to come up 3.
According to Coates, the existence of such external interference does not affect the intrinsic
properties of Die, and so does not affect the intrinsic probability that Die will come up 3,
which remains .166¯. Instead, the external interference only alters Die’s extrinsic properties,
and so only alters its extrinsic probability of coming up 3: it moves it to 1.20
In the present context, Coates’ idea is that counterfactual properties, such as the prop-
erty of D that it would be satisfied if the agent doesn’t A (since then she would B), are
extrinsic properties, and so are irrelevant to the initial intrinsic probability of D. That prob-
ability, according to Coates, will always be < 1, even while the initial extrinsic probability
of D will, in a Behrends/DiPaolo situation, always be 1 (as we just proved above).
19Coates (2014, p. 6-7).
20ibid.
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I now want to raise two problems with Coates’ suggestion. The first problem is that
there is nothing in the notion of intrinsic probability that rules out the possibility of a de-
sire’s intrinsic probability being 1. I’ll recommend a way for Coates to handle this problem.
The second problem is more serious: not only are there desires with intrinsic probability 1,
there are also desires with intrinsic probability 0. And while the first sort of desires do not
plausibly generate counterexamples to Coates-Promote, the second sort do. Let me begin
by clarifying the notion of the intrinsic probability of a desire’s being satisfied.
We can start by stipulating a notion of intrinsic probability in the way Coates suggests.
Define the intrinsic probability [prI] of some outcome as the probability of that outcome
conditional on all and only the intrinsic properties of the outcome. And define the extrinsic
probability [prE] of an outcome as the probability of that outcome conditional on all the
intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the outcome. We can evaluate prI and prE for a range
of outcomes, for instance Die’s coming up 3. Given what we know about the intrinsic
properties of Die, prI(Die comes up 3) = .166¯. And given what we also know about the
particular situation Die finds itself in, prE(Die comes up 3) = 1. How about the intrinsic
and extrinsic probability of a desire’s being satisfied? In the case of some desire D, we
have:
prI(D) = pr(D | intrinsic properties of D)
prE(D) = pr(D | intrinsic & extrinsic properties of D)
Above, I showed that in all Behrends/DiPaolo situations, prE(D) = 1. But according to
Coates, the facts that yield the result that prE(D) = 1, in particular counterfactual facts such
as “if the agent does not A, then she will B” are irrelevant to determining prI(D).21 Because
prI(D) is independent of counterfactual, “extrinsic,” properties, Coates claims we can be
21One worry with Coates’ proposal is that the notion of the ‘intrinsic’ properties of desire is seriously
unclear. For instance, Coates seems to suggest that the ‘strength’ of a desire is one of its intrinsic properties.
But at least one standard way of understanding the strength of a desire is in terms of the motivational efficacy
of the desire; and this, in turn, is usually understood in terms of the truth of certain counterfactual claims
such as: if the agent were to be in such-and-such circumstances, then she would be motivated to   by desire
d. If this is the right way to understand the strength of a desire, then it seems some counterfactuals must be
relevant to a desire’s intrinsic properties. In that case, we are owed a principled reason for including these
counterfactuals as relevant to the intrinsic properties of desire but excluding others. I won’t pursue this worry
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confident – indeed, certain – that even in Behrends/DiPaolo situations it is always the case
that prI(D)< 1. But can we?
Consider dice again. Imagine instead of fair Die, we have Loaded Die. Loaded Die,
like Die, has the extrinsic property of being guaranteed to come up 3. (If it were about to
come up other than 3, external interference of some kind would intervene.) Unlike Die,
Loaded Die also has intrinsic properties (its shape, weight, and so on) that guarantee it will
always come up 3. We can evaluate prI and prE for Loaded Die’s coming up 3. Given what
we know about both the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of Loaded Die, prI(Loaded Die
comes up 3) = prE(Loaded Die comes up 3) = 1. This illustrates something that should be
obvious on reflection: there is nothing in the notion of intrinsic probability that rules out
the possibility of a guarantee of probability 1.
Now return to desires. Do we have any reason for thinking that, unlike dice, desires
can never have intrinsic properties that guarantee the intrinsic probability of their satisfac-
tion is 1? Coates provides none. And in fact we can think of desires the intrinsic properties
of which guarauntee that the intrinsic probability of their satisfaction is 1. For instance,
consider the desire to have at least one desire. This desire is such that, in virtue of some of
its intrinsic properties (e.g., its content) the probability that it will be satisfied, whenever it
is present, is 1. That is, prI(Desire to have at least one desire is satisfied) = 1.22
Coates doesn’t address this possibility. But I think it is clear how he should respond.
Coates should accept the possibility of such desires, i.e., desires the intrinsic probability of
which is 1. What he should say is that, with respect to those desires, nothing can promote
their satisfaction (since they are satisfied when they are realized) and, therefore, that they
do not generate reasons to do anything. The idea, then, would be that while it is true that
here. Instead, I’ll assume both that Coates can give some principled account of which counterfactuals are
relevant to a desire’s intrinsic properties and that we have a reasonably firm intuitive grip on the distinction
between a desire’s intrinsic and extrinsic properties.
22Compare the case of self-certifying beliefs, for instance the belief that I have at least one belief. This
belief is such that, in virtue of its intrinsic properties (e.g., its content) whenever it is present it is true.
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nothing can raise the probability that, e.g., the desire to have at least one desire, is satisfied,
nothing can promote that desire, and so, in a Behrends/DiPaolo Situation in particular,
some action A cannot promote that desire. So the mere fact that such desires sometimes
exist does not show that anything is wrong with Coates-Promote. This is because Coates-
Promote yields the intuitively correct result, viz. that no action promotes a desire whose
satisfaction is guaranteed simply in virtue of its intrinsic properties.
The more serious problem for Coates-Promote emerges when we consider not desires
that are certain to be satisfied, but instead desires that are certain to go unsatisfied, i.e.,
desires where the intrinsic probability of satisfaction is 0. Like desires with intrinsic prob-
ability 1, nothing can increase the probability that these desires will be satisfied. Unlike
desires with intrinsic probability 1, it is still possible to promote the satisfaction of a de-
sire where the intrinsic probability that it will in fact be satisfied is 0. The problem is that
Coates-Promote can’t make sense of this fact.
For instance, consider the desire to have no desires at all. In virtue of its intrinsic
properties (e.g., its content), the intrinsic probability that this desire will be satisfied is 0.
Unlike the desire to have at least one desire, which was self-ratifying in the sense that its
mere presence guaranteed its satisfaction, the desire to have no desires is self-undermining:
its mere presence guarantees that it will not be satisfied. This desire can dissipate or be
removed by surgery or therapy, but it cannot be satisfied. This is so despite the fact that
there are of course worlds that satisfy the description “world in which I have no desires”. In
such worlds, my desire to have no desires is not satisfied: it is not even present.23 Desires
are satisfied by, roughly, being presented with the state of affairs they pick out. And the
desire to have no desires can never be presented with the state of affairs it picks out, since
that state of affairs rules out the presence of the desire itself. In other words, prI(desire to
23Compare the belief that I have no beliefs. This belief is self-undermining in a symmetrical sense: its
mere presence guarantees that it is false. Of course, there are possible worlds that satisfy the description
“world in which I have no beliefs”. But in such worlds, my belief that I have no beliefs is not true, it is not
even present.
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have no desires is satisfied)=0.
Unlike the case of desires where prI(D)=1, desires where prI(D)=0 generate genuine
counterexamples to Coates-Promote. This is because, intuitively, there are some actions
that promote the satisfaction of such desires even though these actions never make the
satisfaction of the desire more likely. Consider again the desire to lack any desires at
all. Suppose an agent has this desire and is offered the opportunity to undergo extensive
Buddhist training, which she has good reason to believe will lead to a reduction in the
number of desires she has. Intuitively, there is a reason for the agent to undergo the training.
And this is so because undergoing the training promotes her desire to lack any desires at
all. But Coates-Promote cannot make sense of this fact. Recall:
Coates-Promote: A-ing promotes D iff pr(D | A) > prI(D)24
No amount of conditionalizing on anything will ever move prI(Desire to have no desires)
from 0 to something greater than 0. And so, in particular, conditionalizing on undergo-
ing Buddhist training will not raise the probability from 0 to something greater than 0.
Nonetheless, it seems obviously right to say that undergoing the training promotes the
agent’s desire.
Or consider a desire with infinitary content, such as the desire to live forever. The in-
trinsic probability that this desire will be satisfied is 0: there is no state of affairs picked out
by the desire such that it could obtain and thereby satisfy the desire. (I’m alive today: that’s
good – but what about tomorrow?) But, again, some actions can promote the satisfaction
of this desire even though these actions can never make the satisfaction of the desire more
likely. Suppose an agent desires to live forever and is offered a pill that will extend her life
by a thousand years. The agent has a reason to take the pill. And this is so because taking
the pill promotes her desire to live forever. (If she lacked the desire, she might not have the
reason to take the pill. And if she had some other desire, such as the desire to live for only
24Here I make explicit the fact that it is the intrinsic probability of D on the right-hand side of the inequal-
ity.
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the next five-hundred years, she might have positive reason not to take the pill.) But, again,
Coates-Promote cannot make sense of this fact. Conditionalizing on taking a life-extending
pill will not raise the probability of the agent’s desire to live forever’s being satisfied from
0 to something greater than 0. Nonetheless, taking the pill promotes the agent’s desire.
Let’s recap. The moral of Beherends/DiPaolo situations is that desires that are certain
to be satisfied [pr(D)=1] can be promoted. Finlay and Schroeder’s accounts of promotion
can’t account for this fact. Coates’ account can. The moral of the argument I just gave is
that desires that are certain to go unsatisfied [pr(D)=0] can be promoted. Coates’ account
of promotion can’t account for this fact. The overall lesson, I suggest, is that promotion
should not be be interpreted in pure probabilistic terms.
3.5 Promotion as Increase in Fit
The arguments against Coates-Promote, Finlay-Promote, and Schroeder-Promote are
all right-to-left counterexamples: they are all objections to the idea that an action’s increas-
ing the probability that a desire is satisfied is necessary in order to promote the desire. This
suggests that increase in probability is just one way of promoting a desire. In what follows
I want to outline an alternative account of promotion that tries to make sense of this idea.
The account is motivated by thinking about the kind of mental state desire is.
Desires are often distinguished from other mental states, such as belief, in terms of
their direction of fit: beliefs aim to fit the world, whereas desires aim to make the world
fit them.25 Beliefs say the world is a certain way, and a world either is or isn’t the way a
belief says it is. When the content of the world fits the content of the belief the belief is
25The locus classicus for this idea is Anscombe (2000). Of course, such talk is largely metaphorical. And
there are various ways of trying to cash out the metaphor. See, for instance Smith (2007, 1987); Zangwill
(1998); Humberstone (1992). And there is a growing debate over whether this distinction can help solve
any serious philosophical puzzles. See, for instance, Tenenbaum (2006); Sobel and Copp (2001); Milliken
(2008). But for present purposes, the metaphor is sufficient, since all I am interested in is the idea that worlds
can be evaluated in terms of how well they fit the content of a desire, not in, e.g., whether the direction of fit
of desire can generate a norm of desire, whether desires can be shown to be genuine sources of reasons, or
whether the idea of direction of fit can tell us anything about the correct theory of agential motivation.
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true. Similarly, desires say how the would should be, and the world either is or isn’t the
way the desire says it should be. When the content of the world fits the content of a desire
the desire is satisfied. Promoting the satisfaction of a desire, I suggest, is best understood in
terms of this idea of the world fitting (or not) a desire: roughly, the satisfaction of a desire
is promoted by an action when the action increases the degree of fit between the content of
the desire and the way the world actually is as a result of the action.
Intuitively, some worlds fit a desire better, and some worse. Suppose Julie desires
chocolate (any chocolate whatever). Then the world where Julie has a bar of chocolate fits
her desire for chocolate better than the world where she has no chocolate, the world where
Julie has a chocolate cake fits her desire for chocolate exactly as well as the world where
she has a bar of chocolate, and the bar-world and cake-world both fit better than the world
where Julie lacks chocolate altogether.
Fit between a world and a desire isn’t all-or-nothing. Suppose Julie desires six bars of
chocolate. Then the world where Julie has four bars of chocolate fits her desire better than
the world where she has just three bars, the world where she has five bars fits her desire
better than the four-world and the three-world, and the world where she has six bars fits
just as well as any other possible world.
This example illustrates the idea of increase (and decrease) in fit. If Julie moves from
a three-bar world to a four-bar world, there is an increase in fit between her desire and
the world. Conversely, if Julie moves from a five-bar world to a four-bar world, there is a
decrease in fit between her desire and the world.
Here, then, is the idea: an action’s promoting the satisfaction of a desire is a matter
of the action’s increasing the fit between the desire and the world. More formally: Let W
denote the set of possible worlds. The degree of fit between a particular desire d and W is
represented by an order ⌫d on W. For some d, and for any two worlds w1 and w2, we can
write w1 ⌫d w2 to mean that d weakly fits w1 over w2. And we can say that w1  d w2
if w1 ⌫d w2 but not w2 ⌫d w1 (a strictly better fit for d in w1 than w2), and w1 ⇠d w2 if
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w1 ⌫d w2 and w2 ⌫d w1 (the same fit for d in both w1 and w2). Let A refer to an agent’s
action, let w@ refer to the member of W that is the actual world prior to the agent’s A-ing,
and let wact refer to the member ofW that is the causal upshot of A-ing. As a first pass at a
non-probabilistic analysis of promotion, we get:
Fit-Promote: A-ing promotes D iff wact  d w@
In other words, A-ing promotes D just in case the fit between D and the world increases as a
causal result of A-ing. For example, in Julie’s case: Suppose Julie desires chocolate and has
none. Suppose further that the world that is the causal upshot of Julie’s buying chocolate
is one in which she has chocolate. Then buying chocolate promotes the satisfaction of
Julie’s desire, since wbuying chocolate  d w@. Of course, probabilistic analyses can account
for simple cases of promotion like Julie’s. But Fit-Promote can handle cases probabilistic
analyses cannot.
Recall, the Behrends/DiPaolo Constraint requires that an account of promotion yield
the result that in a Behrends/DiPaolo situation A-ing promotes D. In a Behrends/DiPaolo
situation, the agent’s desire does not yet fit the world: in other words, her desire is un-
satisfied. However, in a Beherends/DiPaolo situation, whatever the agent does (including
A-ing), her desire is certain to be satisfied. This feature of such situations is what caused
the problems for Schroeder and Finlay’s probabilistic analyses of promotion: since the
probability of the agent’s desire being satisfied could not increase, those accounts could
not capture the idea that A-ing (which was certain to satisfy the desire) promotes the satis-
faction of the desire. But Fit-Promote can, since if the desire is satisfied in the world that is
the causal upshot of A-ing but not in the actual world, wact  d w@. Thus Fit-Promote does
not violate the Beherends/DiPaolo Constraint. What about the problems facing Coates’
probabilistic proposal?
Coates’ proposal ran into problems on two fronts. First, there were desires where the
intrinsic probability of their being satisfied was 1. As we saw, Coates could respond to this
problem by simply acknowledging that, when it comes to desires that are self-satisfying
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in this way, e.g., the desire to have at least one desire, there is nothing that could promote
them, and so they do not generate reasons to do anything. Fit-Promote takes the same tack
with respect to self-satisfying desires. For any desire d such that the mere presence of d
guarantees that it is satisfied, then for any action A, wact ⇠d w@. And so, by Fit-Promote,
nothing can promote that desire. And that, as we saw in the discussion of Coates, seems
like the right thing to say.
The second, more serious problem for Coates’ proposal was the case of desires where
the intrinsic probability of their satisfaction was 0. The problem for Coates is that when
it comes to such desires, although their satisfaction cannot ex hypothesi be made more
probable, it is possible to promote their satisfaction. Fit-Promote explains this fact in terms
of an increase in fit between a desire’s content and the world. For example, consider again
the desire to have no desires. The intrinsic probability that this desire will be satisfied is
0. Nevertheless, it is possible to promote the satisfaction of the desire by, e.g., undergoing
Buddhist training to eliminate some of one’s desires. Fit-Promote captures this fact nicely:
the world where you have, say, 499 desires (as a result of undergoing the training) better
fits the world picked out by your desire than the actual world where you have, say, 511
desires. In other words, the world that is the causal upshot of undergoing the training is
strictly better, in terms of fit with your desire, than the actual world (wact  d w@).
So that is how Fit-Promote improves on its probabilistic competitors. Fit-Promote is a
fully non-probabilistic analysis of promotion: an action that increases the probability that
a desire will be satisfied does not increase the actual degree of fit between the desire and
the world, and so does not constitute an action that promotes the desire. But actions that
increase the probability that some desire will be satisfied do seem to promote that desire:
recall, what was wrong with probabilistic analyses was not that they had the sufficient
conditions for promotion wrong, but that they had the necessary conditions wrong. For
instance, suppose I desire to attend the State Fair, that the only way to get there is to drive,
and that in the actual world my car is out of gas. In such a case, there is a reason for me to
87
fill up the gas tank in my car. This is because filling my car’s tank promotes the satisfaction
of my desire to attend the State Fair. But how? According to Fit-Promote, in order for
filling my car’s tank to promote the satisfaction of my desire to attend the State Fair, it
would have to be the case that the world in which I fill up my tank is a strictly better fit
with the world where I attend the State Fair than the actual world is. But, unlike the case
of Julie’s desire for chocolate and the world that is the result of her action of buying some
chocolate, the world where I have a full gas tank as a result of filling it does not constitute
an improvement in terms of fit between my desire to be at the State Fair and the actual
world where I don’t have any gas. So more needs to be said.
Now, probabilistic analyses of promotion have an easy time with cases like State Fair:
filling my car’s tank increases the probability that my desire to attend the State Fair will
be satisfied and so, according to probabilism about promotion, promotes the satisfaction of
that desire. There is something right about this idea: An action that makes it more likely a
desire will be satisfied does promote the satisfaction of that desire. So the way to revise the
account on offer here is to simply make it disjunctive in the following way: We can write
prwn(D) to denote the probability of some desire’s satisfaction in a world n. Then we can
say that:
Fit-Probability-Promote: An action A promotes D iff [wact d w@ or prwact(D)
> prw@(D)]
This will do the trick, essentially adding increase in fit to increase in probability as a suf-
ficient condition for promotion. Fit-Probability-Promote has all the virtues of Fit-Promote
plus the virtues of a probabilistic analysis such as Coates-Promote while avoiding the dif-
ficulties that faced that account. Call this the FPP account of promotion.26
One potential problem with FPP is that treats the degree of fit between a desire and the
world and the probability that the desire will be satisfied as factors each of which contribute
26Notice too the following advantage enjoyed by FPP: in order to work, FPP does not need to appeal
to Coates’ distintinction between the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ probability of a desire’s being satisfied, a
distinction I said was somewhat suspect. See fn. 21.
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independently to the idea of promotion. Let me explain.
Suppose Julie desires her six bars of chocolate, has five, and has very little prospect of
obtaining one more. The degree of fit between her desire and the world is quite high. And
the probability that her desire will be satisfied is quite low. Now suppose she is offered the
opportunity to buy a bet that slightly increases the probability that she will shortly obtain
five new bars of chocolate. The cost of the bet is four bars. Were she to buy the bet, she
would radically decrease the degree of fit between her desire and the world, but would also
slightly increase the probability that her desire would be satisfied (since if the bet turns out
in her favor, she will end up with six bars). Does taking the bet promote her desire? If
the disjunctive account given by FPP is correct, then it does. But this verdict might seem
puzzling. After all, if Julie takes the bet, she is still very unlikely to obtain the object of
her desire, viz. six bars of chocolate – indeed, she is very likely to end up in a world that is
worse with respect to her desire than she was had she not taken the bet. And it can appear
perverse to say that an action that results in a world like this promotes her desire.
One solution to this puzzle would be to identify a single function designed to weigh
an action’s contribution to the increase (or decrease) of the probability that a desire will be
satisfied against its contribution to the increase (or decrease) in fit between the desire and
the world. For reasons of space, I will not detail what such a solution might look like. Nor
will I argue against the possibility of giving such an account.27 In principle, I am open to
the possibility of giving one. If such an account can be made to work, the main argument
of this paper still stands: the account would need to incorporate the degree of fit between
a desire and the world into its (unified) measure of promotion. But in what follows I will
remark briefly on why I do not think this is a useful idea to pursue. These remarks are also
aimed at alleviating some of the prima facie puzzlement associated with FPP’s verdict on
the case given above. The net result, I hope, is that FPP’s disjunctivism is revealed as an
27I will say this: notice that the relevant function cannot simply be a multiplicative function on the proba-
bility that the desire is satisfied and the degree of match, since cases of probability 0 will then systematically
yield the wrong result.
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advantage, rather than a disadvantage, of the view.
Recall the reason for offering an account of promotion in the first place. Humean
promotionalists say that whether there is a reason for an agent to   depends on whether
 -ing promotes one of the agent’s desires. The idea has intuitive appeal: promoting desires
seems like just what actions should be in the business of doing when there are reasons to
perform those actions. This leaves us wanting an account of promotion. But I do not see that
it leaves us expecting – or even wanting – a non-disjunctive account of promotion. After
all, we can promote causes, hirelings, merchandise, and even pawns in chess. Promotion
in each of these cases has to do with moving forward, with advancing. What does it mean
to advance – to move forward – a desire? What reflection on cases shows us, I think,
is that there are two independent ways of advancing a desire: one way is to increase the
probability that it will be satisfied, and another way is to increase the actual degree of fit
between the desire and the world. Now, the very same action might advance a desire in one
respect and retire it in another. But the same is true of other cases of promotion: the activist
calling for stricter pollution controls counts as promoting environmental responsibility even
if her pleas fall on hostile ears, i.e., even if her pleas have the perverse result of making
environmental responsibility less probable overall. Or anyway, so it seems to me: the
world where more people (including herself) call for environmental responsibility is more
like the world where her cause is already won than the world where less do, even if the
actual world where she calls for such responsibility is one that is less likely to actually
exhibit it.
What this means is that when it comes to an action promoting a desire, we can distin-
guish two independent respects in which it might. An action can make the world fit better
with the desire. This is the case of Julie’s performing an action that results in her having an
additional bar of chocolate. Or an action can make the world more likely to fit better with
the desire. This is the case of Julie’s buying the chocolate bet. Both sorts of action promote
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Julie’s desire, only for different reasons: one promotes the desire because it makes it fit bet-
ter with the world, whereas the other promotes the desire because it makes it more likely
to be satisfied. Keeping these two aspects of promotion separate rather than attempting to
unify them under a single measure somewhat complicates our promotion-involving thought
and talk, but I think these complications redound to our benefit. For example, we can use
the two aspects of promotion to drive a distinction between two different sorts of reasons
grounded in desire: there are the reasons for action that are grounded in the fact that an
action makes the satisfaction of a desire more probable, and there are those grounded in the
fact that the causal upshot of the action more closely fits the content of desire. And there
should be interesting things to say about how each sort of reason figures in deliberation and
about the relationship between the two sorts, e.g., how they should be weighed against one
another.
As I said, I am open to the idea that a unified, non-disjunctive account of promotion
is available. Such an account would have to exhibit the features FPP does, including con-
forming to the Beherends/DiPaolo Constraint and making sense of promoting desires the
intrinsic probability of which is 0. But I do not see any real reason to pursue such an ac-
count unless it can be shown that the disjunctive analysis I offer here is somehow deficient.
And in any case, pursuing this idea is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.6 Conclusion
Finlay-Promote, Schroeder-Promote, and Coates-Promote each fail in different ways
to account for actions that promote a desire. Finlay-Promote and Schroeder-Promote both
fall prey to the Behrends/DiPaolo constraint. Coates-Promote, even if it doesn’t violate
that constraint, fails to account for cases of promotion where the intrinsic probability that a
desire will be satisfied is 0. The structure of these problems with probabilistic analyses of
promotion suggests that probabilistic increase is not a necessary condition for promotion.
The alternative I outline, Fit-Probability-Promote, represents an alternative that can capture
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what was right about probabilistic analyses while avoiding their difficulties. I’ll close by
remarking on the idea of ‘fit’ between a desire and the world, a notion that is central to the
alternative offered here.
I’ve left the notion of ‘fit’ between a desire’s content and the world deliberately vague.
Hopefully, the examples I’ve used give the idea sufficient content. For instance, Julie’s
desire to have six bars of chocolate. It should be obvious that the four-bar world better
fits this desire than the two-bar world. Similarly, the desire to have no desires at all: the
world where I have 499 desires better fits this desire than the world where I have 511. It
is sometimes equally obvious that two worlds are equal in terms of their fit with a desire.
For instance, the world where a Democrat wins the White House and Julie has six bars
of chocolate equally fits her desire as does the world where a Republican wins the White
House and Julie has six bars of chocolate. But matters are not always so straightforward.
This is because the contents of actual desires in the actual world are not always so straight-
forward. I desire a cup of coffee. Is the world where I get a cup of instant Folgers a better
fit than the world where I get a cup of locally roasted arabica? Both are worlds where I
have a cup of coffee. Whether one is a better fit will depend on whether my desire dis-
criminates between them. It might, if I am a coffee connoisseur. It might not, even if I
am: at this moment I might just want coffee, any coffee at all. And, crucially, I might not
know till someone serves me the Folgers that what I really wanted wasn’t just any old cup
of coffee. The ordering  d will therefore sometimes be epistemically opaque to the agent
whose desire is in question, and even to outside observers. This doesn’t mean that there is
no such ordering. What it means is that is that we don’t always know which actions will
promote our desires and so don’t know what there is reason for us to do. But this is for the
familiar reason that we don’t always know what we want.
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4 REASONS AND PROMOTION
Abstract
A number of philosophers with otherwise disparate views about reasons all accept pro-
motionalism, the view that whether there is a reason for an agent to   depends on whether
 -ing promotes something or other. I argue that promotionalism faces an initial problem
when it comes to reasons for belief, but that promotionalists can probably solve this prob-
lem by deploying one of two strategies I identify. I then argue that, even if one of these
two strategies can successfully solve the problem with reasons for belief, promotionalists
face a symmetrical problem in accounting for reasons for non-doxastic attitudes such as
admiration. I argue that, not only will neither of the two strategies I identify help with
the problem when it comes to reasons for non-doxastic attitudes, the nature of the reasons
for these attitudes suggests that no promotionalist account of them will be satisfactory. I
then offer an alternative to promotionalism and diagnose why promotionalism might have
seemed attractive as a view about reasons.
4.1 Introduction
Sometimes agents act, and some of the time there are reasons for agents to act the way
they do. Likewise, sometimes agents have attitudes, and some of the time there are reasons
for agents to have the attitudes they do. For example: The fact that the stock is likely to fall
in price might be a reason to sell it short. Likewise: The fact that Warren Buffet is selling
the stock short might be a reason to believe it is likely to fall in price.
Philosophers have given a number of accounts of the nature of reasons for actions
and attitudes. These accounts agree on very little. They do not agree, for instance, on the
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ontology of reasons, i.e., whether reasons are mental states, facts, propositions, or some
other sort of entity. They do not agree on the scope of reasons: Some philosophers think
that all reasons are agent-neutral, some that they are all agent-relative, while others settle
on a mixed view. They do not agree on the epistemology of reasons, i.e., whether and
how reasons are epistemically available to agents. The list goes on. The existence of these
disagreements is not all that surprising: “Philosophers disagree about the nature of X. News
at Eleven.”
What is surprising, perhaps because it stands in such stark contrast to these disagree-
ments, is that a range of philosophers with otherwise diverse views about the nature of
reasons agree that all reasons have something to do with promotion. As we will see, there
are different ways of cashing out this idea. But however it is cashed out, I think the idea
that all reasons involve promotion is mistaken. And in the first part of this paper, I am going
to try and convince you that this idea is mistaken. Before doing so, I will need to deal with
some preliminaries: in particular, I will distinguish two different views about how reasons
relate to promotion and set aside some worries that will not concern me in this paper. Then
I will present a first objection to the idea that all reasons involve promotion. I will argue
that, while this objection can be met, it points the way to a second, stronger objection, I
will argue that this second objection is fatal to the idea that all reasons involve promotion
and then offer a diagnosis of why the idea might have seemed attractive in the first place.
Finally, I will offer an alternative view about reasons that avoids the objection.
4.2 Promotionalism
Why think that reasons involve promotion? The idea is perhaps best motivated by
thinking about cases. Here is one: Jana wants to spend time in the sun and surf. Going to
the beach would promote the satisfaction of Jana’s desire. Intuitively, then, there is a reason
for Jana to go to the beach. The existence of this reason is guaranteed, in part, by the fact
that going to the beach would promote the satisfaction of Jana’s desire to spend time in
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the sun and surf. If it turns out that it will be overcast and calm, then, intuitively, there
is not a reason for Jana to go to the beach. That is because going to the beach would not
promote the satisfaction of Jana’s desire. Here is another case: Tim is wondering whether
or not to give to charity Y. Tim’s giving to charity Y would promote overall happiness.
Intuitively, then, there is a reason for Tim to give to charity Y. The existence of this reason
is guaranteed, in part, by the fact that giving to charity Y would promote overall happiness.
If it turns out that the charity Y is a fraud, then, intuitively, there is not a reason for Tim to
give to charity Y. That is because giving to charity Y would not promote overall happiness.
Jana and Tim’s cases make it intuitively plausible that reasons have something to do
with promotion. And a wide range of philosophers have defended views about reasons that
try to capture this intuitive idea:1
For R to be a reason for X to do A is for there to be some p such that X has a
desire whose object is p, and the truth of R is part of what explains why X’s
doing A promotes p. [Schroeder (2007c, p. 193).]
The consequentialist holds that the proper way for an agent to respond to any
values recognized is to promote them: that is, in every choice to select the
option with prognoses that mean it is the best gamble with those values. [...]
[According to consequentialism,] the agent concerned with a value is in a paral-
lel position to that of an agent concerned with some personal good: say, health
or income or status. In thinking about how an agent should act on the concern
for a personal good, we unhesitatingly say that of course the rational thing to
do, the rationally justified action, is to act so that the good is promoted. [Pettit
(1991, p. 233, 238).]
The truth of a sentence [‘A has a reason to  ’] implies, very roughly, that A has
some motive which will be served or furthered by his  -ing, and if this turns
out not to be so the sentence is false: there is a condition relating to the agent’s
aims, and if this is not satisfied it is not true to say ... that he has a reason to  .
[Williams (1981, p. 101).]
1Emphasis added in each quote.
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[...] a fact is a reason for  -ing, relative to a system of ends E, iff it explains
why  -ing is conducive to E. [Finlay (2006, p. 8).]
Every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if R is
true of A, then p has prima facie reason to promote A. [Nagel (1979, p. 47).]
Other philosophers are not quite so straightforward about their commitment to the connec-
tion between reasons and promotion, but they still fit the bill. For instance, Michael Smith
holds that
[...] an agent, A, has a normative reason to   in circumstances C, just in case,
in nearby possible worlds in which A is fully rational, A desires that, in those
possible worlds in which she finds herself in circumstances C, she  s. [Smith
(1996, p. 161).]2
On the plausible assumption that A’s  -ing promotes her rational counterpart’s desire that
she   in circumstances where she does, Smith also falls into the category of those who
endorse the connection between reasons and promotion.
Even if it is intuitive that Jana and Tim’s reasons have something to do with promotion,
this wide agreement on a tight connection between reasons and promotion should strike us
as surprising. After all, we have here a group of philosophers with otherwise fairly eclectic
views about reasons and rationality. Nevertheless, each of them accepts some instance of
the schema:
Reason-Promote There is a reason for an agent, A, to   (where  -ing is an
action or an attitude) iff A’s  -ing promotes a K of the relevant kind.3
I shall call the view that accepts Reason-Promote promotionalism about reasons and its
proponents promotionalists.4 Promotionalists all accept Reason-Promote but they disagree
2See also Smith (1994)
3Compare Snedegar (2013).
4Notice that Reason-Promote is an existence principle about reasons. It does not say what a reason for
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amongst themselves on what the K of the relevant kind is. For instance, according to
Schroeder and Williams, the relevant kind of K is (the object of) an agent’s desires. Smith’s
view is similar, though he differs with respect to whose desires are relevant. According to
Smith, the relevant desires that are promoted are the desires of an agent’s fully rational
counterpart. Finlay’s view is also similar, though Finlay holds that the relevant item that
is promoted is an end and not a desire. Nagel and Pettit each hold, in different ways, that
what is promoted is a value or valuable state of affairs.
This disagreement over what the relevant kind of K is suggests that we can distinguish
two versions of promotionalism, each corresponding to a view about the relevant kind of
K: desire-promotionalism and value-promotionalism. According to desire-promotionalism,
the relevant kind of K is a desire, end, or goal. Schroeder, Williams, Finlay, and Smith are
each desire-promotionalists in this sense, since each of them holds that whether there is a
reason for an agent to   depends essentially on whether the agent’s  -ing would promote
some desire, end, or goal. According to value-promotionalism, the relevant kind of K is
a value or valuable state of affairs. Pettit and Nagel are both value-promotionalists in this
sense, since each holds that whether there is a reason for an agent to   depends essentially
on whether the agent’s  -ing would promote some value or valuable state of affairs.
I am going to be arguing that both versions of promotionalism are false. To anticipate:
my argument will be that neither version of promotionalism yields the correct results about
reasons for attitudes like admiration, fear, envy, blame, and so on. But before I proceed
to this argument, I want to say a bit more about how to understand what Reason-Promote
says, and, in the course of doing so, to set aside a worry.
In order for Reason-Promote to represent an informative principle about reasons, we
shall need to know what it is for an agent’s  -ing to promote a K of the relevant kind. One
 -ing is, it only says what has to be the case for there to be a reason for  -ing. Reason-Promote is therefore
silent on the questions concerning, e.g., the ontology of reasons. For a nice overview of possible views about
the ontology of reasons, see Turri (2009). So promotionalists can disagree over what sort of thing a reason
for  -ing is while agreeing that Reason-Promote correctly states the conditions under which there exists a
reason for  -ing.
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intuitive, popular view about this is probabilistic. According to the probabilistic conception
of promotion, what it is for an agent’s  -ing to promote a K of the relevant kind is for the
the agent’s  -ing to make K more probable. For example, the idea would be that an agent’s
 -ing promotes the satisfaction a desire just in case it makes the satisfaction of the desire
more probable. Or the idea might be that an agent’s  -ing promotes some value just in case
it makes the realization of that value more probable. Although my aims in this paper do not
depend on any particular way of understanding promotion, in particular on understanding
it in probabilistic terms, in order to have something to work with, this is the framework I
will assume for the purposes of this paper.5
Since I am going to be assuming a probabilistic conception of promotion, I want to
mention an outstanding worry with this idea, mainly to set it aside for the purposes of this
paper. The probabilistic conception of promotion says that a K is promoted by an agent’s
 -ing just in case K is made more probable. But things are not more or less probable
simpliciter: they are more or less probable than something else. What is this something
else? The worry is that answering this question on behalf of the probabilistic conception of
promotion is not straightforward.
Two natural answers seem to be: (i) K is promoted by an agent’s  -ing just in case
K is made more probable by the agent’s  -ing than by the agent’s not- -ing and (ii) K
is promoted by an agent’s  -ing just in case K is made more probable by the agent’s  -
ing than by the agent’s doing nothing at all.6 But, as several philosophers have pointed
out, both these answers seem to suffer from extensional difficulties: they get the reasons
wrong.7
Briefly, the problem with (i) is that there are cases in which, intuitively, there is a
5Among those who explicitly discuss promotion, the probabilistic conception is endorsed by Finlay
(2006); Schroeder (2007c,a); Coates (2014). Snedegar (2013) uses it as a working hypothesis. I know of
no promotionalist who offers an alternative to the probabilistic conception of promotion. In Sharadin (2014a)
I attempt to articulate an alternative to probabilism about promotion.
6Finlay (2006, 2010) has the former view, Schroeder (2007c) has the latter.
7Behrends and DiPaolo (2011); Evers (2009); Snedegar (2013); Sharadin (2014a).
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reason for an agent to   even though had the agent not  ’d, the relevant K had the same
probability of being promoted. Here is a case like that:8
Beer: Dan desires a beer. If Dan walks to the fridge, opens it, and takes out
a beer, his desire is guaranteed to be fulfilled. If Dan politely asks Kate for a
beer, she will give him one, and his desire is again guaranteed to be fulfilled.
If Dan sits on the couch and complains loudly that he wants a beer, his desire
will not be fulfilled, as he will not get himself a beer and no one will get one
for him. Dan in fact walks to the fridge and gets himself a beer. Had he not
done so, he would have politely asked Kate for a beer.9
Now, if ‘not  -ing’ is the correct contrast class for determining whether an agent counts
as having promoted her desire by  -ing, then Dan does not count as having promoted
his desire for a beer by getting himself one. For, had Dan not gotten himself a beer, he
would have politely asked Kate for a beer, and his desire would have had exactly the same
probability of being satisfied. But this is the wrong result: intuitively, Dan did promote
the satisfaction of his desire by getting himself a beer. As Jeffrey Behrends and Joshua
DiPaolo explain, this is because Dan performed an action that guaranteed the satisfaction
of his desire, and it is a condition of adequacy on an account of promotion that doing
something that actually results in the satisfaction of a desire is sufficient for promoting that
desire.10
The answer ‘doing nothing’ (ii) suffers the same difficulty. To see this, suppose I
have arranged things so that Dan’s desire for a beer will be satisfied no matter what Dan
does, including the case in which Dan does nothing. Now suppose again that Dan goes
to the fridge and gets himself a beer. If ‘doing nothing’ is the correct contrast class for
determining whether an agent counts as having promoted her desire by  -ing, then Dan
8For simplicity, I will only present the case in terms of desire-promotionalist views here. But the same
arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to value-promotionalists. That is because the arguments are targeted at
the relevant conception of promotion and not against the relevant kind of K that is supposed to be promoted.
9This is a case modeled off one given in Behrends and DiPaolo (2011).
10Behrends and DiPaolo (2011, p. 3). See also Tanyi (2011).
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again does not count as having promoted his desire for a beer by getting himself one. For,
no matter what Dan does, including the situation in which he does nothing, his desire
has exactly the same probability of being satisfied. But, again, this is the wrong result:
intuitively, Dan did promote the satisfaction of his desire by getting himself a beer. And,
again, this is because Dan performed an action that guaranteed the satisfaction of his desire.
Worse, answering with (ii) suffers an additional difficulty: it bars one from counte-
nancing reasons to do nothing. But, intuitively, there are sometimes such reasons. For
instance, suppose I arrange things so that Dan’s desire for a beer will be satisfied just in
case he does nothing at all. If he does anything, including either going to the fridge for
a beer, politely requesting one from Kate, or complaining loudly, I have set things up so
that his desire will not be satisfied. Intuitively, in this case, Dan’s desire is promoted by
his doing nothing. So, intuitively, there is a reason for Dan to do nothing. But if ‘doing
nothing’ is the correct contrast class for determining whether an agent counts as having
promoted her desire by  -ing, then Dan does not count as having promoted his desire by
doing nothing. This is because, quite obviously, the probability of Dan’s desire being sat-
isfied given that he does nothing cannot be greater than the probability that Dan’s desire is
satisfied given that he does nothing. And so we are barred from saying what it is clearly
correct to say about this case, which is that there is a reason for Dan to do nothing.
These are real challenges for the promotionalist. What they show is that the promo-
tionalist still owes us a plausible story about what it is to promote a K of the relevant kind,
since neither of the natural answers (i and ii) seem to work. You might think that pro-
motionalism is in serious trouble because it does not have a plausible story to tell about
promotion. But my hunch is that promotionalists can find ways of replying to these chal-
lenges.11 So I am not going to focus my attention on arguments over the correct account of
promotion. I am interested instead in a much more general argument against promotional-
ism. The argument I am interested in does not depend on any particular view about what
11Coates (2014) develops one line of response. Sharadin (2014a) develops another.
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promotion is like. Instead, I am going to argue that, whatever we say about what it takes to
promote a K, promotionalism cannot account for certain sorts of reasons. So I will simply
assume a probabilistic conception of promotion in the rest of the paper in order to have a
framework within which to work. If, in the end, some workable conception of promotion
cannot be found, then we will simply have two reasons for rejecting promotionalism about
reasons.
4.3 First Objection: Reasons for Belief
Let me start my argument against promotionalism by considering an objection to
which I think promotionalists have a response. Briefly, the objection is that reasons for
belief do not fit the schema provided by Reason-Promote because, at least some of the
time, there are reasons for an agent to believe some proposition but the agent’s believing
that proposition does not promote any K of the relevant kind.12 As it will emerge, I think
the promotionalist can successfully reply to this objection. But, as I will argue in the next
section, a related objection is fatal to promotionalism.
We saw above that promotionalism can seem intuitively – even obviously – correct
when it comes to reasons like Jana and Tim’s reasons for action. But reasons for action
are just one sort of reason. There are also reasons for attitudes like belief. Let us focus our
attention on reasons for belief by restricting Reason-Promote to cover just those reasons:
Reason-Promote-Belief: There is a reason for A to believe that p iff A’s be-
lieving that p promotes a K of the relevant kind.
Reason-Promote-Belief is an entailment of Reason-Promote. That is because Reason-
Promote is supposed to be an existence principle about reasons for all manner of  -ings
12Actually, the objection can be put more generally than this. According to the most general version of
the objection, there are sometimes reasons for an agent to  mind (where  mind is some doxastic attitude or
other) even though the agent’s  mind-ing does not promote any K of the relevant kind. For concreteness and
simplicity, I will work through the objection using the attitude of belief, but the objection does not strictly
depend on the relevant doxastic attitude being belief.
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for which there can be reasons. So if Reason-Promote-Belief is false, then so is Reason-
Promote. The objection I am interested in here says that Reason-Promote-Belief is false
because the left-to-right direction of the bi-conditional is false. This is because, according
to the objection, there are sometimes cases where there is a reason for an agent to believe
a proposition even though her believing that proposition does not promote any K of the
relevant kind.13 Here is an example of such a case:
Trivial Belief: As Kim is waiting for the bus, she counts the number of cars
that pass her. Kim’s vision is normal, she is not distracted, and she is suitably
good at counting. She counts sixteen cars.
It seems uncontroversial that, given the details of Trivial Belief the following is true:
Reason for Belief: There is a reason for Kim to believe sixteen cars passed her
as she waited for the bus.
Now, there might be controversy over what the relevant reason for belief actually is.14 But
this controversy does not matter for present purposes. What matters is that it is uncontro-
versial that, in a case like Trivial Belief, there is a reason for Kim to believe that sixteen
cars passed her as she waited. Given this, and given Reason-Promote-Belief, we can derive:
Kim’s Belief Promotes: Kim’s believing that sixteen cars passed her as she
waited for the bus promotes a K of the relevant kind.
The trouble for promotionalism is that it is unclear what the K is supposed to be that is
promoted by Kim’s believing that sixteen cars passed her as she waited for the bus. Intu-
itively, at least, there is no desire that is promoted by Kim’s so believing – it is not as if
Kim counted the cars that passed her because she desired to form a true belief about their
number. And intuitively there is not any objective value that is promoted by Kim’s belief –
it is, after all, a trivial belief.
13Thomas Kelly has recently leveled a version of this objection against what he calls ‘instrumentalist,’ and
what we would call ‘desire-promotionalist,’ views of epistemic rationality. See Kelly (2003, 2007).
14See fn. 4.
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This means that the promotionalist faces a challenge. At first glance, it seems there
are two ways out for the promotionalist: either she can explain why the intuitive Reason for
Belief is in fact false, or she can give an account of the K that is promoted by Kim’s belief.
Actually, the situation is more pressing. This is because the problem for the promotionalist
is quite general. Not only is it overwhelmingly intuitive in the case at hand that Reason for
Belief is true, but also, since the setup of the case was perfectly arbitrary, if a promotionalist
tries to convince us that Reason for Belief is false in the case at hand, we can continue to
add additional details to Trivial Belief that secure the truth of Reason for Belief without
(obviously) securing the truth of the claim that Kim’s belief promotes anything at all. And
then the promotionalist will still be stuck with the challenge of saying what it is that is
supposed to be promoted by Kim’s belief. Quite generally, then, the promotionalist owes us
a story about what the K is that is promoted by the attitude of belief, whether in Kim’s case,
in similar cases of trivial belief, or even in perfectly ordinary cases of belief. In other words,
the case of Kim’s belief makes the challenge of giving an account of what is supposed to be
promoted by the attitude of belief especially pressing – since in this case it seems intuitively
obvious that no desire or value is promoted – but even if the promotionalist can respond to
this case by tweaking its details, and so by denying Reason for Belief, she still faces the
challenge of saying what, in general, is supposed to be promoted by the attitude of belief.
There are two strategies that promotionalists can and have used to reply to this chal-
lenge. Each of these strategies represents a different way of trying to spell out what the K
is that is promoted by the attitude of belief. In what follows I will lay out these strategies
and comment briefly on each. My interest here is not in arguing that these strategies fail
as replies. In the end, I am willing to grant for the sake of argument that one or either will
work, though along the way I will mention some difficulties each strategy faces. But even
if these strategies work for the attitude of belief, I will argue in the next section that they
cannot be adopted to reply to a related challenge that arises for attitudes other than belief.
The first strategy is what I will call the Special K strategy. According to the Special K
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strategy, there are special epistemic or cognitive desires, ends, goals, or values. The idea,
then, is that Kim’s believing sixteen cars passed her as she waited for the bus promotes
one of these special epistemic or cognitive desires, ends, goals, or values. Quite generally,
the thought is that the attitude of belief promotes one of these special epistemic desires,
ends, or values. What would the details of the Special K strategy look like? That depends
on whether one is a desire-promotionalist or a value-promotionalist. If one was a desire-
promotionalist, one could hold that all agents, all of the time, have the epistemic end,
desire, or goal of believing all and only the true propositions.15 One problem with this
idea, briefly, is that, if agents do in fact possess such an epistemic end, desire, or goal,
then its nature is radically different from other sorts of ends, desires, and goals that agents
possess. For instance, the epistemic end of believing what is true does not seem to “weigh
up” against other ends agents possess: the end of believing what is true is not supposed,
on this picture, to be weighed against the prudential end of, say, believing what it is useful
to believe. But then the desire-promotionalist who thinks there is such an end faces an
additional argumentative burden: she must explain the sense in which this peculiar non-
weighing end is, in reality, an end that we can appropriately ascribe to agents.16
The value-promotionalist way of pursuing the Special K strategy might seem to be
more promising, because it can avoid saying that agents have distinctively epistemic ends,
desires, or goals. The value-promotionalist could instead hold that that true beliefs have
a distinctive epistemic value.17 But the value-promotionalist faces her own problems in
deploying the Special K strategy: for one thing, it is notoriously difficult to say what the
distinctively epistemic value of true belief comprises. While it is fairly uncontroversial that
true beliefs often have instrumental value in helping agents achieve their desired ends, this
platitude does not help in the present case. That is because, in order to work as a reply to
15Foley (1987) seems to have a view like this.
16Owens (2003) makes this point in the course of arguing that there is no ‘aim’ or ‘goal’ of belief.
17For instance, this seems to be the kind of idea Alston (2005) and Lynch (2009) have in mind.
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the challenge, this version of the Special K strategy needs to show that in every case true
belief has a value: that true beliefs have what is usually called intrinsic or final and not just
instrumental value. It needs to show this in order to account for why this value is promoted
not just in cases where believing truly contributes to the satisfaction of an agent’s desires,
ends, or goals, but also in cases (as in Trivial Belief) where there does not appear to be
any straightforward connection between believing truly and the satisfaction of an agent’s
ends, desires, or goals. But accounting for epistemic value as a kind of final, or intrinsic,
value is itself fraught with difficulty. For instance, it will not do to insist that we regard
true belief as valuable for its own sake. For all this shows, we might be mistaken about
so regarding it; but since promotionalism entails that there is a reason only if something is
actually promoted, the fact that we (systematically, universally, without exception) regard
true belief as if it promoted a value will not by itself do the trick. These considerations do
not tell decisively against the Special K strategy. I mention them only to draw attention to
the fact that providing an account of the epistemic end, desire, goal, or value that is always
promoted by agents’ true beliefs is not as straightforward as it might at first have seemed.
In the face of such difficulties, promotionalists might try a second strategy of reply,
what I will call the Modal strategy. The Modal strategy eschews the attempt to identify
special epistemic ends, desires, goals, or values. Instead, according to the Modal strategy,
the thing to do is to focus on the role played by true beliefs in promoting any desire or ob-
jective value whatever.18 Mark Schroeder explains the Modal strategy like this:19 whatever
the specific content of an agent’s desires, there are some propositions such that believing
truly about those propositions promotes the agent’s desires. This much is uncontroversial.
18This strategy seems to be suggested first by Nozick (1993). It has more recently been endorsed in
various forms by Kornblith (2002) and Schroeder (2007c). But see fn. 19 below on Schroeder’s use of the
strategy.
19Schroeder does not actually endorse the Modal strategy when it comes to accounting for reasons for
doxastic attitudes like belief; instead, he uses the strategy to account for agent-neutral moral reasons. See
Schroeder (2007c, esp. Chapter 6). But I am interested here in the strategy, not in the use to which Schroeder
puts it.
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And while there are many propositions believing the truth about which does not directly
promote an agent’s desires, believing falsely about these propositions can lead the agent
into error about other propositions. And similarly for those other propositions: believing
falsely about those propositions might lead an agent into error about still further proposi-
tions. But then, given a relatively weak assumption about the holism of belief formation,
this means that an agent’s believing the truth about any given proposition will promote – at
least to some degree – the satisfaction of the agent’s desires, no matter what their content.
This is because believing the truth about any given proposition promotes believing the truth
about other propositions which in turn promotes believing the truth about... and so on until
we get to propositions believing the truth about which promotes directly the satisfaction of
any given specific desire.20 A similar story can be told on behalf of the value-promotionalist
that thinks the relevant K promoted is not a desire or end, but instead an objective value.
Notice that however we tell it, this story is suitably general while avoiding the difficulties
associated with the Special K strategy. It does not depend on thinking that all agents all of
the time have some specific epistemic ends or desires that are promoted by their believing
truly about any proposition whatever, nor does it depend on thinking that true beliefs always
everywhere have intrinsic, non-instrumental value. Instead, it only depends on thinking (i)
that for any desire (objective value) whatever, there are some propositions such that believ-
ing truly about those propositions promotes the satisfaction of that desire (realization of
that value), and (ii) belief formation is suitably holistic.
Above I mentioned some difficulties with pursuing the Special K strategy. There are
also a range of difficulties associated with pursuing the Modal strategy.21 For one thing,
it does not seem to allow for the possibility of reasons for orphaned beliefs, i.e., beliefs
that are not themselves involved in the formation of other beliefs. For another, adopting
20Schroeder (2007c, pp. 113-114).
21For an outline of some of these difficulties, see Evers (2009); Shafer-Landau (2012); McPherson (2012).
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it requires accepting a controversial thesis about the weight of reasons.22 Interesting as
they are, these difficulties with the Special K and Modal strategies are irrelevant at present.
That is because I am willing to grant that one or other of these two strategies will be
successful. Perhaps it is correct that agents have special epistemic ends, desires or goals.
Or perhaps it is correct that believing the truth about any proposition whatever will, via
the holism of belief formation, promote the satisfaction (realization) of any desire (value)
whatever. Perhaps both ideas are correct. As I am about to argue, the real problem with
promotionalism is not that it cannot account for reasons for belief, but instead that it cannot
account for reasons for attitudes like admiration, fear, blame, and so on. So I will proceed
under the assumption that promotionalists can successfully reply to the objection we have
been considering, either by means of the Special K, the Modal, or some third strategy. I
turn now to a second, related, objection to promotionalism, one that I think is fatal to the
view.
4.4 Second Objection: Reasons for Fitting Attitudes
Promotionalism can seem intuitive, even obvious, when it comes to reasons for action
like Jana and Tim’s reasons. And perhaps it can be made to work when it comes to reasons
for belief like Kim’s reason. But reasons for action and reasons for belief are just two
sorts of reasons. There are also reasons for non-doxastic attitudes like admiration, fear,
blame, and so on. To say that these attitudes are non-doxastic is not to say that they do
not (at least sometimes) involve belief. It is to say that, whatever else possession of these
attitudes involves, it is not only the possession of certain beliefs. For instance, it is difficult
to say what, precisely, admiring someone involves. But whatever we say about this, we can
safely say that admiring a person involves being attitudinally related to them in a distinctive
way that does not simply amount to being credally related to certain propositions. Thus
while admiring a person might sometimes (or even always) involve having certain beliefs
22Schroeder (2007c).
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(plausibly, about the person), admiring a person is not exhausted by having certain beliefs.
That is what I mean when I say that admiration is a non-doxastic attitude. Quite generally,
an attitude is a non-doxastic attitude in the relevant sense when the possession of any (set
of) beliefs is not sufficient for possessing the relevant attitude.
As I said, there are sometimes reasons for non-doxastic attitudes: reasons to admire,
to fear, to blame, and so on. Let us focus our attention on reasons for these non-doxastic
attitudes by restricting Reason-Promote to cover just those reasons:
Reason-Promote-ND-Attitude: There is a reason for A to  mind (where  mind-
ing is any non-doxastic attitude) iff A’s  mind-ing promotes a K of the relevant
kind.
Reason-Promote-ND-Attitude is an entailment of Reason-Promote. That is because Reason-
Promote is supposed to be an existence principle about reasons for all manner of  -ings for
which there can be reasons. So if Reason-Promote-ND-Attitude is false, then so is Reason-
Promote. The objection I am interested in here says that Reason-Promote-ND-Attitude is
false because the left-to-right direction of the bi-conditional is false. This is because, ac-
cording to the objection, there are sometimes cases where there is a reason for an agent to
 mind even though her  mind-ing does not promote any K of the relevant kind. In order
to see how this objection works, let us focus our attention on the non-doxastic attitude of
admiration. Here is a case involving reasons for admiring:
Trivial Admiration: Jon has never met, nor will he ever meet, Thomas. Thomas
works tirelessly to alleviate suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and
medical care.
It seems uncontroversial that, given the details of Trivial Admiration the following is true:
Reason for Admiration: There is a reason for Jon to admire Thomas.
Now, there might be controversy over what the reason for admiration actually is.23 But this
controversy does not matter for present purposes. What matters is that it is uncontroversial
23See fn. 4.
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that, in a case like Trivial Admiration, there is a reason for Jon to admire Thomas. There
might also be a controversy over whether the reason there is for Jon to admire Thomas
is a reason Jon has.24 But, again, this controversy does not matter for present purposes.
What matters is that it is uncontroversial that, in case like Trivial Admiration, regardless of
whether the reason is one that Jon in the relevant sense posseses, there is a reason for Jon to
admire Thomas. The existence of this reason is guaranteed, in part, by the fact that Thomas
is, by hypothesis, admirable: he works tirelessly to alleviate suffering and death from lack
of food, shelter, and medical care. We could also put this point in the following way: just
as true propositions merit belief, admirable persons merit admiration. And if an attitude
is merited, then there is a reason to have it.25 Of course, promotionalism is a view about
when there are reasons for attitudes. What promotionalism says is that there is a reason to
have an attitude just in case the attitude promotes a K of the relevant kind. In Jon’s case,
given Reason-Promote-ND-Attitude, this means we can derive:
Jon’s Admiration Promotes: Jon’s admiring Thomas promotes a K of the
relevant kind.
The trouble for promotionalism is that it is unclear what the K is supposed to be that is
promoted by Jon’s admiring Thomas. Intuitively, at least, there is no desire that is promoted
by Jon’s so admiring. And intuitively there is not any objective value that is promoted by
Jon’s admiring Thomas. This means that the promotionalist faces a challenge similar to the
one she faced in the case of belief.
At first glance, it might appear that there are two ways out for the promotionalist: ei-
ther she can explain why the intuitive Reason for Admiration is in fact false, or she can
give an account of the K that is promoted by Jon’s admiring Thomas. But, as with the
24For more on what it takes to have a reason, see the opposing accounts in Schroeder (2011); Lord (2010).
25Note that by saying this I am not commiting to a so-called Fitting-Attitude analysis of value. It does
not follow from the claim that an attitude’s being merited entails there is a reason to have it that the attitude’s
being merited just is a matter of there being a reason to have it. I take it the former is uncontroversial,
expressing what amounts to a conceptual truth about the connection between reasons and values, whereas the
latter is controversial because it purports to analyze one concept (value) in terms of the other (reasons).
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case of belief, this appearance is misleading: the situation is more pressing. Not only is it
overwhelmingly intuitive in the case at hand that Reason for Admiration is true, but also,
since the setup of the case was perfectly arbitrary, if a promotionalist tries to convince us
that Reason for Admiration is false in the case at hand, we can continue to add additional
details to Trivial Admiration that secure the truth of Reason for Admiration without (obvi-
ously) securing the truth of the claim that Jon’s admiring Thomas promotes anything at all.
And then the promotionalist will still be stuck with the challenge of saying what it is that is
supposed to be promoted by Jon’s admiration. The promotionalist therefore owes us a story
about what the K is that is promoted by the attitude of admiration, whether in Jon’s case,
in similar cases of trivial admiration, or even in perfectly ordinary cases of admiration. In
other words, Jon’s case makes the challenge of giving an account of what is supposed to
be promoted by the attitude of admiration especially pressing – since in this case it seems
intuitive that no desire or value is promoted – but even if the promotionalist can respond
to this case by tweaking its details, and so by denying Reason for Admiration, she still
faces the challenge of saying what, in general, is supposed to be promoted by the attitude
of admiration when there is a reason to have that attitude.
Actually – here is where things depart from the case of belief – the challenge is even
more general. To see this, notice that nothing in the setup of the challenge depended on
the relevant non-doxastic attitude being the attitude of ‘admiration’. Indeed, we could
have picked any other non-doxastic attitude for which we think there can be reasons and
generated a symmetrical challenge for the promotionalist. What this means is that, for each
non-doxastic attitude for which there can be reasons, the promotionalist owes us an account
of what, in general, is supposed to be the K that is promoted by that attitude when there is a
reason to have that attitude. For instance, if we think there can be reasons to fear to blame,
and so on, then we are owed an account about what is promoted by the attitude of fear, by
the attitude of blame, and so on, when there are reasons to have these attitudes.
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In short, my objection to promotionalism is that there is no good promotionalist ac-
count of what is promoted by the relevant non-doxastic attitudes. Before arguing for this
conclusion, it is worth distinguishing two possible approaches the promotionalist might
take to giving such an account. One sort of approach is piecemeal: according to this ap-
proach, the K that is promoted by admiration when there is reason to admire is a different
K than is promoted by fear when there is reason to fear, which is in turn different from the
K that is promoted by blame when there is reason to blame, and so on. A second sort of
approach is wholesale: according to this approach, the K that is promoted by admiration
when there is reason to admire is the very same K that is promoted by fear when there is
reason to fear, by blamewhen there is reason to blame, and so on. In what follows I will not
concern myself with the differences between the piecemeal and the wholesale approaches
to giving an account. This is because I am going to argue that the non-doxastic attitudes do
not promote any of the relevant kinds of K when there is reason to have them: that is, I will
argue that it is false that, when there is reason to have a non-doxastic attitudes, having the
attitude promotes either desires or objective values, whether these are supposed to be the
same desires or objective values for all non-doxastic attitudes or different for each.
Despite being more general, this challenge to the promotionalist clearly has the same
form as the challenge in the case of belief. So the sensible promotionalist will no doubt
want to try out one of the two strategies from the case of belief – outlined above – in
replying to it. Unfortunately, whatever their merits in the case of belief, neither the Special
K nor the Modal strategy is any help here. It is easy to see why.
Consider first the Special K strategy. Recall, there were two ways of pursuing the Spe-
cial K strategy for belief corresponding to whether one was a desire- or a value-promotionalist.
According to the desire-promotionalist idea, there are special epistemic desires, such as the
desire to believe all and only the true propositions, such that those desires are promoted by
beliefs for which there are reasons. According to the value-promotionalist idea, there are
special epistemic values, such as the epistemic value of true belief, such that those values
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are promoted by beliefs for which there are reasons. The success of the Special K strat-
egy for belief therefore required thinking either that (i) agents have special epistemic de-
sires, ends, or goals or that (ii) special epistemic values are promoted by beliefs for which
there are reasons. There are two corresponding ways of pursuing the Special K strategy
here, in the case of non-doxastic attitudes like admiration, depending on whether one is a
desire- or a value-promotionalist. According to the desire-promotionalist idea, there are
special admiration-related desires, ends, or goals, such that those desires, ends, or goals
are promoted by instances of admiration for which there are reasons, i.e., instances of mer-
ited admiration. According to the value-promotionalist idea, there are special admiration-
related values, such that those values are promoted by instances of merited admiration. The
success of the Special K strategy for admiration therefore requires thinking either that (i)
agents have special admiration-related desires, ends or goals, or that (ii) special admiration-
related values are promoted by merited admirings.
Now, whatever you think about the truth of (i) or (ii) when it comes to belief, it seems
clear that (i) and (ii) are false when it comes to admiration. With respect to (i): while
there might be a case to be made that all agents, all of the time, desire to, or have the
end of, say, ‘believing all and only the true propositions,’ it is hard to see what parallel
case there is that all agents, all of the time, desire to, or have the end of ‘admiring all and
only the admirable things.’ Worse, even if you thought such a case was available for the
attitude of ‘admiration,’ the generality of the problem means that the same case needs to be
available for all the other non-doxastic attitudes for which there can be reasons, including
the attitudes of fear and blame. But it simply is not true that all agents, all of the time,
desire to, or have the end of, e.g., ‘fearing all and only the fearful things’ or ‘blaming all
and only the blameworthy things’. Nor, I take it, do we think that all agents all of the time
have a standing general desire or end that encompasses these specific desires, such as the
desire for any of their attitudes, that that attitude be merited. To see this, notice that it
is possible to conceive of an agent with a coherent and consistent set of desires who, say,
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desires to admire her boss only on the condition that some advantage acrues to her by doing
so. Insofar as we think such an agent is possible, then we do not think that all agents all
of the time have a standing general desire for any of their attitudes that it be merited. And,
of course, we do think such agents are possible: they are the bugbear of much of modern
moral philosophy.
What about the idea (ii) that instances of admiration for which there are reasons pro-
mote special admiration-related values? Again, there is something to be said for the idea
that epistemic value represents a distinctive kind of intrinsic value promoted by beliefs for
which there are reasons. But the parallel idea in the case of admiration is not only opaque,
it is positively mysterious. What is the distinctive kind of intrinsic value supposed to be
such that that value is promoted by admiring all and only those things that merit admira-
tion? A natural, but mistaken, idea is that merited admirings, e.g., Jon’s admiring Thomas,
promote the distinctive admiration-related value of ‘having admiration toward all and only
those things that merit admiration.’ The problem with this idea is that it is unclear what the
status of this value is supposed to be. There is an intuitive sense in which true belief has
a distinctive value beyond its contribution to instrumental value; I seriously doubt whether
there is a corresponding sense in which merited admiration has a distinctive value beyond
its contribution to instrumental value.
Now consider the Modal strategy. In response to the challenge for belief, the Modal
strategy eschewed an attempt to identify special epistemic ends, desires, goals, or values.
Instead, according to the Modal strategy, the important thing to focus on is the role played
by true beliefs in promoting any desire or objective value whatever. The success of the
strategy, recall, depended on thinking that, no matter what the content of the relevant desires
or objective values, true beliefs will, given a relatively weak hypothesis about the holism
of belief formation, promote those desires or values. The idea, recall, was that, for any
given desire (value, etc.), there are some propositions such that believing truly about those
propositions would promote the satisfaction of that desire (value). This idea, together with
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the claim that believing falsely about any given proposition could, given the holism of
belief formation, lead one into error about the propositions true belief about which directly
promotes a given desire (value), yields the conclusion that true belief about any given
proposition promotes (at least to some degree) the satisfaction of any given desire (value).
How would this strategy work in the present case? The first step would be to focus on
the role played by merited non-doxastic attitudes in promoting any desire or objective
value whatever. The idea, then, would be that, no matter what the content of the relevant
desires or objective values, merited non-doxastic attitudes (such as admiration directed at
admirable things) will, given a relatively weak hypothesis about the holism of attitude-
formation, promote those desires or values. Unfortunately, this strategy fails in the present
case, and for obvious reasons.
What made the Modal strategy work in the case of belief was the tight connection
between true belief and the successful promotion of desires, ends, goals, or values. But
there is no symmetrically tight connection between merited non-doxastic attitudes such as
admiration and the successful promotion of desires, ends, goals, or values. In particular, it
is not true that, for any given desire (value, etc.) there are some things such that admiring
those things if and only if they are admirable promotes the satisfaction of that desire (value).
Worse, even if it were true that for any given desire (value) there were some things such that
admiring those things iff they are admirable promotes the satisfaction of that desire, it is
not true that admiring any given thing that does not merit admiration can lead one into error
about those things admiration of which promotes the satisfaction of a given desire. Worse
still, even if this were somehow true in the case of admiration, in order for the strategy to
work as a response to the challenge, parallel claims would have to hold in the case of all
the non-doxastic attitudes for which there can be reasons. And such claims clearly do not
hold.
My argument so far only shows that what might seem like two promising strategies for
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replying to the challenge from non-doxastic attitudes on behalf of promotionalism are non-
starters. This does not show that promotionalism has no way to respond to the challenge.
It could be that I have simply overlooked some promising strategy of reply. Maybe the
problem is not as bad as it seems. Unfortunately, I think it is as bad as it seems. Here is
why: According to promotionalism, the existence of reasons for an attitude is guaranteed
by the existence of a particular relationship between the attitude and either desire or value,
viz. the relationship of the former promoting the latter. But what the case of merited
non-doxastic attitudes illustrates is that, sometimes at least, the existence of reasons for an
attitude is guaranteed not by a relationship of promotion between the attitude and desire or
value, but instead by a relationship of fittingness between the attitude and its object. And
the fact that an attitude, e.g., Jon’s admiration, fits its object, e.g., Thomas, in this way does
not guarantee that the attitude promotes anything at all. This means that, as an existence
principle about reasons, promotionalism is hopeless, since there will always be possible
cases in which there are reasons for an attitude – in particular, when the attitude fits its
object – but where having the attitude is not guaranteed to promote anything at all. Let me
make one final remark about my argument. Then I will address the issue of what, if I am
right, my argument against promotionalism shows.
I claimed much earlier in the paper (§2) that, although I would be assuming a probab-
listic conception of promotion, my argument against promotionalism would not depend on
any particular conception of what it takes for one thing to promote another. I am now in
a position to make good on that claim. My argument against promotionalism turns on the
idea that, for some attitudes, at least some of the time, the existence of reasons for those
attitudes is guaranteed simply by the existence of a relationship of fit between the attitude
and its object. The crucial claim is that promotionalism makes a hash of this idea, since it
requires for the existence of reasons that an attitude promotes a desire, end, goal, or value.
Now, although I think it is easiest to see how promotionalism goes wrong in the cases I
give with a probablistic conception of promotion in mind, such a conception is not actually
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required. All that is required is the intuitive idea that an attitude’s promoting a desire or
value can come apart from an attitude’s fitting its object. And all that is required for that
thought is that our concept of one thing promoting another – however this is, in the end, to
be analyzed – be distinct from our concept of one thing fitting another – however this is to
be cashed out (more on this below). I take it that this is true of our concepts of promotion
and fit. So while my argument proceeds on the assumption that promotion is a matter of
increasing probability, it does not depend on it.
4.5 Replacing Promotionalism and Diagnosing its Mistake
Recall:
Reason-Promote: There is a reason for an agent, A, to   (where  -ing is an
action or an attitude) iff A’s  -ing promotes a K of the relevant kind.
I just argued that Reason-Promote was false because one of its entailments, viz. Reason-
Promote-ND-Attitude was false. What does this show? One thing it shows is that we
cannot be promotionalists about all sorts of reasons. This might strike us as at the very
least disappointing, especially if we thought, as it seems plausible to think, that a satisfac-
tory general account of reasons will apply equally well to reasons for actions, for doxastic
attitudes, and for non-doxastic attitudes.26 It would be an unhappy result, that is, if there
were no explanatory unity to be found among the reasons, if there were no single existence
principle about reasons that expressed a truth about when there exist reasons for agents
to  , whether  -ing is an action, a doxastic attitude like belief, or a non-doxastic attitude
like admiration. So if we want to avoid this unhappy result, what sort of -ists should we
be? Is there a replacement principle for Reason-Promote that does better with respect to
26Now, it may be that some of philosophers I gave as examples of promotionalists (§1 above) do not
want to be understood as promotionalists about all sorts of reasons. Mark Schroeder, at least, is officially
non-committal on this point, saying that although his hunch is that the same “kind” of treatment he gives
to reasons for action should apply also to reasons for doxastic (and presumably non-doxastic) attitudes, he
remains officially neutral on this point. See his Schroeder (2007c, p. 113, fn. 16). The way to think about the
upshot of my argument in relation to Schroeder, then, is that it shows that we should not be neutral on this
point: whatever general treatment of reasons we give, if it is to be fully general, it cannot be promotionalist.
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all the reasons? I think there is, and I think once we have this principle in front of us, it
will be easy to diagnose what went wrong with promotionalism. In order to introduce my
alternative, let me rehearse some plattitudes about the connections between three normative
concepts: standards of correctness, correctness, and reasons.
Standards of correctness and correctness are related in the following way: a standard
of correctness is a standard that says what a thing must be like if it is to be correct. For
instance, an agent’s belief is correct iff it conforms to the standards of correctness for
belief; similarly, an agent’s action is correct iff it conforms to the standards of correctness
for action. The same is true for any   such that we can evaluate  -ing in terms of its
conformance to standards of correctness. We can formalize this idea like so:
Conform-Correct: A’s  -ing conforms to the standard of correctness for  -ing
iff A’s  -ing is correct.
Correctness and reasons are also related: whether there is a reason to   depends on whether
 -ing would be correct. If  -ing is incorrect, then there is not a reason to do it, and if  -ing
is correct then, whatever else may be true of it, there is a reason to do it. This just amounts
to the idea that whether there is a reason to   depends on whether or not there is anything
that counts in favor of (the correctness) of  -ing. We can express this in the following way:
Reason-Correct: There is a reason for A to   iff A’s  -ing is correct.
Together, Conform-Correct and Reason-Correct yield both a replacement for promotional-
ism, and a diagnosis of why promotionalism might have seemed attractive, if it did. Putting
these together, we get:
Reason-Conform: There is a reason for A to   iff A’s  -ing conforms to the
standard of correctness for  -ing.
Now, my suggestion is that, rather than being promotionalists about reasons who accept
Reason-Promote, we should be conformationalists about reasons who accept Reason-Conform.
That is the kind of -ists I think we should be, if we want to be able to accept a single uni-
fied principle that expresses a truth about when reasons for actions and attitudes exist. I
117
think conformationalism, i.e., the view that accepts Reason-Conform and the principles
that yield it, is pretty uncontroversial: it rests only on plattitudes about the internal connec-
tions between the normative concepts of standards of correctness, correctness, and reasons.
How does all this bear on my arguments against promotionalism? Here is where things get
interesting.
Notice that nothing I have just said depends in any way on a view about what the
substantive content of the standards of correctness are for actions, for beliefs, for non-
doxastic attitudes like admiration, or for anything else we think can be evaluated in terms
of whether or not it is correct. A view about what the substantive content of the standards
of correctness are for actions, beliefs, and so on, amounts to a substantive normative view:
it is a view about when (and why) an action, belief, etc. is correct. There are a wide range
of possible views about what the standards of correctness are for actions, for beliefs, and
so on. You might hold, for instance, that an action is correct when it maximizes utility.27 Or
you might think that a belief is correct when it is true.28 But if you were a promotionalist
of the sort I have been arguing against in this paper, you would have to think that:
Correct-Promote: A’s  -ing is correct iff A’s  -ing promotes a K of the rele-
vant kind.
Correct-Promote is a substantive (though not very substantive) normative view about when
an action, belief, etc. is correct. It says that the substantive content of the standards of
correctness for any  -ing involves promoting some K or other. And, taken together with
Conform-Correct and Reason-Conform (two principles I have said we should all accept),
Correct-Promote yields promotionalism:
Reason-Promote: There is a reason for an agent, A, to   iffA’s  -ing promotes
a K of the relevant kind.
27For instance, this seems to be the view of classical utilitarians like Mill. See Mill (2002).
28Shah (2006, 2003); Shah and Velleman (2005); Wedgwood (2007, 2002) all hold a view along these
lines.
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We can make Correct-Promote (and so Reason-Promote) increasingly substantive by being
increasingly specific about the K that is promoted by  -ing: for instance, by saying that the
kind of K is a desire or a value. This would then yield the different promotionalist views I
have been calling desire- and value-promotionalism. But however specific and correspond-
ingly substantive promotionalists decide to be, what all of this means is that, if I am right,
you might find promotionalism attractive because you accept a substantive normative view
(Correct-Promote, or some more specific version of it) about what the standards of correct-
ness are for actions, beliefs, and a whole range of other attitudes. And what my argument
against promotionalism shows is not that there is no true existence-principle about rea-
sons, but that we should reject promotionalism’s substantive normative views about what
the standards of correctness are for, e.g., non-doxastic attitudes like admiration. We should
reject the substantive normative claim that the standards of correctness for non-doxastic at-
titudes involve promotion (of either a desire or a value). Once we reject this claim, we are
left with just Reason-Conform; that is, we are left being conformationalists about reasons.
4.6 Conclusion
In closing, let me recap. Promotionalism is a view accepted by a wide range of
philosophers with otherwise disparate views about reasons and rationality. And it is an
intuitive view: the existence of some reasons to   seems obviously to depend on whether
or not something or other is promoted by  -ing. Reasons for belief might appear to be
an exception to the view: it can seem puzzling what, if anything, is promoted by agents’
beliefs. I argued that this puzzle can (probably) be resolved by promotionalists, either by
adopting the Special K strategy, according to which there are special epistemic desires,
ends, goals, or values that are promoted by belief, or by adopting the Modal strategy, ac-
cording to which beliefs play a role in promoting any desire or value whatever, no matter
what the content of those desires or values.
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But accounting for reasons for belief only postpones the problems with promotional-
ism. That is because, as I argued, there are some reasons for attitudes, in particular, reasons
for non-doxastic attitudes like admiration, that cannot be accounted for by promotionalism.
Neither the Special K nor the Modal strategy is any help in accounting for these reasons.
This is because reasons for these non-doxastic attitudes seem to exist not in virtue of a rela-
tionship of promotion between the attitudes and desires, ends, goals, or values, but instead
in virtue of a relationship of fit between the attitudes and their objects.
I suggested that reflecting on some plattitudes about the connection between stan-
dards of correctness, correctness, and reasons both reveals an alternative to promotional-
ism, which I call conformationalism about reasons, and reveals why we might have found
promotionalism attractive, to the extent that we did. According to conformationalism, there
is a reason for an agent to   iff  -ing conforms to a standard of correctness for  -ing. And
promotionalism will then seem attractive only if we accept a substantive normative view
about the standards of correctness for non-doxastic attitudes according to which those at-
titudes are correct iff they promote something or other. My argument that promotionalism
cannot account for reasons for these non-doxastic attitudes thus amounts to an argument to
the effect that we should reject such substantive normative views, i.e., views that make the
correctness of non-doxastic attitudes like admiration depend on their promoting a desire,
end, goal, or value. Having rejected such substantive normative views, we are free to en-
dorse conformationalism as the correct view about when reasons exist without running up
against the problems facing promotionalism.
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A PATTERNS OF TRANSMISSION ANDWRONG KIND OF REASONS
SKEPTICISM
Abstract
In a recent article, Jonathan Way has argued for skepticism about the wrong kind of
reasons on the grounds that wrong kind of reason skeptics, but not defenders, can explain
a distinctive pattern of transmission among the wrong kind of reasons. In this paper I
argue that the pattern of transmission Way identifies is not distinctive of the wrong kind
of reasons. I show how wrong kind of reason defenders and skeptics alike can explain the
relevant pattern by appeal to a more general pattern of transmission among reasons.
A.1 Introduction: The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
When it comes to reasons, philosophers disagree over a lot. One thing – perhaps the
only thing – philosophers agree on is the familiar platitude that a reason is a consideration
that counts in favor of what it is a reason for:
Counts-in-Favor: F is a reason to   iff F counts in favor of  -ing.
But, equally familiarly, accepting Counts-in-Favor seems to yield Wrong Kind of Reasons
Problems. For instance, consider the belief that it will rain tomorrow and:
Right: Weather reports say that it will rain tomorrow.
Wrong: A mad billionaire will pay you a substantial sum to believe it will rain
tomorrow.
Intuitively, both R and W count in favor of believing it will rain tomorrow. So, by Counts-
in-Favor, both R andW are reasons to believe it will rain tomorrow. But there is a difference
between R and W: this difference is often captured by saying R is the “right” kind of reason
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to believe it will rain tomorrow, whereas W is the “wrong” kind of reason to so believe.1
This is an example of a Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.2 There is a growing number of
proposed solutions to this problem designed to distinguish, in a principled way, between
the “right” and the “wrong” kind of reasons.3
In a recent article, Jonathan Way takes a different tack.4 Instead of trying to explain
the distinction between the “right” and the “wrong” kind of reasons in a principled manner,
Way argues for a view he calls “Wrong Kind of Reason Skepticism” (WKR Skepticism).
WKR Skepticism is the view that reasons that seem to be the “wrong” kind of reason for
an attitude are not really reasons for the attitude at all, “any more than fool’s gold is gold”.5
Instead, according to WKR Skepticism, the “wrong” kind of reasons for attitudes “are
reasons to want these attitudes, and to bring it about that you have these attitudes, if you
can.”6 Way is not the only WKR Skeptic, but his argument for the position is a novel one.7
According toWay, reflection on different patterns of transmission among reasons reveals an
explanatory challenge that those who think the “wrong” kind of reason are genuine reasons
(WKR Defenders) cannot meet (or at least have not yet met), and that WKR Skeptics can.
In this article I show why Way’s argument for WKR Skepticism doesn’t work.
The plan is this: First I’ll explain Way’s novel argument for WKR Skepticism. Then,
I’ll explain how that argument depends on an assumption about the relationship between
1Hieronymi (2005, 2013); Schroeder (2007c); Sharadin (2014b); Olson (2009, 2004); Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006, 2004); Stratton-Lake (2005); Lang (2008); Reisner (2009); Schroeder (2010);
Way (2012); D’Arms and Jacobson (2000)
2The same problem arises for a range of other attitudes – and, importantly, actions – for which there can
be reasons. Here I’ll focus just on the wrong kind of reasons problem for attitudes.
3See especially Hieronymi (2005, 2013); Stratton-Lake (2005); Schroeder (2010); Sharadin (2014b)
4Way (2012).
5ibid., p. 492
6ibid.
7For some other defenders of WKR skepticism, see Gibbard (1992); Kelly (2002); Parfit (2011b); Shah
(2006).
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reasons, sufficiency, and the attitudes it is rational to have. I’ll then argue that both WKR
Defenders and WKR Skeptics have good reason to reject that assumption. The upshot is
that WKR Defenders are under no pressure fromWKR Skeptics, at least not on the grounds
Way claims. In the final section of the paper I’ll step back from the details and offer some
reflections on the disagreement between WKR Defenders and Skeptics.
A.2 Patterns of Transmission
Way begins his argument by pointing out that reasons sometimes transmit from one
object to another. And they sometimes exhibit distinctive patterns when they do. For
instance, in the case of reasons for action, the following pattern of transmission appears to
hold:
Action Pattern: If there is a reason to  , then the fact that  -ing facilitates
 -ing is a reason to  .8
For instance, if there is a reason to go to the store, then the fact that filling your car’s tank
with gas facilitates going to the store is a reason to fill your tank with gas.9 I have no
quarrel here with the truth of Action Pattern: grant it for the sake of argument. Not only
do reasons for action exhibit patterns of transmission, the right kind of reasons for attitudes
also appear to exhibit structurally isomorphic patterns of transmission. For instance, here
is a pattern of transmission exhibited by the right kind of reasons for intention:
Intention Pattern: If there is a reason of the right kind to intend to  , then the
fact that  -ing facilitates  -ing is a reason of the right kind to intend to  .10
For instance, if there is a reason of the right kind to intend to go the store, then the fact
that filling your car’s tank with gas facilitates going to the store is a reason of the right
8Way (2012, p. 494).
9Way makes several important qualifications regarding this principle. See especially Way (2012, p. 494-
6) These qualifications do not affect my argument in this paper, so I will ignore them in what follows.
10Way (2012, p. 496).
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kind to intend to fill your tank with gas.11 Let’s also grant the Intention Pattern for the
sake of argument. The right kind of reasons for desire also exhibit distinctive patterns of
transmission:
Desire Pattern: If there is a reason of the right kind for you to desire x to  ,
then the fact that y’s  -ing facilitates x’s  -ing is a reason of the right kind for
you to desire y to  .12
For instance, if there is a reason of the right kind to desire your partner to go to the store
(to pickup ingredients for dinner, say), then the fact that your filling your car’s tank with
gas facilitates your partner’s going to the store is a reason of the right kind for you to desire
to fill the tank with gas. So far, so good: let’s also accept the Desire Pattern for the sake of
argument.
Way next invites us to notice that although “wrong kind of reasons do not transmit in
the way that the right kind of reasons do – the patterns we get by replacing ‘right’ with
‘wrong’ in the Intention and Desire Patterns are false . . . putative reasons of the wrong
kind do transmit in other ways”.13 In particular, reflection on cases supports the idea that
(putative) wrong kind of reasons transmit according to the:
Wrong Reason Pattern: If there is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude A,
then the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a reason of the wrong kind
for attitude B.14
Let’s also grant the Wrong Reason Pattern for the sake of argument. Way next claims,
plausibly I think, that the patterns of transmission exhibited by different kinds of reasons
should not be taken as primitive. Instead, “[w]hen reasons of a certain kind have some
distinctive feature, we should expect an account of reasons of that kind to explain that
11The Intention Pattern is subject to the same qualifications as the Action Pattern. See Way (2012, p. 496).
Again, these qualifications do not matter of present purposes.
12Way (2012, p. 497).
13ibid.
14Way (2012, p. 498).
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feature”.15 Way’s idea, then, is that WKR Skeptics, but not WKR Defenders, can explain
the Wrong Reason Pattern. Let’s look first at how WKR Skeptics can explain the Wrong
Reason Pattern.
WKR Skeptics can explain the way in which (putatively) wrong kind of reasons trans-
mit by appealing to the following plausible pattern of transmission among reasons:
Bringing About Pattern: If there is a reason to bring about attitude A, then
the fact that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a reason to bring about attitude
B.16
The Bringing About Pattern is a close cousin of the Action Pattern (whence its plausibility)
and, if true, it allows WKR Skeptics to easily explain why the Wrong Reason Pattern
appears to hold. Here is how: we can move from the Bringing About Pattern to the Wrong
Kind of Reason Pattern by replacing ‘reason to bring about’ with ‘reason of the wrong kind
for’. And WKR Skepticism just is the view that putatively wrong kind of reasons for an
attitude are actually reasons to bring about the attitude. So WKR Skeptics can explain the
distinctive pattern of transmission exhibited by (putatively) wrong kind of reasons by (i)
accepting the Bringing About Pattern and (ii) claiming that putative reasons of the wrong
kind for an attitude just are reasons to bring about the attitude.
What about WKR Defenders – can they explain the Wrong Reason Pattern? Way
thinks not: In the remainder of his article, Way argues that two promising strategies avail-
able to WKR Defenders for explaining the Wrong Reason Pattern are untenable. I won’t
consider those arguments here; instead, I’m going to argue that the Wrong Reason Pattern
isn’t a distinctive pattern of transmission exhibited by the wrong kind of reasons. As I’ll
argue, the Wrong Reason Pattern is explained by our acceptance of a more general pattern
of transmission among reasons. So: WKR Defenders and Skeptics alike can and should
give the same explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern.
15Way (2012, p. 500).
16Way (2012, p. 501).
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A.3 The Mixed Pattern
What is at issue is what explains the Wrong Reason Pattern for WKR Defenders.
As we just saw, WKR Skeptics can explain the Wrong Reason Pattern by appeal to the
Bringing About Pattern and their account of what putative wrong kind of reasons actually
are (they are reasons for bringing about the relevant attitudes). This line of explanation
is not available to WKR Defenders, since explaining the Wrong Reason Pattern in this
way involves giving up on the idea that the wrong kind of reasons for attitudes are genuine
reasons for their respective attitudes. But it could be that the Wrong Reason Pattern follows
from a more general pattern of transmission among reasons such as:
General Pattern: If there is a reason for attitude A, then the fact that attitude
B facilitates attitude A is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude B.17
As Way is aware, the General Pattern, if true, offers WKR Defenders an easy explanation
of the Wrong Reason Pattern. This is because the General Pattern is a combination of two
claims, one of which is the Wrong Reason Pattern, and one of which is the:
Mixed Pattern: If there is a reason of the right kind for attitude A, then the fact
that attitude B facilitates attitude A is a reason of the wrong kind for attitude
B.18
Since we are here granting the truth of the Wrong Reason Pattern (that is the explanandum,
after all), what is at issue in the truth of the General Pattern is the truth of the Mixed
Pattern. If the Mixed Pattern is true, then WKR Defenders can explain the apparent truth
of the Wrong Reason Pattern by our acceptance of the General Pattern, which combines
the Mixed Pattern and the Wrong Reason Pattern. In fact, if the Mixed Pattern is true, both
WKR Defenders and Skeptics can appeal to it to explain the Wrong Reason Pattern.19 So:
17Way (2012, p. 499).
18ibid.
19The explanation of the Wrong Reason Pattern given by WKR Skeptics will in this case be overdeter-
mined: they can explain it both by appealing to the Bringing About Pattern and their account of what the
wrong kind of reasons actually are and by appeal to the Mixed Pattern (and so the General Pattern).
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Is the Mixed Pattern true?
Yes. Here’s an argument to that effect: If there is a reason of the right kind for some
attitude, then there is an instrumental reason to do anything that facilitates having that atti-
tude. This is because it is good to have have attitudes there are right kind of reasons for, and
it is instrumentally good to do what facilitates that which is good. And since instrumental
reasons for attitudes are paradigmatic cases of wrong kind of reasons for attitudes, the fact
that some attitude B facilitates an attitude A for which there is a right kind of reason is,
ceteris paribus, a wrong kind of reason for attitude A. So the Mixed Pattern is true be-
cause, first, it is good to have attitudes which constitute a proper response to one’s reasons
– attitudes for which there is a right kind of reason – and, second, anything that facilitates
properly responding to one’s reasons is instrumentally good and therefore something for
which there is an instrumental (albeit wrong kind of) reason. Way disagrees:
[T]his argument for the Mixed Pattern fails. It may well be good for its own
sake to have attitudes which constitute a proper response to one’s reasons. But
we do not properly respond to our reasons by having attitudes there is merely
some reason for. We properly respond to our reasons only when we have at-
titudes there is sufficient reason for. So the appeal to value of this sort does
not support the claim that it is good for its own sake to have attitudes there is
reason of the right kind for.20
Way is right about two things, but wrong about these two things show. He is right that we
do not properly respond to our reasons by having attitudes there is merely some reason for.
He is also right that we properly respond to our reasons only when we have attitudes there
is sufficient reason for. But this does not show that the Mixed Pattern is false. It would only
show that the Mixed Pattern were false if we also thought that responding to our reasons
by having attitudes was an all or nothing affair. But it isn’t. Let me explain.
Suppose you acquire some evidence, E, that supports proposition P. E is a paradigmatic
right kind of reason to believe that P: after all, it’s evidence that P. So you now have a right
20Way (2012, p. 499-500).
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kind of reason to believe that P. What is the proper response to this reason? The proper
response is to increase your degree of belief, i.e., your credence, in the proposition P. How
much? That depends. It depends, first, on the correct account of how it is evidence should
affect our credences. There’s controversy over what that account is. Here, I’ll assume
that something along the lines of Bayesian conditionalization correctly states how agents’
credential states should be affected by evidence. But nothing depends on Bayesianism
being the correct account. The proper response to E depends, second, on how good of
evidence E is for P. E might be very good evidence that P: for instance, it might entail that
P. In that case, the correct response to E is to be certain that P, i.e., to have a credence of
1 (an “all-out belief”) in P. But E might be less good evidence for P: for instance, it might
make P only slightly more likely to be true. In that case, the correct response to E is to
slightly increase your degree of certainty in P, i.e., to have a slightly higher credence in P.
The details don’t matter. What matters is that properly responding to your reason, E, is a
matter of having of having an attitude there is reason, E, for, even when E is not sufficient
reason for an all-out belief that P: it’s a matter of having a graded attitude of a certain kind
and degree. In this case, it’s a matter of having a credence that P of a certain strength.
It should be clear, then, why we should reject Way’s argument and accept the Mixed
Pattern. AsWay says, we do not properly respond to our reasons by having attitudes such as
“all-out belief” there is merely some reason for. After all, if E is not very good evidence that
P, the correct response to E is not to outright believe that P. Instead, we properly respond to
our reasons only when we have attitudes there is sufficient reason for. But the right kind of
reasons for an attitude are all sufficient reasons for something. In the case of E and P, if E is
even some evidence that P, then it is a sufficient right kind of reason to have an attitude of a
certain kind and degree, viz. a certain (higher) degree of credence in P. Hence if we admit
– as Way does – that it is good to have attitudes that constitute a proper response to one’s
(sufficient) reasons, then it is good to have that degree of credence in P. And so an attitude
that facilitates this proper response will be instrumentally good: it will be an attitude for
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which there is the wrong kind of reason. The Mixed Pattern holds.
It might seem like the preceding discussion depends on idionsyncracies having to do
with belief. In particular, it might seem like my argument depends on belief being an
attitude that, unlike other attitudes, is capable of being graded – of not always being an all
or nothing affair. But notice that this same thing is true with respect to other attitudes for
which there can be reasons. For instance, desire. It is not plausible to suppose that desire
is an all or nothing affair; when we desire something, we desire it to a greater or lesser
degree. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is by comparing the strength of two desires: I
might both desire to attend the concert and desire to live past fifty. If I am as we usually
expect people to be, it makes sense to think of my desire to live past fifty as stronger than
my desire to attend the concert.21 Moreover, the proper response to a right kind of reason
for some desire can be to increase the strength of the desire, much like the proper response
to a right kind of reason for some belief is to increase the degree or strength of the belief.
For example, if I learn that my favorite musician will be making a surprise appearance at
the concert then presumably this is a reason for me to desire to attend the concert. And the
correct response to that reason will be to increase the degree to which I desire to attend the
concert (though presumably not to increase the strength of that desire beyond the strength
of my desire to live past fifty). In these cases, too, the Mixed Pattern holds: if there is the
right kind of reason for me to desire something, then it is good for me to have a desire
of the strength supported by the reason there is; and so the fact that some further attitude
facilitates my having the desire supported by the right kind of reason will be an instrumental
(albeit wrong kind of) reason for the facilitative attitude.
We can also put the point like this: sometimes, the right kind of reason for an attitude
is a sufficient reason for an all-out version of the attitude. In these cases Way has no quarrel
with the claim that the fact that some other attitude would facilitate the all-out attitude is the
21It’s controversial what the strength of a desire amounts to, but that controversy is not germane at present,
since it is uncontroversial that desires come in different strengths.
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wrong kind of reason for the facilitative attitude. And so in these cases the Mixed Pattern
holds. Other times, the right kind of reason for an attitude is not a sufficient reason for an
all-out version of the attitude. In these cases Way is correct that it would not be good to
respond to this reason with an all-out version of the attitude: after all, that is not what the
reason supports. But it does not follow from the fact that a reason is not a sufficient reason
for an all-out version of an attitude that it is not a sufficient reason for any attitude at all.
As we just saw in the case of belief, E might not be a sufficient reason for all-out belief
that P while at the same time being a sufficient reason for some attitude or other, e.g., a
credence of a certain strength. In these cases, although Way is correct that it would not be
good to respond to this reason with an all-out version of the attitude, he is wrong that it
would not be good to respond to this reason with any attitude at all. It would be good to
have the credence supported by the reason. And so the fact that some other attitude would
facilitate this non-all-out attitude is the wrong kind of reason for the facilitative attitude. In
these cases, too, then, the Mixed Pattern holds.
A.4 Concluding Remarks
Distinctive patterns of transmission among reasons of a certain kind shouldn’t go un-
explained by an account of reasons of that kind. I just argued that we should accept the
Mixed Pattern. The Wrong Reason Pattern is the explanandum: it’s what both WKR De-
fenders and Skeptics must explain. If the Mixed Pattern is true, then the Wrong Reason
Pattern is explained by our acceptance of the General Pattern, which combines the Mixed
Pattern and the Wrong Reason Pattern. The upshot is that both WKR Defenders and Skep-
tics can explain theWrong Reason Pattern by pointing to the general pattern of transmission
among reasons. WKR Defenders don’t have an especially hard time of things, paceWay.
Let me close by making two brief remarks. First, although I’ve argued that Way’s case
against WKR Defenders doesn’t work, Way’s contribution shouldn’t be ignored. For one
thing, it’s possible that there is some other distinctive pattern of transmission among the
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wrong kind of reasons that WKR Skeptics, but not WKR Defenders, can explain. I doubt
that there is, but this is a possibility certainly worth exploring. In any case, even if there is
no distinctive pattern of transmission explicable only by adopting WKR Skepticism, Way
is correct to direct our attention to the patterns of transmission that hold among reasons.
Identifying and reflecting on these patterns can help shed light on the nature of reasons; for
instance, it may be that reflecting on the patterns of transmission among reasons can help
shed light on how and when reasons of different kinds combine. But exploring either of
these two possibilities is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, a quick word on the disagreement between WKR Defenders and Skeptics.
WKR Defenders and Skeptics alike agree on the existence of a distinctive class of facts
defined in terms of its extension. WKR Defenders think these facts constitute genuine
reasons of a distinctive kind. Their task, then, is to say what distinguishes these facts as
reasons from facts that constitute reasons of a more ordinary kind, and to explain what
results this has for our normative thinking in terms of reasons. WKR Skeptics think these
facts constitute reasons, but not of any distinctive kind, only with a distinctive content;
recall, according to WKR Skepticism alleged wrong kind of reasons are reasons to try and
bring about the relevant attitudes, but not genuine reasons for the attitudes themselves.
In some ways, this disagreement between WKR Defenders and Skeptics obscures their
agreement on a host of other issues. For example, WKR Skeptics, no less than WKR
Defenders, also face the task of explaining what results the discovery of a class of reasons
with a distinctive content has with respect to our normative thinking in terms of reasons.
The task will take a different shape for WKR Defenders and Skeptics, but it is aimed at the
same goal: providing us with the best possible understanding of our normative thought and
talk in terms of reasons. So I’m hopeful that progress by one camp can be used to make
progress by the other.
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